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Abstract 
 
 
 
The primary purpose of this thesis was to improve the data analysis of Motor 
Vehicle Crashes (MVCs).  This thesis employed the Air Force Safety Center (AFSC) 
data, collected over 20 years, of MVCs in which US Air Force (USAF) military 
personnel are involved when off duty and off base.  Categorical Data Analysis and 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) were applied to identify risk factors related to MVCs 
and influence the severity of injuries and those factors associated with the alcohol 
consumption before driving, and affect the number of lost workdays resulting from 
MVCs. 
Categorical Data Analysis showed that male USAF members aged 17-24 years 
or with the rank of Airman were more prone to experience a fatal MVC.  Moreover, 
fatal MVCs peaked between the hours of 2200 pm to 0559 am, and USAF female 
drivers seemed to wear seatbelts more than USAF male drivers.  These thesis results 
revealed the value of wearing seatbelts for the prevention of severe injuries during 
crashes.  Finally, ANOVA results exposed that the more severe the Type of Injury, the 
greater the number of Lost Days and that 2-wheeled vehicle MVCs have the most 
significant effect on the number of Lost Days.      
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ANALYSIS AND MODELING OF MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES INVOLVING 
AIR FORCE MILITARY PERSONNEL 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
 
Background 
 Universally, road networks offer people a high level of mobility essential for 
improved quality of life, national economic growth, and development.  Road network 
construction also limits the isolation of cities and regions.  However, road networks 
are one of the most significant places in which millions of people, especially those in 
younger age groups, are involved in Motor Vehicle Crashes (MVCs) resulting in 
fatalities and a multitude of injuries.  According to World Health Organization 
(WHO) statistics, 1.2 million people are killed on roads every year and up to 50 
million more are injured (WHO, 2008).  Annual fatalities due to MVCs are expected 
to reach 2.4 million by the year 2030 and to increase from the 9th cause of death in 
2004 to the 5th cause by 2030 (WHO, 2008: 29-30).     
The private motor vehicle is the primary means of personal transportation in 
our world.  Unfortunately, since people have to operate a motor vehicle in their 
everyday lives, in order to travel to work, school or vacation, to visit friends, to go 
shopping or for general enjoyment and relaxation, they put themselves at a high risk 
of being involved in a MVC.   
The United States (US) has enormous and rambling road networks that not 
only provide an unprecedented degree of mobility for its citizens and visitors, but also 
a high risk of MVC occurrence.  The US is one of the countries that face this social 
2 
problem at a serious and alarming level.  According to the “Traffic Safety Facts 
Annual Report” issued by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA), from Fiscal Year (F.Y.) 1997 to F.Y. 2006, the US had on average, 6.3 
million MVCs, 42,300 deaths and 2.9 million injuries per year.  
MVCs and their regrettable consequences are one of the gravest issues that the 
Military Services and the Department of Defense (DoD) have faced for many years 
now.  MVCs are the leading cause of fatalities among the members of the Military 
Services (DoD, 1999: 2-35, 2-45, 2-55; 2-65).  Based on US Air Force Safety Center 
(AFSC) data, during the period from F.Y. 1988 until F.Y. 2007, the US Air Force 
reported 12,403 Private Motor Vehicle (PMV) mishaps in which US Air Force 
military personnel had been involved when off duty and off base.  These mishaps 
have left 1,104 people dead, 242 people completely or partially disabled, and 12,088 
people with various types of injuries.   
Without taking into account the number of lost workdays which have been 
caused by the fatalities and the cases of permanent total or partial disability, the above 
number of PMV mishaps resulted in 152,252 lost workdays, of which 52,398 were 
hospitalization days.  Also, the AFSC estimation of the total direct costs for these 
crashes is about $417 million.   
First of all, MVCs fatalities and injuries influence the victims’ lives, their 
families, friends, the military and society.  Each and every MVC in which an airman 
is involved, independent of its direct consequences, negatively affects Air Force 
power and capacity to fulfill missions.  Lost productivity due to workplace disruption 
and additional costs for medical and rehabilitation services are some of the MVCs’ 
consequences which not only affect the Air Force budget but also have a financial 
impact upon the taxpayers. 
3 
MVCs are complex events and rarely can a single cause of such an incident be 
found.  MVCs are the result of a combination of factors such as human factors, 
roadway environment factors, and vehicle factors.  The age, the gender and the 
comparative experience, or lack thereof, of the driver, speeding and other traffic 
violations, as well as driver impairment such as the effect of alcohol or other drug 
abuse are some of the human factors that can cause a MVC.  Furthermore, driver 
inattention or failure to use occupant protection systems such as a safety belt or 
motorcycle helmet, and an aberrant driver’s behavior can influence the risk of a MVC 
event and injury severity. 
Following human factors, the roadway environment is the 2nd most prevalent 
factor contributing to MVCs.  According to the General Accounting Office (GAO) the 
roadway environment includes the design of the roadway, roadside hazards, and the 
roadway condition (GAO, 03-436: 20).  Finally, the factor which is believed to 
contribute less towards MVCs than driver or roadway environment factors is the 
vehicle.  More specifically, the vehicle factor is associated with vehicle related 
failures and vehicle design including size and safety characteristics (GAO, 03-436: 
26-32 & Evans, 1991: 64-95). 
MVCs impact both the injured party and the broader society.  In addition to 
the victims and their families, friends and employers are affected by MVCs in many 
ways.  Unfortunately, in addition to fatalities or injuries and property damages; 
burdensome economic costs and various psychological outcomes are usual 
consequences after MVC events (WHO, 2004: 47-51 & NHTSA, 2002; 809-446).  
These economic, psychological and emotional problems can change the victim’s life 
dramatically with harmful consequences for the individual victims, their families and 
their friends (NHTSA, 2002; 64 – 69).  
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The WHO estimates that without increased accident-reduction efforts and new 
safety initiatives, the total number of MVC fatalities and injuries will increase 
universally by 65% by 2020 in comparison with the current dispiriting MVC figures 
(WHO, 2004: 3).  The US Air Force, through the AFSC, issues numerous regulations 
and has put into practice several intervention programs.  One of the most popular US 
Air Force intervention programs is the “101 Critical Days of Summer” campaign.  
This program was developed to suppress the increase in Air Force’s mishaps and 
deaths that occur during the period between Memorial Day and Labor Day of each 
year. 
The 2008 US Air Force “101 Critical Days of Summer” program included a 
campaign with a video in which the top Air Force safety officer advised the Air Force 
personnel on motor vehicle safety topics.  According to Maj. Gen. Wendell Griffin’s 
speech in the “101 Critical Days of Summer” 2008 campaign video:  
“Each year the US Air Force loses more people in MVAs than any other 
mishap type.”  
 
He continues: 
 
“In 2007 the Air Force lost nineteen people during the 101 critical days of 
summer, eight of those deaths involved automobiles and each one was preventable.”   
 
Unfortunately, similar mishaps were not prevented for summer 2008 and 
Airmen losses caused by MVCs were once again unsettling.  Through the 101 critical 
days of 2008 the Air Force lost sixteen airmen and eight of those were from MVC 
fatalities (AFSC, 2008).    
Considering the high rate of MVCs around the world and specifically amongst 
US Air Force military personnel, the colossal costs, both direct and indirect, and so 
many other grievous effects that MVCs have on victims, their families, friends and 
country, it is imperative for Air Force policymakers to take more precautions and 
5 
apply more intervention programs in order to reduce the rate of MVCs.  US Air Force 
supervisors at all levels must try to improve their personnel’ s sense of personal 
responsibility and readiness, so as to prevent mishaps caused by MVCs, mitigating 
lost workdays, and operational costs, fatalities and injuries.   
The main purpose of this thesis is to attempt to improve the data analysis of 
MVCs in which Air Force military personnel are involved when off duty and off base, 
to attain information that can help US Air Force policymakers to make better 
decisions and apply more effective intervention programs to combat the MVC 
tragedy. 
Problem Statement 
 The high frequency of MVC occurrences and the considerable costs they cause 
affect the operational readiness and productivity of US Air Force military personnel.  
Figure 1 depicts some of the results of the Headquarters AFSC Research and 
Epidemiology Branch (SEAR) study (AFSC, 2007). 
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Figure 1. The US Air Force Ground Off-Duty Mishap Fatalities per Mishap 
Categories from Fiscal Year (F.Y.) 2005 to F.Y. 2007 
 
Based on this study, almost 75% of the Air Force ground off-duty deaths from F.Y. 
2005 to F.Y. 2007 involved 4-wheel or 2-wheel motor vehicles.   
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According to the NHTSA’s research note, in 2005, MVCs were the leading 
cause of death for United States citizens age 3 through 6 and 8 through 34 (NHTSA, 
2008; 810-936: 1-2).  Figure 2 presents the MVCs’ fatalities by rank from F.Y. 2003 
to F.Y. 2007 according to AFSC data. 
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Figure 2. The US Air Force MVC Fatalities by Rank from F.Y. 2003 to F.Y. 2007 
 
In accordance with the AFPC demographics snapshot, the average age of the 
officer force is 35 and the average age of the enlisted Airmen force is 29.  Of the 
force, 38.47% are below the age of 26 and 14.58% of the officers force are below 26, 
versus 44.54% of enlisted Airmen forces (AFPC, 2008).  Regrettably, it is apparent 
that the US Air Force demographic characteristics, in conjunction with the NHTSA’s 
Traffic Safety Facts, indicate susceptibility and vulnerability to fatal MVCs (Bridget, 
2001: 6). 
Therefore, MVCs are not only a current problem for the US Air Force but also 
a future somber threat to its military personnel with enormous and varied woeful 
outcomes for them, their families, friends, and American taxpayers.   
This thesis intends to use the AFSC data of MVCs in which US Air Force 
military personnel are involved when off duty and off base and apply Categorical 
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Data Analysis and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to address the following policy 
objectives respectively: 
 1. Identification of risk factors that are related to MVCs and influence the 
severity of injuries. 
 2. Identification of factors which are associated with alcohol consumption 
before driving and the factors affecting the number of lost workdays resulting from 
MVCs and influencing the total MVC direct costs. 
Purpose and Rationale 
 The primary purposes of this thesis are to reinforce the published literature 
that identifies, quantifies and explores the MVC risks to US Air Force military 
personnel and improve the data analysis of MVCs to obtain more effective 
understanding that can assist US Air Force policy makers in making better decisions 
and applying more efficient intervention programs specifically tailored to various 
groups of Air Force military personnel.   
 In particular, this research attempts to deal with the following research 
questions:  
1. Whether the factors of gender, age and rank of US Air Force military 
personnel affect their risk of MVCs and subsequent type of injury. 
2. Whether the time of day influences the risk of MVCs and type of 
injury on US Air Force military personnel. 
3. Whether the type of vehicle (motorized four-wheeled (4W), or two-
wheeled (2W)) impacts the risk of MVCs and injury severity on US Air Force 
military personnel. 
4. Whether the presence of alcohol is associated with the risk of 
involvement in MVCs.   
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5. Whether the seatbelt usage by US Air Force military personnel is 
associated with injury severity in the event of a MVC.   
6. Whether the gender, age or rank of US Air Force military personnel is 
associated with the seatbelt usage when a MVC occurred. 
7. What factors are related to alcohol consumption for those MVCs for 
which a toxicological (TOX) test was conducted? 
8. What factors influence the number of lost workdays which affect the 
US Air Force’s direct costs resulting from the MVCs in which its military personnel 
were involved?   
Research Focus 
This research focuses on MVC data collected by the US AFSC from F.Y. 
1988 through F.Y. 2007 and contains data concerning MVCs in which US Air Force 
military personnel were involved when they were off duty and off base.  This thesis is 
henceforth referring to military personnel when they are off duty and off base when 
this study uses the term, “military personnel”.  
Assumptions/Limitations 
Based on the above research focus statement, the following assumptions were 
made to normalize the AFSC data and limitations identified before applying the 
methodology: 
1. The initial data includes MVC events from F.Y. 1988 to F.Y. 2008 
with the exact final date being the 19th of April 2008.  Due to the large number of 
observations and because it is believed that having entire Fiscal Years would be more 
efficient for this study analysis, the seven months of F.Y. 2008 have been excluded.  
Therefore, the methodology was applied to the MVC observations reported from F.Y. 
1988 through F.Y. 2007. 
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 2. Since the study focuses only on US Air Force military personnel, it 
excludes the observations of MVCs in which military personnel of other military 
services have been involved. 
 3. Because most MVCs of US Air Force military personnel occur off duty 
and off base, on base and on duty MVCs were excluded. 
4. The “Other Activities” besides “Operating Motor Vehicle” and 
“Passenger In/On Motor Vehicle” were also eliminated because the “Other Activities” 
were beyond the scope of this research effort. 
5. The sixty one cadet victims and the one PMV mishap related to the 
rank of Brigadier General were kept out due to the lack of the population data of these 
USAF members.  
6. Lastly, private boat or plane crashes were also excluded. 
Therefore, the final number of PMV mishaps used for this study in which US 
Air Force military personnel had been involved as drivers or passengers from F.Y. 
1988 through F.Y. 2007, when off duty and off base, is 12,403 which resulted in 
13,788 traffic crash victims, rather than the 17,982 victims observed in the original 
AFSC data.  
Preview 
 This chapter identifies the policy problem and purposes of this thesis, states its 
policy objectives, defines the research questions, and the assumptions/limitations that 
were made in order to normalize the AFSC data.  Chapter II encloses a synopsis of the 
current literature review and knowledge about MVCs.  The main goal of Chapter II is 
to understand the factors that cause MVCs, the MVCs’ consequences and the meaning 
of the intervention programs.  A discussion of the methodology applied to analyze the 
data and answer the research questions is depicted in Chapter III.  The outcomes of 
10 
the Chapter III analysis are presented in Chapter IV, and finally, Chapter V outlines 
the conclusions of this study and recommendations for further research.    
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II. Literature Review 
 
 
 
Motor Vehicle Crashes 
Motor Vehicle Crashes (MVCs) are responsible for a significant number of 
fatalities and injuries.  The “World Health Statistics 2008” report published by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) on 20 May 2008, foresees that injuries caused by 
MVCs will be one of the most rapidly growing public health concerns over the next 
25 years.  Fatalities due to MVCs are expected to rise from 1.3 million in 2004 to 2.4 
million by the year 2030 and increase from the 9th cause of death in 2004 to the 5th 
cause in 2030 (WHO, 2008: 29-30).  Figure 3 shows that there are regional and 
national differences in the distribution of road user mortality (WHO, 2004: 42). 
 
Figure 3. Road Users Killed in Various Modes of Transport as a Proportion of 
all Road Traffic Deaths  
(Reproduced from WHO, 2004: 42 with the permission of the publisher) 
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The Air Force Safety Center (AFSC) data are consistent with the above  
findings, especially with those relating to the United States (US) population.   
74.91% of MVC fatalities involved US Air Force military personnel either  
as drivers or passengers in/on motorized four wheelers during the road crash  
whereas only 25.09% of these involved motorized two wheelers.  
MVCs are one of the most sobering national issues for the US.  In a  
normal month, more Americans die due to the MVCs than were killed  
by the terrorist attack on 11th September 2001 in New York and  
Washington (Evans, 2003: 1384).  According to the “Traffic Safety  
Facts Annual Reports” issued by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA), from Fiscal Year (F.Y.) 1997 to F.Y. 2006, the US had on average, 6.3 
million MVCs per year, 42,300 deaths and 2.9 million injuries per year.  Figure 4 
depicts the number of traffic fatalities in 2006 within the US by state and the 
percentage change from 2005.   
 
Figure 4. 2006 Traffic Fatalities by State and Percent Change from 2005 
(NHTSA, 2007; 810-816: 1) 
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The US Air Force is one of many organizations in which MVCs have left 
personnel killed or permanently either partially or totally disabled.  Furthermore, 
MVCs have had a financial impact upon the Air Force as well as on taxpayers.  
Although the US Air Force has made great efforts to reduce the number of MVCs in 
which its personnel are involved, the related lost workdays and costs reveal the 
gravity of the situation.  Based on AFSC data over the last twenty years (F.Y. 1988 to 
F.Y. 2007), the Air Force has reported 12,403 Private Motor Vehicle (PMV) mishaps 
that have left 1,104 people dead, 242 people completely or partially disabled and 
12,088 people with various types of injuries.  Figure 5 provides a graphical 
representation of the PMV mishap rate per 100,000 US Air Force military personnel 
from F.Y. 1988 through F.Y. 2007. 
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Figure 5. Rate of the PMV Mishaps per 100,000 US Air Force Military Personnel 
by F.Y. 
 
Figure 6 depicts the rates of dead and Permanent Totally or Partially Disabled 
(PT or P Dis) victims per 100,000 US Air Force military personnel from F.Y. 1988 
through F.Y. 2007. 
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Figure 6. Fatalities and Permanent Total or Partial Disabilities Rates per 100,000 
US Air Force Military Personnel by F.Y. 
 
Finally, figure 7 presents the graphical representation of the lost workdays’ 
rate per 100,000 US Air Force military personnel from F.Y. 1988 to F.Y. 2007, which 
has been caused by MVCs, without taking into account the number of lost workdays 
which have been caused by the fatal and permanent total or partially disabled cases.  
This thesis will discuss thoroughly the issue of the lost workdays’ estimation in fatal 
and permanent total or partially disabled cases in Chapter III. 
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Figure 7. Rate of Lost Workdays per 100,000 US Air Force Military Personnel 
by F.Y. 
  
Given the impacts of MVCs to the US Air Force this thesis will attempt to 
improve the data analysis of MVCs suffered by Air Force personnel when off duty 
and off base, to enable effective outcomes in reducing the rate and impact of MVCs.  
The objectives of this study are to identify risk factors that are related to MVCs, 
influence the severity of injuries, are associated with the alcohol consumption before 
driving and affect the number of lost workdays.  
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Definition. 
Motor Vehicle Crash (MVC): 
 
“an event that produces injury and/or property damage, involves a motor vehicle in 
transport, and occurs on a traffic way or while the vehicle is still in motion after 
running off the traffic way.” 
(NHTSA, 2007; 810-818: 197)  
 
This thesis uses the term “crash” instead of “accident” for one basic reason.  
Following Evans’s explanation in his book entitled “Traffic Safety and the Driver” the 
term “accident” is inappropriate for technical use.  According to Evans, the term 
“accident” expresses a feeling that fate is responsible for the road traffic events 
(Evans, 1991: 8).  This thesis submits that MVCs’ injuries and fatalities are not due to 
fate but rather that they are predictable and therefore preventable. 
According to the WHO: 
Road traffic fatality: “a death occurring within 30 days of the  
road traffic crash.” 
 
Road traffic injuries: “fatal or non-fatal injuries incurred as a  
result of a road traffic crash.” 
 
Road user: “a person using any part of the road system as a  
non-motorized or motorized transport user.” 
(WHO, 2004: 201). 
Source 
This thesis intends to use many published resources regarding MVCs and 
traffic safety issues, but two agencies in particular will be the primary sources of 
information.  This study will incorporate the data generated by these organizations’ in 
order to obtain statistical and other information about the MVCs that have occurred in 
the US or worldwide. 
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The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). 
NHTSA is the primary agency that investigates and analyzes the MVCs which 
occur within the US.  NHTSA is an agency of the Executive Branch of the US 
Government, part of the Department of Transportation (DOT). Its mission as 
described at its official website is to: 
“Save lives, prevent injuries and reduce economic costs due to road traffic 
crashes, through education, research, safety standards and enforcement activity.” 
 
Some of the NHTSA’s responsibilities and activities are: 
  - writing and enforcing safety, theft-resistance, and fuel economy 
standards for motor vehicles 
- licensing vehicle manufacturers and importers  
- allowing or blocking the import of vehicles and safety-regulated 
vehicle parts 
- developing anthropomorphic dummies in safety testing, as well as the 
test protocols themselves  
- providing vehicle insurance cost information  
(Wikipedia, NHTSA; 2008).   
In addition, NHTSA conducts or sponsors studies with the research goal of 
determining the causes of MVCs as well as to develop more effective and efficient 
means to improve safety (GAO, 03-436: 5). 
NHTSA’s major activity is the creation and maintenance of the data files 
maintained by the National Center for Statistics and Analysis.  In particular, NHTSA 
has three principal databases which provide information about road crashes: the 
Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS), the Crashworthiness Data System 
(CDS), and the General Estimates System (GES) (NHTSA, Official Website; 2008). 
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The FARS contains information derived by the states on all MVCs that result 
in the death of a road user within 30 days of the incident.  This data system was 
established, planned, and developed by the National Center for Statistics and Analysis 
(NCSA) to help and support traffic safety agencies to recognize traffic safety 
problems and assess both motor vehicle and highway safety standards and initiatives.  
FARS is one of the two major sources of data used at the NCSA (NHTSA/FARS, 
Official Website; 2008).  
NHTSA’s CDS contains detailed data on a random sample of minor, fatal 
crashes.  Research teams located at Primary Sampling Units (PSU’s) across the 
country study about 5,000 crashes a year involving passenger cars, light trucks, vans, 
and utility vehicles.  Trained crash investigators obtain data from crash sites, studying 
evidence such as skid marks, fluid spills, broken glass, and bent guard rails.  
Moreover, they locate the vehicles involved, photograph them, measure the 
crash damage, and identify interior locations that were struck by the occupants. These 
researchers follow up on their on-site investigations by interviewing crash victims and 
reviewing medical records to determine the nature and severity of injuries.  Interviews 
with people in the crash are conducted with discretion and confidentiality 
(NHTSA/CDS, Official Website; 2008). 
 NHTSA’s GES Data come from a nationally representative sample of police-
reported motor vehicle crashes of all types, from minor crashes to those resulting in 
fatalities.  The system aims to identify traffic safety problem areas, provide a basis for 
regulatory and consumer initiatives, and form the basis for cost and benefit analyses 
of traffic safety initiatives. 
Likewise, the information is employed to estimate how many motor vehicle 
crashes of different kinds take place and what happens when they occur.  Although 
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sources suggest that about half the motor vehicle crashes in the country are not 
reported to the police, the majority of these unreported crashes involve only minor 
property damage and no significant personal injury (NHTSA/GES, Official Website; 
2008). 
The World Health Organization. 
The WHO is the directing and coordinating authority for health within the 
United Nations system.  It is responsible for providing leadership on global health 
matters, shaping the health research agenda, setting norms and standards, articulating 
evidence-based policy options, providing technical support to countries and 
monitoring and assessing health trends (WHO, Official Website; 2008). 
The organization was established in 1948 as a specialized agency of the 
United Nations serving as the directing and coordinating authority for international 
health matters and public health.  The WHO attempts through its publications to 
support national health strategies and address the most pressing public health concerns 
of populations around the world.  To respond to the needs of Member States at all 
levels of development, the WHO publishes practical manuals, handbooks and training 
material for specific categories of health workers, internationally applicable 
guidelines and standards, reviews and analyses of health policies, programs and 
research and state-of-the-art reports that offer technical advice and recommendations 
for decision-makers (WHO, Official Website; 2008) 
Road Traffic Risks & Factors that Cause MVCs 
In traffic safety studies and research, it is worthwhile to identify the factors 
that increase the risk of MVC injury and fatality.  This thesis will attempt to describe 
and explain this public health problem as other studies do and to identify the risk 
factors that cause MVCs and influence the injury severity on the US Air Force 
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military personnel when off duty and off base.  It is therefore important to point out 
that the understanding the meaning of risk is vital to this study.  Before describing and 
analyzing the factors that contribute to a MVC event, it is necessary to attempt to 
clarify the meaning and the dimensions of the risk in road traffic. 
 In accordance with a WHO report published in 2004, there are four basic 
elements of road traffic risk.  The first is the level of exposure to the road traffic 
environment, in terms of the amount of movement or travel that someone decides to 
make during his/her life.  Additionally, in order to denote the remaining elements of 
the road traffic risk, the use of statistic terminology is needed.  The conditional 
probability is the main characteristic of the three remaining road traffic risks.  Hence, 
the second risk element is the probability of the crash given a specific level of 
exposure.  The probability of injury, given the event of crash, is the third road traffic 
risk, and the fourth risk is the probability of the outcome and the severity of injury, 
given that the event of injury occurs (WHO, 2004: 71). 
Exposure to Road Traffic Risk. 
Since much of the world’s population has to be a road user in everyday life in 
order to travel to work, school or vacation, visit friends, go shopping or generally 
enjoy themselves and relax, many people put themselves at a high risk of being 
involved in a MVC.  The less someone exposes him/herself to the road traffic 
environment, the less probability there exists of being involved in a MVC. 
The NHTSA carried out a study which examined the trend and pattern of 
highway traffic MVC fatality by month, day, and day of week for the period 1975-
2002 (NHTSA, 2005; 809-855).  The study revealed that the number of motor vehicle 
fatalities in the US was especially high during the holidays: New Year’s, Memorial 
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Day, the 4th of July, Labor Day, Thanksgiving, and Christmas (NHTSA, 2005; 809-
855: 16). 
What is more, NHTSA indicates that July 4th and 3rd and December 23rd and 
24th were the four days with the highest crash fatalities from 1975 to 2002 (NHTSA, 
2005; 809-855: 9 & 19).  These analyses also showed that the MVCs’ fatality rates 
increased during weekends (NHTSA, 2005; 809-855: 17).  Furthermore, January 1 
and October 31 (Halloween) were the two days with the most pedestrian fatalities 
(NHTSA, 2005; 809-855: 19).  Consistent with the above results, one can conclude 
that MVC rates escalate throughout the weekends or holiday periods due to the 
increased amount of movement or travel during these periods. 
Risk of MVC Involvement. 
 Given the risk exposure discussed above, the probability of the MVC event 
depends basically on a series of factors that this thesis aims to thoroughly outline.  
Generally, factors such as driver behaviors and characteristics, and roadway or vehicle 
conditions significantly influence the risk of involvement in MVCs (WHO, 2004: 71 
& GAO, 03-436: 6). 
Risk of Injury. 
 The WHO reports that the factors that are associated with a high risk of MVC 
injury are the vehicle’s crash protection system, the quality of roadside protection, the 
correct use vs. non use or misuse of the occupant protection systems and accessories, 
speeding in excess of the official speed limits and the consumption of alcohol. (WHO, 
2004: 88). 
Risk of Injury Outcome. 
 Many studies have concluded that a large number of people have died as a 
result of MVC before reaching the hospital.  The WHO states that 50% of deaths 
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related to MVCs occurred within a few minutes of the collision but before coming to a 
hospital (WHO, 2004: 93).  Table 1 shows the proportion of MVCs’ fatalities by the 
pre-hospital, emergency room and hospital ward phases in three different cities. 
Table 1. Proportion of MVC Fatalities by Pre-Hospital and Hospital Phases 
(Reproduced from WHO, 2004: 93 with the permission of the publisher) 
Setting Kumasi, Ghana (%) Monterrey, Mexico (%) 
Seattle, USA 
(%) 
Pre-hospital 81 72 59 
Emergency room 5 21 18 
Hospital ward 14 7 23 
 
The WHO also supports the presumption that the likelihood of dying increased as the 
socioeconomic level of the MVC’s victim decreased (WHO, 2004: 93). 
The time between a MVC event and death or serious injury is extremely 
crucial and varies among patients and countries.  Factors that can influence the risk of 
injury outcome, according to the WHO report are:  
- the availability of first aid treatment and timely arrival of emergency 
medical services at the crash site 
- the quality of medical treatment provided by the emergency services 
before arrival at hospital  
- the quality of the hospital’s facilities and services  
- rehabilitation services and psychosocial support. 
(WHO, 2004: 93). 
Factors that Cause MVCs 
The factors that cause MVCs are well known and documented.  However, a 
MVC is a complex event and rarely can a single cause of such an incident be found.   
 One of the most widely known studies about the identification of the factors 
that cause road crashes is the “Tri–Level Study of the Causes of Traffic Accidents” 
conducted in the 1970s by the Indiana University at Bloomington Institute for 
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Research in Public Safety.  The study results revealed that MVCs were brought about 
by drivers (human factors), environmental factors, and vehicle factors (GAO, 03-436: 
4-5). 
As presented in figure 8, the “Tri-Level Study” deduced that almost 70% of 
crashes were due to human factors, while about 21% and 9% were environmental and 
vehicle factors respectively (GAO, 03-436: 5). 
 
Figure 8. Tri-Level Study Results about the Factors that Cause MVCs  
(GAO, 03-436: 5) 
 
Likewise, Rumar, based on the outcomes of the Sabey & Staughton study in 
1975 and the Treat study in 1980, concluded that the road user (human factor) is the 
dominant factor that causes MVCs (Rumar, 1985: 156).  Figure 9 illustrates these 
findings.   
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Figure 9. Venn Diagram Showing the Causes by Percentage, of Road Crashes 
Using British and American Crash Reports  
(Rumar, 1985: 155; Lum and Reagan, 1995) 
 
According to the above Venn Diagram, 57% of MVCs were due to human 
(driver) factors, 27% were a combination of roadway and driver factors, 6% were 
combined human and vehicle factors, 3% of MVCs were due to roadway factors 
(roadway design, roadway hazards and roadway conditions), 1% to jointed roadway 
and vehicle factors, 2% of MVCs were due to vehicle factors (vehicle related failures 
and vehicle design including its size and safety) and 3% to combined human, roadway 
and vehicle factors (Rumar, 1985: 155). 
This thesis, consistent with the above studies, supports that the main factors 
contributing to a MVC are the following: 
 1. Human Factors 
2. Roadway Environment Factors and  
3. Vehicle Factors 
In accordance with the results of the above studies, but also consistent with the 
majority of the research and recorded expert opinion, the human factor - and more 
specifically the driver’s behavior and characteristics - has been identified as the most 
crucial factor of the three.  The driver factors are deemed to be the most prevalent in a 
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MVC occurrence, followed by the roadway environment and vehicle factors (GAO, 
03-436: 7). 
Although the above factors are able to contribute simultaneously to a MVC 
event, the purpose of this study is to analyze them independently as the other studies 
and research do.  
Human Factors 
 Over the past years a significant number of studies, articles, reports by experts 
have deduced that driver characteristics, behaviors, decisions, physical condition and 
performance can affect the risk of the MVC occurrence and the level of injury 
severity.  Human factors that are able to cause a MVC include the age, gender and the 
inexperience of the driver, speeding and other traffic violations, as well as driver 
impairment such as the effect of alcohol or other drug abuse.  In addition, driver 
inattention or phenomena such as the non use of occupant protection systems, e.g. a 
safety belt or motorcycle helmet, and aberrant driver behavior can influence the risk 
of a MVC event. 
Driver’s Age, Gender and Inexperience. 
 According to the WHO, over 50% of the universal mortality due to MVC 
occurs among young adults aged between 15 and 44 years.  Furthermore, the road 
traffic mortality rates are higher in males than females (WHO, 2004: 44).  Figure 10 
below reveals the importance of the variants, depicting the global road traffic deaths 
by age and gender group in 2002. 
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Figure 10. Universal Road Traffic Deaths by Age & Gender Group in 2002 
(Reproduced from WHO, 2004: 45 with the permission of the publisher) 
 
Based on NHTSA, in 2005, MVCs were the leading cause of death in the 
United States for every age 3 through 6 and 8 through 34 (NHTSA, 2008; 810-936: 1-
2).  Additionally, the GAO shows that the age of the driver to a large degree affects 
the probability of traffic crashes.  More specifically, GAO found that younger and 
older drivers are involved in MVCs, especially with fatal injuries, more frequently 
than other age groups (GAO, 03-436: 17).   
Perneger and Smith’s population-based study claims that driving errors 
resulting in fatal two-car collisions do not occur at random, but affect excessively 
some groups of drivers.  They conclude that there is a strong relationship between age 
and the probability of initiating an MVC.  Compared with drivers aged 45-49 years, 
teenagers are three times, and those over 85 years 19 times, more likely to have 
initiated the MVC (Perneger and Smith,1991: 1138 & 1142). 
Also interesting are the results of the Massie and others’ study.  This study, 
based on passenger-vehicle data in the US in F.Y. 1990, reveals that young men have 
a higher risk of fatal involvement than do women of comparative age, as is also 
demonstrated in figure 11 (Massie and others, 1995: 76). 
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Figure 11. Fatal Involvement Rates per 100 Million Miles, Males vs. Females by 
Age Group (Reproduced from Massie & others, 1995: 77 with the permission of 
the publisher) 
  
The above chart shows that the male and female curves are U-shaped, with the 
lowest fatal involvement rates are seen among 35-39, 45-49 and 55-59 age groups, 
while the highest rates are shown by the youngest and oldest age groups.  The curves 
specify that age has a strong relationship to the differential risk of fatal involvement 
(Massie and others, 1995: 77). 
Consistent with the above findings, the AFSC data indicates that gender and 
age of the US Air Force military personnel are relevant factors to the risk of fatal 
MVCs.  Figure 12 presents the fatal involvement rates per 10,000 Vehicle Traveled 
Miles (VTM) for the USAF drivers by gender and age through F.Y. 1990 to F.Y. 
2001 based on AFSC, Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and National 
Household Travel Survey (NHTS) data (NHTS, 2009 & FHWA, 2009). 
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Figure 12. Fatal Involvement Rates per 10,000 VMT, USAF Male vs. Female 
Drivers by Age Group 
 
Among US Air Force military personnel, the most prone to being involved in 
fatal MVCs are male drivers aged 19 to 24 years old.  This study did not take into 
account the VTM of drivers under 19 years because these military members travel 
minimally due to their on base training commitment.   
Furthermore, Massie and others concluded that young male drivers, compared 
with their female counterparts, are more prone to risky behavior.  They tend to drive 
faster and closer to the vehicle in front of them when entering the traffic stream, run 
yellow lights or hastily turn left in front of oncoming traffic, not use seat belts or 
motorcycle helmets as often and drive after alcohol consumption, which may increase 
the risk of having more serious injuries in case of an MVC (Massie & others, 1995: 
84). 
 Inexperience is another characteristic of drivers that can contribute to an 
MVC.  Many studies, such as Zhang and others and Chipman and others 
have attributed inexperience to younger age groups  (Zhang and others, 1998: 289 & 
293) (Chipman and others, 1993: 211), and it seems reasonable to believe that young 
drivers do not have the same driving abilities and experience as older drivers.  
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However, the above arguments are difficult to prove since the experience of driving 
and the exposure to risk are often confounded (Jonah, 1986: 257).   
Jonah, based on statistics from Canada and US traffic accidents in 1984, tried 
to explain that the relative effects of experience and age –related factors seem 
somewhat obscure.  Definitely, an inexperienced driver is more prone to be involved 
in an MVC, but as Pelz and Schuman, in their attempt to separate experience and 
exposure, conclude:  
“…length of driving experience-measured in this case from the time when the young 
man said he ‘learned how to drive’-did not appear so important as age itself in 
accounting for infractions…”  
(Jonah, 1986: 257) 
 It is obvious that young drivers, especially males, are at greater risk of being 
involved in a fatal MVC than older drivers and here is the paradox.  Although young 
male drivers are considered to have better physical driving skills, and tend to have 
better reflexes than the other age groups of drivers, disproportionately more young 
male drivers are involved in MVCs (Rumar, 1985: 162-163). 
One answer is that young male drivers are more prone to take risks while 
driving (Jonah: 1986: 265).  The WHO specifies some of the factors that motivate 
young drivers to take risks while driving.  These factors can include any or all of the 
following: 
- Psychological characteristics, such as looking for excitement and over-
confidence in their abilities  
  - Greater inclination to use/abuse alcohol than exists among older people 
 - Enhanced tendency to employ excessive driving speed than are older 
drivers. 
(WHO, 2004: 79) 
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Likewise, as Jonah discusses, risk seems to attract young people more than it 
does other age groups in terms of expressing their passions, responding to peer 
pressure and the need for approval or feelings of power and control.  Members of 
younger age groups tend to have the impression that they are invincible and that is the 
basic reason why young drivers have the propensity to take risks while driving and 
put their lives and others’ lives at a higher risk of an MVC (Jonah, 1986: 268). 
This thesis will consider in more detail in subsequent chapters whether the 
factors of gender, age and rank of US Air Force military personnel affect their risk of 
MVCs and subsequent severity of injury.   
Speeding and Other Traffic Violations. 
For decades, it has been well accepted that the speed of motor vehicles 
increases the risk of MVC occurrence and the likelihood of serious and fatal injuries.  
Currently, speed is a crucial factor due to the fact that modern vehicles have the 
mechanical capacity to reach high rates of speed and can easily accelerate within 
small distances (WHO, 2004: 76). 
On the effects of speed on crashes and crash injury, WHO summarizes that: 
“The greater the speed, the less time there is to prevent a collision.  At the 
same time, the greater the speed, the more severe the consequences once a crash has 
occurred.” 
(WHO, 2004: 78) 
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Table 2 portrays the effects of speed limit changes in different countries 
Table 2. Effects of Speed Limit Changes  
(Reproduced from WHO, 2004: 127 with the permission of the publisher) 
Date Country Type of road 
Speed limit 
change 
Effect of 
change on 
speed 
Effect of change 
on number of 
fatalities 
1985 Switzerland Motorways 
 
130 km/h to 
120 km/h 
5 km/h 
decrease in 
mean 
speeds 
12% reduction 
1985 Switzerland Rural roads 100 km/h to 80 km/h 
10 km/h 
decrease in 
mean 
speeds 
6% reduction 
1985 Denmark 
Roads in 
built-up 
areas 
60 km/h to 
50 km/h 
3-4 km/h 
decrease in 
mean 
speeds 
24% reduction 
1987 USA Interstate highways 
55 miles/h 
(88.5 km/h to 
65 miles/h 
(104.6 km/h) 
2-4 miles/h 
(3.2-6.4 
km/h) 
increase in 
mean 
speeds 
19-34% increase 
1989 Sweden Motorways 110 km/h to 90 km/h 
14.4 km/h 
decrease in 
median 
speeds 
21% reduction 
 
Speeding decreases the driver’s reaction capability in potential risky 
situations, such as hazards in the roadways or on curves, and lengthens both the 
distance and the time which are needed for the vehicle to stop (GAO, 03-436: 7).  
According to an NHTSA technical report, the speed decreases the vehicle’s ability to 
decelerate, and reduces the ability of roadway protective equipment such as guardrails 
and barriers to stop the vehicle and protect vehicle occupants (NHTSA, 2005; 809-
839: 33).   
Additionally, in keeping with the same NHTSA report, 30% of all fatal 
crashes, resulting in approximately 1,000 fatalities, resulted from speeding-related 
MVCs every month in the US from 1983 to 2002.  The report concludes that male 
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drivers are more likely to be involved in speeding-related MVCs’ fatalities than 
female counterparts among all age groups, although as the driver’s age increases the 
gender gap concerning speeding decreases.  It is also interesting to note that NHTSA 
detected during the above period that Western states had a higher percent of speeding-
related fatalities than the Eastern half of the US (NHTSA, 2005; 809-839: 33). 
The Mao and others study in 1997 tried to investigate the factors affecting the 
severity of MVC involving young drivers in Ontario.  One of the results was that 
young drivers and especially male drivers were more likely to drive over the speed 
limit and were more vulnerable to being involved in MVCs (Mao and others, 1997: 
184). 
Furthermore, according to the following figure 13, it is obvious that younger 
male and female drivers are the most likely to be involved in a fatal MVC.  Men also 
have more probability than women of any age category to be involved in a speed -
related fatality (GAO, 03-436: 7-8). 
 
Figure 13. Speeding Driver in Fatal MVC in the US from 1997 to 2001, by Age 
and Gender (GAO, 03-436: 8) 
 
Moreover, it is important to emphasize that the risk of having an MVC is 
increased both for vehicles travelling faster than the speed limits and for those 
travelling at speeds significantly under the speed limits (FHWA, 2008).  The speed 
limits state the highest speed a driver is allowed to travel.  However, each driver can 
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choose the speed within the limit that is appropriate for him/her under specific 
circumstances related to the vehicle, roadway or environment factors. 
Table 3 presents some of the factors that influence the drivers’ speed decisions. 
Table 3. Factors Affecting Drivers’ Choice of Speed  
(Reproduced from WHO, 2004: 76 with the permission of the publisher) 
Road and Vehicle 
related 
Traffic and environment 
related Driver related 
Road Traffic Age 
Width Density Sex 
Gradient Composition Reaction time 
Alignment Prevailing speed   Attitudes 
Surroundings Environment Thrill-seeking 
Layout Weather Risk acceptance 
Markings Surface condition Hazard perception 
Surface quality Natural light Alcohol level 
Vehicle Road lighting Ownership of vehicle 
Type Sings Circumstances of journey 
Power/weight ratio Speed limit Occupancy of vehicle 
Maximum speed Enforcement  
Comfort   
 
Traffic law violations are also one of the factors that cause MVC.  Those 
drivers who do not conform to the traffic laws increase the risk of being involved in 
an MVC.  Some of the basic traffic control violations are driving without a valid 
driver’s license, running red lights, failing to stop at stop signs or passing to the left 
without the correct procedure for this action being followed.   
A GAO study (GAO, 03-436: 10) as well as other studies (Jonah, 1986: 259, 
268, Perneger and Smith, 1991: 1141-1142, Massie and others, 1995: 84, Zhang and 
others, 1998: 292-293) found that young male drivers, road users who have 
committed prior driving violations, have invalid driver’s licenses, and drive under the 
influence of alcohol, based on police reports, have the highest risk of being involved 
in an MVC. 
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It is also crucial to stress that the current lifestyle in our society has 
dangerously altered people’s habits.  The GAO study describes the results of the 1999 
DaimlerChrysler Corporation survey provided to over 5,000 people concerning their 
behavior at red lights.  The survey found that the majority of the “violators” who were 
running red lights claimed that they were in a rush and tried to save time (GAO, 03-
436: 10). 
This thesis will not be concerned with speeding as an influencing factor in the 
risk of MVCs and injury severity for the US Air Force military personnel due to the 
lack of this information in the AFSC data.  
Driver Impairment. 
Driver impairment includes excessive level (equal or above the statutory 
Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) Level) of alcohol or other drug abuse.  Alcohol 
is an important factor in increasing the risk of an MVC event and crash severity.  For 
this reason, this thesis will have a strong focus on this factor and its influence upon 
the risk of MVCs and injury severity on the US Air Force military personnel.  
According to the US Alcohol Policy Information System (APIS) website (APIS; 
2008) and NHTSA (NHTSA, 2008; 810-920: 1), as of January 2007, in all 50 States, 
the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, it is illegal to drive or operate 4-wheeled or 
2-wheeled vehicles with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .08 grams per 
deciliter or above. 
Figure 14 maps the rate of alcohol-impaired fatalities per 100 million Vehicle 
Miles of Travel (VMT) for each State in 2006. 
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Figure 14. Alcohol Fatalities per 100 Million VMT by State in 2006  
(NHTSA, 2008: 810-920: 1) 
 
Table 4 describes the proportion of the alcohol-impaired driving fatalities that 
corresponds to each of the four categories of the alcohol-impaired fatality rate shown 
in the map in figure 14.  
Table 4. Alcohol Fatalities & % of Total Alcohol Fatalities by Alcohol Fatality 
Rate Category in 2006 (NHTSA, 2008: 810-920: 2) 
 
More specifically, in 2006 the highest proportion of all alcohol-impaired 
fatalities was 46% with an alcohol-impaired fatality rate between 0.30 and 0.45, 
followed by 31% with rates between 0.46 and 0.60 (NHTSA, 2008: 810-920: 1-2). 
In 1964, a case study conducted in the US known as “Grand Rapids” found 
that drivers under the influence of alcohol had a higher risk of being involved in 
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MVCs than did drivers who were sober (WHO, 2004: 80).  The Compton RP’s study, 
more recent than the “Grand Rapids”, carried out in the US at Long Beach, California 
and Fort Lauderdale, Florida, reached results consistent with the “Grand Rapids” 
findings (WHO, 2004: 80). 
 Figure 15 depicts that the greater the BAC of the driver the higher the relative 
likelihood of that driver’s being involved in an MVC becomes.   
 
Figure 15. The Alcohol Effects on the Probability of MVC  
(Reproduced from the University of North Carolina, Highway Safety Research 
Center’s Alcohol Studies with the permission of the publisher) 
 
Additionally, the GAO supports the above conclusion (GAO, 03-436: 11-14).  
However, the GAO claims that young male drivers are the most vulnerable group to 
be involved in MVCs while the influence of alcohol (GAO, 03-436: 11-12).  Figure 
16 portrays the gravity of the situation among young drivers. 
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Figure 16. Drivers in Alcohol-Related Fatal Crashes in the US from 1997 to 2001, 
by Age and Gender (GAO, 03-436: 12) 
 
The most recent study carried out by NHTSA is a statistical analysis of alcohol 
related driving trends in the US from 1982 to 2005 (NHTSA, 2008; 810-942).  The 
conclusions of this analysis are consistent with the GAO report (GAO, 03-436: 11-
14).  The NHTSA found that the drivers drink less as they become older and 
therefore, are less likely to be involved in an alcohol- related MVC fatal crash or in 
one resulting in serious injury.  Females were also found to be less inclined to 
combine alcohol with driving than are males (NHTSA, 2008; 810-942: 40). 
Many other studies have reached the same conclusions.  A cross-sectional 
analysis conducted in 1991 by Zlatoper in order to estimate a model of motor vehicle 
deaths in the US indicates that the alcohol consumption variable is directly related to 
motor vehicle fatality rates with an estimated coefficient of 2.646 at α = 0.05 level of 
significance and high t-statistic equal to 3.27 (Zlatoper, 1991: 434-435).  Likewise, 
Perneger and Smith characterize alcohol consumption as the strongest risk factor for 
MVC initiation for their study (Perneger and Smith, 1991: 1138). 
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Jonah, in his analysis of accident risk and risk taking behavior among young 
drivers gives an explanation of this elevated risk among young impaired drivers.  
Based on his findings young age groups drive impaired because they are more socially 
active, and they have more opportunities to drink than do older drivers, especially at 
night (Jonah, 1986: 260). 
 The consumption of drugs and their effect of increasing the risk of MVC 
events remain undetermined.  The WHO claims that currently, there is no verification 
that the consumption of drugs is associated with significant MVC risk (WHO, 2004: 
84).  But, the WHO points out that there is evidence that drivers who take many 
psychoactive drugs, both medicinal and recreational, consume them in combination 
with alcohol.  In that case, the consumption of the above type of drugs in conjunction 
with alcohol can be a crucial factor in contributing to a serious MVC (WHO, 2004: 
84). 
The GAO also concludes that the consumption of marijuana in combination 
with alcohol negatively influences driving ability and performance and increase the 
risk of being involved in an MVC with serious injuries (GAO, 03-436: 14).  However, 
the GAO also presents another study which was carried out by Maastricht University, 
the Netherlands, which found that drivers were less able to perceive peripheral traffic 
when they were under the influence of low doses of either alcohol or marijuana 
(GAO, 03-436: 14).  Finally, the Zhang and others study in Canada reveals a positive 
relationship between driving while impaired by either illicit drugs or prescription 
drugs and MVC occurrence with fatal injury, especially among elderly drivers (Zhang 
and others, 1998: 293). 
 This study will try to answer if the presence of alcohol influences the risk of 
involvement in MVCs for US Air Force military personnel.  Furthermore, the study 
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will examine which factors are associated with alcohol consumption before driving 
for those MVCs where the presence of alcohol was tested.      
Driver Inattention. 
“Driver inattention occurs when there is a delay in recognition of information 
needed to safely accomplish the driving task.”  
(GAO, 03-436: 14).   
The GAO differentiates inattentiveness into two categories.  The first is the 
distraction category, which includes visual distraction, auditory distraction, 
biomechanical distraction and cognitive distraction.  The second category is the 
drowsiness or sleep category, which is associated with driver fatigue (GAO, 03-436: 
14).  
 Figure 17 displays the results of the GAO’s analysis of NHTSA’s data.  Based 
on this chart, of the 2.5 million drivers of passenger vehicles that were towed away 
from MVCs due to their inattentiveness, 52% were distracted, about 34.84% claimed 
that they were lost in thought, and 13.92% suffered sleepiness or drowsiness. 
 
Figure 17. Inattentive Drivers Involved in MVCs by Age, 1997-2001  
(GAO, 03-436: 15) 
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Moreover, the GAO study concludes that the drivers who are the most inattentive of 
age group are those drivers aged 16 to 20 (GAO, 03-436: 15). 
 It is interesting to point out that the basic reason for auditory distraction is the 
hand held mobile telephone.  In the US these telephones have increased in numbers 
from 500,000 in 1985 to 120 million in 2001 (WHO, 2004: 81).  The WHO claims 
that the risk of an MVC when the drivers make use of their cell phone is four times 
greater than for those who do not use them.  Finally, recent studies have shown that 
the use of hands-free telephones is still able to distract drivers but the effects are less 
harmful than those of using hand held mobile telephones (WHO, 2004: 85). 
 Sleepiness and fatigue are crucial causes of a MVC event.  According to the 
National Sleep Foundation’s Sleep in America poll, 60% of Americans have driven 
while feeling sleepy and 37% admit to actually having fallen asleep at the wheel in the 
past year.  However, the National Sleep Foundation claims that many people cannot 
tell if or when they are about to fall asleep.  Therefore, when drivers feel sleepiness 
while driving, many of them believe that they can handle this by smoking, eating or 
drinking and listening to music but they put themselves and others at a high risk of 
MVC occurrence (National Sleep Foundation, 2008).  
 The WHO identifies three high risk groups who are vulnerable to drowsiness.  
The first group is young males, 16 to 29 years old.  The second one is shift workers 
who have to work at night or irregular hours not in sync with the “Internal Circadian 
Biological Clock.”  According to the National Sleep Foundation, the human “Internal 
Circadian Biological Clock” programs the timing of periods of sleepiness and 
wakefulness throughout the day.  The circadian rhythm dips and rises at different 
times of the day and depends on whether someone is a “morning person” or “evening 
person.”  Therefore, adults' strongest sleep drive generally occurs between 2:00-4:00 
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am and in the afternoon between 1:00-3:00 pm (National Sleep Foundation, 2008).  
Finally, the last high risk group is those people who suffer from untreated sleep apnea 
syndrome or narcolepsy (WHO, 2004: 85).  
This research will not be addressing driver inattention as a factor affecting the 
risk of MVCs and injury severity for US Air Force military personnel due to the lack 
of this information in the AFSC data.  
Occupant Protection System. 
 The three basic occupant protection systems are safety belts and airbags for 
four-wheeled vehicle users, and crash helmets for two-wheeled vehicle users.  Almost 
all of the studies on traffic safety conclude that the failure of the driver and 
motorcycle rider to use seat belt or helmet respectively is a basic cause of serious 
MVC injuries.  For the purposes of this study, air bags and crash helmets will be 
excluded from consideration as factors that influence the risk of MVCs and injury 
severity on the US Air Force military personnel due to the lack of this information in 
AFSC data.  
In February 1996, NHTSA submitted a report to Congress on the benefits of 
safety belts and motorcycle helmets.  The report results confirmed that safety belts are 
highly effective in preventing injuries and fatalities in MVCs, and that they minimize 
the severity of injuries when these do occur.  NHTSA estimated that safety belts are 
40 to 50% effective in preventing MVC fatal injury and 45 to 55 % effective in 
avoiding serious MVC injuries.  In contrast, the same report finds that helmets are not 
able to defend the rider from most kinds of MVC injuries (NHTSA, 1996; 808-347: 
32-33). 
However, NHTSA believes that motorcycle helmets are 67% effective in 
avoiding brain injuries.  More specifically, riders who wear a helmet were three times 
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less likely to experience a head injury than were the riders who did not use helmets 
(NHTSA, 1996; 808-347: 33). 
Table 5 depicts the benefits of seat belts in terms of their effectiveness in 
various types of MVCs. 
Table 5. Benefits of Seatbelts in Terms of their Effectiveness in Various Types of 
MVCs  
(Reproduced from WHO, 2004: 91 with the permission of the publisher) 
Crash type Proportion of all crashes (%) 
Driver seat-belt 
effectiveness in different 
crash types (%) 
Frontal 59 43 
Struck side 14 27 
Non-struck side 9 39 
Rear 5 49 
Roll-over 14 77 
 
 According to an NHTSA research note, the 2007 survey for seat belt usage in 
the US indicates that the use of this safety system is lower among 16 to 24 year olds 
than among other age groups and that females use the seat belt more than males 
(NHTSA, 2008; 810-932: 1).  Furthermore, seat belt usage continues to be lower 
among the black population than among other communities.  Finally, as measured by 
NHTSA’s National Occupant Protection Use Survey (NOPUS), the use of seat belts 
nationwide was 82% in 2007, a small increase from the 2006 use rate of 81% 
(NHTSA, 2008; 810-932: 1). 
The WHO finds that helmets decrease the number of MVCs’ resultant fatal 
and serious injuries by between 20% and 45% (WHO, 2004: 90).  According to 
NHTSA in 2005, 4,553 motorcyclists were killed and almost 87,000 were injured in 
MVCs in the US (NHTSA, 2006; 810-620: 1).  NHTSA claims that motorcycle 
helmets are 37 percent effective at protecting from fatal injuries and save about 1,500 
rider lives each year (NHTSA, 2007; 810-840: 5).  Therefore, NHTSA estimates that 
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helmets prevented 1,546 motorcyclist fatalities in 2005, and that 728 more would not 
have died if all motorcyclists were helmeted (NHTSA, 2006; 810-620: 1). 
Finally, it is extremely important to stress that the helmet, which the 
motorcyclist is to wear for head protection must satisfy official safety standards.  A 
study in California showed that riders, who wore either regular certified helmets or no 
helmets at all, sustained less frequent brain injuries than those who used non-standard 
helmets (WHO, 2004: 90). 
 The objective of driver air bags is to offer protection for seat belted or 
unbelted drivers and passengers in frontal MVCs (WHO, 2004:92).  NHTSA found 
that air bags in conjunction with safety belts provide one of the most effective 
occupant protection systems currently available (NHTSA, 2006; 810-621: 5). 
A recent NHTSA study showed a 14% fatality-decreasing effectiveness for air 
bags without use of safety belt and 11% when a safety belt was used in combination 
with air bags.  It is, however, crucial to point out that air bags are an accessorial 
occupant protection system and are not designed to perform in all crashes.  
Additionally, NHTSA clarifies that some MVCs at lower speeds are able to cause 
injuries, but not the serious injuries that air bags are designed to avoid.  Therefore, 
NHTSA advises that occupants of vehicles should always wear seat belts, even in 
vehicles with air bags (NHTSA, 2006; 810-621: 5). 
NHTSA also warns that drivers of motor vehicles should be cautious with the 
seating placement for child passengers.  For example, children in rear-facing child 
safety seats should not be placed in the front seat of vehicles equipped with 
passenger-side air bags.  The impact of a deploying air bag striking a rear-facing child 
safety seat could result in injury to the child (NHTSA, 2006; 810-621: 5). 
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 This thesis will address the question of whether seatbelt usage of US Air Force 
military personnel is associated with injury severity in the event of an MVC.  In 
addition, this study will examine whether the gender, age or rank of the US Air Force 
personnel is related to seatbelt usage when an MVC occurred.    
Driver Behavior. 
 It has been widely accepted and documented that driver behavior is the core of 
the MVC event (Kontogiannis and others, 2002; 381).  Evans believes that the two 
crucial factors that influence the individual’s risk in traffic are the individual’s 
behavior and the behavior of other road users (Evans, 2003; 1385).  The GAO claims 
that behavioral error is the major factor causing or contributing to the MVC (GAO, 
03-436: 17).  
 Hans Monderman, a Dutch civil engineer and road safety expert, was one of 
those who maintained that driver behavior is the most significant factor that affects 
the risk of the MVCs (Times on Line, 2008).  Moderman’s most popular concept is 
the “Shared Space” model (Times on Line, 2008).  The basic principle of this model is 
that the human interaction and eye contact are more beneficial means than traffic 
signs and rules in order to maintain an area’s safety and reduce MVCs (Times on 
Line, 2008).   
The “shared space” principles have applied in West Palm Beach, Florida.  
Road traffic signals and markings have been removed from local areas where 
pedestrians have closer contact with cars.  The planners of the experiment have 
observed that the traffic has been slower, MVCs have decreased and trip times have 
been reduced (McNichol, 2008). 
Another interesting approach to drivers’ behaviors is Evans’ view of this 
important issue.  Evans believes that the crucial issue is the drivers’ behaviors (how 
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the drivers do drive) and not the drivers’ performance (how the drivers can drive).  He 
continues that: 
“…people in general drive as they live.  Involvement in traffic crashes is correlated 
with being emotionally unstable, unhappy, asocial, anti-social, impulsive, aggressive, 
and being under stress.”  
(Evans, 1991: 158). 
 
However, this thesis asserts that more research is needed in the driver behavior 
area in order to provide a better understanding of what motivates and “encourages” 
the aberrant driver’s behavior and errors.  The psychological approach of driver 
behavior is beyond the scope of this thesis purpose. 
Roadway Environment Factors 
According to the study conducted in 1985 by K. Rumar, using British and 
American crash reports as a source of data, about 34% of serious MVCs appear to 
have been, at least in art, caused by factors associated with the roadway or its 
environment (Rumar, 1985: 155; Lum and Reagan, 1995).  The GAO also supports 
that the roadway environment is one of the factors that are related to the risk of MVC 
events and is the second most prevalent cause contributing to MVCs (GAO, 03-436: 
6-7).  Moreover road networks are the core of the exposure to road traffic risk.  If 
there were no road networks, there would be no MVCs. 
In this study the meaning of roadway environment factors is in compliance 
with the above GAO report and covers the design of the roadway, the roadside 
hazards, and the roadway condition (GAO, 03-436: 20). 
Roadway Design. 
 Roadway design basically includes the plan, construction and design of the 
medians, barriers, lanes and their width, shoulders, the curves and their slopes, access 
points or intersections (GAO, 03-436: 20).  The road design is associated with the risk 
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of an MVC occurrence.  According to WHO there are four elements in the planning, 
design and maintenance of the road network that influence the road safety.   
“These elements are: the safety awareness in the planning of new road networks, the 
incorporation of safety features in the design of new roads; the safety improvements 
to existing roads and the remedial action at high-risk crash sites.  The absence of any 
of these elements is risk factors for crashes.” 
(WHO, 2004: 87). 
   
The Institute of Advanced Motorists (IAM) Motoring Trust is an independent 
road safety organization whose research in road traffic issues in Britain, from 2000 to 
2005, showed that on average two – thirds of all road deaths per day in the country 
happen on rural roads (IAM’s Rural Road report, 2008).  In addition, GAO reports 
that fatal MVCs occurred more often on rural roads than on urban roads (GAO, 03-
436: 21).  Apart from roadside hazards (trees or natural embankments adjacent to the 
roads) on rural roads, which this thesis is going to analyze below, the poor design of 
these roads is the basic reason that the risk of an MVC occurring on these roads is 
higher than on urban roads (GAO, 03-436: 21).  
 GAO claims that it is crucial for the roadway to be designed to provide drivers 
with the space and time that are needed for them to take the appropriate actions in 
order to remedy some possible driving mistakes, without collisions.  Most two lane 
rural roads have curves with steep slopes, narrow lanes, no shoulders and many 
roadside hazards.  All the above characteristics of rural roads increase the risk of 
MVC involvement (GAO, 03-436: 21-23). 
Roadside Hazards. 
  WHO claims that collisions between vehicles that fail to follow the route of 
the road and solid roadside objects such as poles, trees and road signs are a basic road 
safety issue universally.  Between 18% and 42% of fatal MVCs are due to roadside 
hazards in Australia and many European countries (WHO, 2004: 93).  The IAM 
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Motoring Trust Report also concluded that almost 40% of MVC fatalities in Britain’s 
rural roads resulted from vehicles leaving the road and colliding into roadside fixed 
objects, such as trees (Castle and others, 2008).  The particular characteristic of these 
MVCs is the restricted visibility of the drivers as a result of the poor location of these 
objects (WHO, 2004: 93). 
 Unfortunately, the US is also one of the countries that suffer from these types 
of collisions.  GAO reveals that 14,000 people are killed per year and about 1 million 
people are injured during the same period when their vehicles leave the road and 
impact roadside objects such as poles and trees.  From 1997 to 2001, about 20% of 
total impacts with roadside hazards were posts or poles, 14% were ditches, 14% were 
trees and 11% were guardrails (GAO, 03-436: 24).  The small distance from the edge 
of the road to roadside objects and the large number of trees next to the US rural roads 
are the major causes of increasing the risk of MVC events and the severity of injuries 
(GAO, 03-436: 24). 
 The responsible agent for roadway design in the US is the American 
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO).  AASHTO 
states that MVC injuries and fatalities due to roadside hazards are a crucial problem 
for the US because more than 40% of all fatal traffic crashes in 2003 involved 
vehicles running off the road (AASHTO Safety Plan, 2005).  The AASHTO Strategic 
Highway Safety Plan published in 2005 states that one-third of all highway fatalities 
and two-thirds of all rural fatalities resulted from vehicles leaving the road and 
crashing into fixed objects, such as trees, embankments or utility poles. 
In addition, the responsible agent of US roadway design reveals that trees are 
the most “murderous” roadside hazards of all fixed objects on rural roads, and 
declares that very little has been achieved towards addressing this problem on a 
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national level.  Moreover, it mentions that, based on NHTSA’s traffic safety facts 
2003, one of the leading roadside hazards in terms of highway deaths is the utility 
pole.  AASHTO through its plan agrees that the cost, not only to remove the trees but 
also, to relocate poles is staggering. However, AASHTO asserts that an appropriately 
funded program would yield very cost-effective safety improvements, which would 
reduce this problem for many years. 
Roadway Conditions. 
 Roadway conditions can affect the risk of an MVC event.  There are two 
issues relating to the condition of the roads, the road surface situation and reduced 
visibility which can be influenced by either the lack of daylight or bad weather (GAO, 
03-436: 24-26).  According to the GAO report, if a road surface is either in bad 
condition with holes, ruts, paved edge drop-offs, and worn or slippery surfaces, the 
drivers’ ability to control their cars is compromised and the probability of being 
involved in MVCs is increased (GAO, 03-436: 24-26). 
 Furthermore, in accordance with the WHO report a fundamental requirement 
for traffic safety of the road users is: 
“To see and be seen” 
In general, visual errors have a direct positive relationship with the cause of MVCs 
(WHO, 2004: 85-86).  It is apparent that when drivers have reduced visibility they are 
not able to manage their cars and there is a greater possibility of an MVC.  Events 
associated with weather or the presence or absence of artificial or natural lighting are 
the most frequent factors that cause reduced visibility to drivers (GAO, 03-436: 24-
26). 
 A slippery road surface is one of the most dangerous conditions that a driver 
can encounter while driving.  Rain, snow, sleet, and ice can create slippery roads.  The 
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problem with slippery roads is that the reduced friction between the roadway surface 
and the tires of the vehicle can lead to a wide variety of MVC events (GAO, 03-436: 
25).  The Mao and others research in Ontario shows that MVCs occur more frequently 
on wet roads and during snowy weather (Mao and others, 1997: 187).  Additionally, 
in accordance with the same research, sleet, apart from some other factors that this 
thesis will analyze next, was found to increase the risk of fatal MVCs (Mao and 
others, 1997: 187). 
 Inadequate visibility can occur either during the nighttime period or during 
specific weather conditions such as fog, rain, snow or strong winds (GAO, 03-436: 
25-26 & Mao and others, 1997; 187).  The WHO report indentifies three types of 
crashes that can occur due to drivers’ reduced visibility: 
“1. a moving vehicle running into the rear or side of a slowly moving or 
stationary vehicle located ahead on the roadway, at night-time  
 2. angled collisions or head-on collisions in the daytime;  
 3. rear-end collisions in fog, in daytime and at night.” 
(WHO, 2004: 86).  
  
According to Rumar the accident rate at night is 2-3 times higher than during 
the daytime period (Rumar, 1985: 160).  The above finding is consistent with the 
NHTSA research note in which NHTSA makes a contrast between passenger vehicle 
occupant fatalities occurring during the day and those occurring at night.  The results 
are dramatic.  The MVC fatality rate at night seems to be three times higher than the 
daytime rate.  NHTSA offers many other reasons apart from inadequate visibility for 
this higher fatality rate for which the night is blamed (NHTSA, 2007; 810-637: 1, 4).  
  The main reason for higher fatality rates at night in comparison with daytime 
is that drivers tend to take more risks during nighttime travel.  NHTSA found that the 
risks which drivers and passengers had taken were, lower seat belt use, high rate of 
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alcohol involvement, and high speed above of the statutory speed limits (NHTSA, 
2007; 810-637: 4). 
Some of the NHTSA findings are provided below:  
- Of the total unrestrained driver and passenger deaths in 2005,  
64% of them occurred during the nighttime and 46% during the daytime MVCs 
- The alcohol involvement in vehicle occupant fatalities was 3.3 times 
higher during nighttime MVCs than during daytime MVCs 
- A higher proportion of drivers and passengers involved in fatal  
 
MVCs were killed in speeding-related MVCs at nighttime 
(NHTSA, 2007; 810-637: 4). 
 
An exploratory study in Australia investigated the environmental factors 
associated with crash-related mortality and injury among taxi drivers in New South 
Wales.  The study observed 7,923 taxi drivers who were involved in MVCs, almost 
10% of whom were killed or injured.  Findings show gender, and one environmental 
factor to be significantly related with an increased risk of MVC fatality and injury 
among taxi drivers.  The risk rate of MVC fatality and morbidity is increased by 60% 
for those who work night shifts (Lam, 2004; 36: 905). 
The design of the roadway, roadside hazards, inadequate visibility and road 
surface conditions are factors directly associated with the risk of MVC occurrence and 
the severity of the injury.  Nevertheless, for the purposes of this study, roadway 
environment factors other than the “time of the day” and especially the reduced 
visibility during the night hours will be excluded from consideration as factors that 
influence the risk of MVCs and the injury severity which may be inflicted on crash 
victims among the US Air Force military personnel, as the AFSC data do not provide 
this information.  However, as outlined above, the role of drivers and their behaviors 
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continue to fill a dominant role in the level of risk more than the roadway and its 
environment.  
Vehicle Factors 
The contribution of vehicle factors to the event of serious MVCs is about 2% 
and 10% in combination with the roadway environment and driver factors (Rumar, 
1985: 155; Lum and Reagan, 1995).  The WHO claims that in general there is no 
evidence that periodic motor vehicle inspections reduce the incidence of MVCs events 
(WHO, 2004: 88). 
However, the quality of vehicle design, including its size (Evans, 1991), the 
periodic checks of vehicle operating condition and its maintenance influence safety 
and driver control in dangerous situations and affect the ability to avoid crashes (Air 
Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)/Safety Office (SO), 2008).  Many studies and 
experts support that vehicle factors contribute less to MVCs than do either driver or 
roadway environment factors (GAO, 03-436: 26).  As both the GAO report and 
Evans’s book, titled “Traffic Safety and the Driver,” contend, this thesis asserts that 
the two main issues associated with vehicle factors are vehicle related failures and 
vehicle design including its size and safety characteristics (GAO, 03-436: 26-32 & 
Evans, 1991: 64-95). 
Vehicle Related Failures. 
Vehicle failure can influence the risk of a MVC occurrence by either some 
kind of equipment- related failures or maintenance related failures (GAO, 03-436: 
26).  The main responsibility for equipment related failures lies with the manufacturer 
of the vehicle while the owner of the vehicle is responsible for maintenance related 
failures.  In the US equipment related failures can be detected by the manufacturer or 
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by NHTSA, and can result in a recall of the product if it is necessary for public safety 
(GAO, 03-436: 27). 
The owner or operator of the vehicle is accountable for maintenance related 
failures.  For example, the drivers have to check the mechanical and electrical systems 
of their car periodically and they should rectify any problem they encounter during 
their inspection. 
 GAO analysis found that 778,000 MVCs of the total which occurred from 
1997 to 2001 in the USA were associated with vehicle related failures such as defects 
on brake systems, and tires without tread depths or improperly inflated (under 
inflated) (GAO, 03-436: 27).  It is well documented that smooth tires can result in a 
blowout at high speeds or loss of control of the vehicle on wet road surfaces.  
Moreover, tires low on air will have weaker grip on the road and can have excessive 
sidewall flexing that increases tire wear and may possibly lead to a blowout with 
unpredictable results (AFIT/SO, 2008). 
Vehicle Design Including Its Size and Its Safety Characteristics.  
 The design and the size of the vehicle seem to affect the risk and type of 
MVCs.  Figure 18 reveals that vans are safer than other types of vehicles and along 
with sport utility vehicles (SUV’s) have the lowest fatal crash rate (GAO, 03-436: 29). 
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Figure 18. MVC Rate by Vehicle Type (GAO, 03-436: 29) 
 
Additionally, some types of MVCs tend to have more serious injury outcomes 
than others.  Rollover crashes can easily be characterized as “deadly” among the 
various types of collisions.  About 10,100 (or almost 32%) of the 31,875 occupant 
fatalities in the US during 2001 occurred in rollover crashes (GAO, 03-436: 29).  One 
possible explanation of the above dramatic result is the increase in popularity of taller 
SUVs, people carriers and minivans which have more top weight than standard 
passenger cars (Wikipedia, Car accident; 2008).  
The percentages of rollover occurrence by vehicle type in 2001 are illustrated 
in figure 19.  In accordance with figure 19 and the finding of the GAO analysis SUVs 
were over three times more likely to be involved in a rollover MVC than were 
passenger cars.  Also, the proportion of SUVs that rolled over in fatal MVCs was 35% 
which is 2 times more than passenger cars (GAO, 03-436: 29-31). 
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Figure 19. Rollover MVC Rates by Vehicle Type (GAO, 03-436: 30) 
 
It is important to point out that there is an attempt currently under way by the 
US government to reduce the future rate of rollover fatalities.  US automobile 
companies will have to comply with the US Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards 
and produce SUVs and vans that are more resistant to rollover crashes by 2012 (Ken, 
2006). 
Finally, GAO explains that according to NHTSA’s Chief of Information 
Services statement: 
“the central problem with identifying vehicle factors is that police officers are 
not necessarily qualified to identify vehicle defects.”   
(GAO, 03-436). 
Likewise, the size of the vehicle seems to be an important issue on the 
occupant protection in MVCs (Evans, 1991: 64-95).  Evans claims that when a small 
vehicle (2,000 pound) crashes into another larger vehicle (4,000 pound), then the risk 
of fatal injury in the large vehicle is 13 times less than it is in the small one.  
Moreover, a driver in a 2,000 pound vehicle crashing into another with the same 
weight is almost twice as likely to be killed, than a driver in a 4,000 pound vehicle 
crashing into another 4,000 pound vehicle (Evans, 1991: 94-95). 
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Furthermore, Evans states that in an MVC, the risk in a 2,000 pound vehicle is 
approximately 2.4 more times than in a 4,000 pound vehicle (Evans, 1991: 95).  
Finally, based on general physics principles, Evans makes two important conclusions 
associated with the vehicle size: 
“1. The lighter the vehicle, the less risk posed to other road users 
2. The heavier the vehicle, the less risk posed to its occupants.” (Evans, 
1991: 95).  
 
For decades many public road safety agencies like NHTSA through the 
National Advanced Driving Simulator (NADS) and many independent road safety 
organizations have conducted car safety testing under real conditions, using 
anthropomorphic dummies and have tried to improve vehicle safety systems.  The 
main goals of a vehicle’s safety system are to reduce the risk of MVCs’ occurrences 
and simultaneously lessen the risk of injury severity should an MVC occur.   
Unfortunately, the other road users such as pedestrians, cyclists and 
motorcyclists do not normally have protection other than their clothing and their 
personal readiness.  This is the basic reason why these specific groups of road users 
are twice as likely to suffer severe injuries as the motorized four wheeled road users 
(Wikipedia, Car accident; 2008).  
For the purposes of this thesis, vehicle factors other than type (motorized four-
wheeled (4W), two-wheeled (2W)) will be excluded from consideration as factors that 
impact the risk of MVCs and affect injury severity for US Air Force military 
personnel due to the lack of this information in AFSC data. 
Vehicle related failures and vehicle design and safety are factors that can 
influence the risk of MVCs occurrence and the severity of the injury.  Nevertheless, it 
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seems that driver factors such as good judgment, common sense and general behavior 
are more important in affecting the four levels of road traffic risk.  
Regrettably, experts have differing perspectives on the importance of the 
above factors in causing MVCs (Pless, 2004:846).  For example in accordance with 
Vernic and Teret the factors which are most significant in order to reduce MVC 
fatalities are the improvement of vehicle safety systems and roadways (Vernic and 
Teret, 2004: 170).  On the contrary, McKay asserts that the greatest focus must be 
placed on the use of safety belts and the reduction of alcohol usage around the US 
(McKay, 2004: 170-171).  However, Evans believes that the key to minimizing the 
MVC problem in the US is to concentrate efforts on changing the drivers’ behavior 
(Evans, 2003: 1385 & Evans, 2004: 171-172).  
MVCs’ Consequences 
 After a thorough discussion and analysis of the factors that influence road 
traffic risk, it is imperative to consider the results of MVCs and their economic and 
social impacts.  This thesis will attempt to identify the factors that affect the number 
of lost workdays resulting from MVCs and negatively impact the US Air Force 
budget and consequently, the economic stability of US taxpayers.  In reality, MVCs 
influence both the injured party and the broader society.  Unfortunately, apart from 
MVCs’ fatalities or injuries and property damage, burdensome economic costs and 
various psychological outcomes are among the usual consequences after MVC events 
(WHO, 2004: 47-51 & NHTSA, 2002; 809-446). 
Fatalities & Injuries 
 Without a doubt, one of the worst outcomes of an MVC is the victim’s death, a 
human loss.  In fact, it is extremely difficult to put a price on human life.  
Additionally, MVCs injuries vary in type and severity.  Table 6 reveals that brain 
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injuries represent roughly a quarter of those suffered by victims who are injured 
seriously and require medical treatment in health facilities. 10% suffer open wounds 
and 20% have broken their lower limbs (WHO, 2004: 49). 
Table 6. The 20 leading Non-Fatal MVC Injuries Sustaineda as a Result of 
Global MVCs in 2002  
(Reproduced from WHO, 2004: 49 with the permission of the publisher) 
Type of injury sustained Rate per 100,000 
population 
Proportion of all 
traffic injuries 
Intracranial injuryb (short-termc) 85.3 24.6 
Open wound 35.6 10.3 
Fracture patella, tibia or fibula 26.9 7.8 
Fractured femur (short-termc)  26.1 7.5 
Internal injuries 21.9 6.3 
Fractured ulna or radius 19.2 5.5 
Fractured clavicle, scapula or 
humerus 
16.7 4.8 
Fractured facial bones 11.4 3.3 
Fractured rib or sternum 11.1 3.2 
Fractured ankle 10.8 3.1 
Fractured vertebral column 9.4 2.7 
Fractured pelvis 8.8 2.6 
Sprains  8.3 2.4 
Fractured skull (short-termc) 7.9 2.3 
Fractured foot bones 7.2 2.1 
Fractured hand bones 6.8 2.0 
Spinal cord injury (long termd) 4.9 1.4 
Fractured femur (long termd) 4.3 1.3 
Intracranial injuryb (long termd) 4.3 1.2 
Other dislocation 3.4 1.0 
a Requiring admission to a health facility,  b Traumatic brain injury,  c Short-term = 
lasts only a matter of weeks,                      
d Long-term = last until death, with some complications resulting in reduced life 
expectancy. 
 
In addition, the WHO states that MVCs are the leading factor of traumatic 
brain injuries universally and gives some interesting figures on global levels prior to 
2004, such as: 
 -  13% to 31% of total hospital patients were victims of MVCs 
 - MVCs’ victims were the most frequent users of health care facilities 
and units as well as X-ray departments, rehabilitation and  
57 
physiotherapy services. 
(WHO, 2004: 48-49) 
Regrettably, the physical and emotional pain that the MVCs’ victims often 
suffer cannot always be alleviated nor can truly adequate compensation be provided. 
Economic Impact 
MVCs cause huge economic costs which are heavily burdensome for 
individual household budgets and the national budget alike.  However, the WHO 
claims that estimating the economic cost of MVCs is crucial for a better awareness of 
the extent of this social health problem.  Likewise, it will provide a comparison 
measure between MVCs and other health problems.  This could prove to be an 
essential tool to validate the most cost- effective intervention programs (WHO, 2004: 
47-48).  This study will focus on answering the question of which factors influence 
the number of lost workdays which affect the US Air Force’s direct costs arising from 
the MVCs in which its military personnel are involved.    
 Unfortunately, MVCs cause multidimensional impacts that influence not only 
the victims’ lives but also those of their families, friends and society in many ways.  
The NHTSA explains that MVC medical costs from victims’ cure and rehabilitation 
in terms of payments for insurance, deductibles, uncovered costs, and uninsured 
expenses increase the costs to society.  This burden on society can be interpreted as 
higher insurance premiums and costs which decrease the medical resource allocation 
for medical research, disease prevention and control and basic public health needs 
(NHTSA, 2002; 809-446: 5).  
 Likewise, lost productivity due to workplace disruption caused by MVC 
related deaths or serious injuries, is a considerable cost.  Besides that, the victims’ 
dependents experience, apart from the emotional pain, various economic burdens such 
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as the loss of victims’ earnings, medical bills, funeral costs and legal bills (WHO, 
2004: 52 & NHTSA, 2002; 809-446: 7). 
The WHO reports that over 70% of households worldwide stated that their 
income, food consumption and food production had all diminished after an MVC 
fatality of the household head or head’s spouse (WHO, 2004: 52).  The NHTSA also 
reinforces the above finding by stating that insurance in the US does not sufficiently 
cover the most serious injuries.  Therefore, the financial consequences can be ruinous 
for the victim, depending upon their original financial status and insurance coverage, 
and the resulting medical and rehabilitation costs, plus any loss of income (NHTSA, 
2002; 809-446: 7).  The broader society also shares the financial burden in terms of 
providing support to the victims and their dependents, and experiencing reduced 
national productivity due to the victims’ inability to work (NHTSA, 2002; 809-446: 
5). 
NHTSA differentiates the MVCs’ cost components into two categories, direct 
and indirect costs.  Emergency treatment, initial medical costs, rehabilitation costs, 
long-term care and treatment, insurance administration expenses, legal costs, and 
employer/workplace costs are all considered to be direct costs.  In contrast, 
productivity costs in the workplace due to temporary and permanent disability and 
decreases in household productivity originating from these disabilities are regarded as 
indirect costs. Property damage and travel delay, crash costs other than those directly 
attributable to an injury, are estimated for injury and non-injury crashes (NHTSA, 
2002; 809-446: 13).  A description of each of these cost components is included in 
Appendix A. 
 Table 7 shows MVCs’ costs by region as a percentage of the gross national 
product (GNP).   
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Table 7. MVC Costs by Region as Percentage of GNP  
(Reproduced from WHO, 2004: 51 with the permission of the publisher) 
Regiona GNP, 1997         
(US$ billion) 
Estimated annual crash costs 
As % of GNP Costs (US$ 
billion) 
Africa 370 1 3.7 
Asia 2,454 1 24.5 
Latin America & Caribbean 1,890 1 18.9 
Middle East 495 1.5 7.4 
Central & Eastern Europe 659 1.5 9.9 
Subtotal 5,615  64.5 
Highly-motorized 
countriesb 
22,665 2 453.3 
Total   517.8 
GNP: gross national product, a Data are displayed according to the regional 
classifications of the TRL Ltd, United Kingdom, b Australia, Japan, New Zealand, 
North America, and the western European countries 
 
In accordance with the above table, the annual burden of economic costs 
globally is estimated at almost US$ 518 billion and in most countries the cost exceeds 
the 1% of GNP (WHO, 2004: 51).  What is more, the WHO states that MVCs’ 
economic impacts cause serious damages to low and middle-income countries.  These 
economic damages are estimated to be far greater than the total annual amount 
received in development support.  In the high-income countries of the Europe Union, 
the annual cost of MVCs is two times higher than is the Europe Union’s annual 
budget for all of its activities (WHO, 2004: 51). 
  The NHTSA reports that the total cost (direct and indirect) of motor vehicle 
crashes that occurred to the US in 2000 was $230.6 billion, and represents the present 
value of lifetime costs for 41,821 fatalities, 5.3 million non-fatal injuries, and 28 
million damaged vehicles, in both police-reported and unreported crashes (NHTSA, 
2002; 809-446: 1-2).  Also, this enormous cost is equal to approximately $820 for 
every person living in the US (NHTSA, 2002, 809-446: 1-2).  Figure 20 gives the 
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picture of the percentage distribution of each cost component to the MVCs’ total 
(direct and indirect) cost. 
 
 
Figure 20. Cost component’s % Distribution to MVCs’ Total Cost in 2000 
(NHTSA, 2002; 809-446: 10) 
 
Interestingly, some of the NHTSA’s additional results are that lost market 
productivity accounted for $61 billion of the total cost, while property damage was 
estimated to be in the proximity of $59 billion.  Medical expenses were estimated at 
about $32.6 billion and travel delay costs accounted for about $25.6 billion. (NHTSA, 
2002; 809-446: 1, 10). 
Based on the above findings, the gravity of MVCs in terms of economic costs 
is revealed.  However, an even more devastating fact emerges: despite these enormous 
economic impacts, MVCs place an even greater cost on victims; serious psychological 
effects that are difficult to quantify emerge in many crash incidents.  Although, the 
purpose of this study is to deal with the factors that affect the lost workdays of the US 
Air Force resulting from MVCs and that negatively affect Air Force budget, it is 
worthwhile to briefly consider the general psychological consequences of MVCs.   
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Psychological Outcomes 
 Economic costs can not capture the psychological impacts resulting from 
MVCs’ injuries.  The NHTSA reports two common psychological consequences for 
victims who have experienced MVCs: Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and 
Major Depressive Episode (MDE) (NHTSA, 2002; 809-446: 63-69). 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. 
 The four basic symptoms of PTSD which the MVCs’ victims suffer most 
frequently are: 
- re-experiencing, in which it is difficult for the MVCs’ victims to  
forget the traumatic experience because they recall frequently the scenes of the MVC 
that they have experienced 
 - avoidance, in which the MVCs’ victims try to reduce the risk of 
exposure inasmuch as they have a concern of experiencing another MVC 
 - numbing, which causes the MVCs’ victims to not be able to care for 
others 
 - hyper arousal, in which the MVCs’ victims have sleep disturbance, 
irritability or outbursts of anger, concentration difficulties, hyper vigilance and an 
exaggerated startle response.  
(NHTSA, 2002; 809-446: 64). 
The above symptoms of PTSD last for at least one month. However, the 
NHTSA clarifies that there are various types of PTSD which depend on the length of 
their symptoms.  For example acute PTSD is defined as having symptoms for fewer 
than 3 months, chronic PTSD is defined as having symptoms for more than 3 months, 
and delayed onset PTSD is defined as having the onset of the symptoms at least 6 
months after the stressing event (NHTSA, 2002; 809-446: 64). 
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 Generally, based on both old and current studies, the prognosis for PTSD is 
not favorable and the time of the symptoms’ manifestation after the MVC event varies 
among individuals.  Also, the time period from the PTSD to complete recovery differs 
amongst victims.  Furthermore, it has been observed that the MVCs’ victims who 
have the symptoms for one year rarely recover completely (NHTSA, 2002; 809-446: 
64-65). 
Major Depressive Episode. 
 The second more prevalent psychological impact is depression.  The NHTSA 
describes that under the MDE victims have: 
“a depressed mood or loss of interest or diminished ability to derive pleasure from 
everyday activities plus some mix of other symptoms such as change in weight, 
sleeplessness, etc.” 
(NHTSA, 2002; 809-446: 66) 
Generally, it is accepted that the symptoms of depression last 6 months or 
longer but there are people who can experience some of the symptoms for months or 
years (NHTSA, 2002; 809-446: 67).  Based on NHTSA sources almost 5% to 10% 
percent of people diagnosed with MDE can experience the full set of symptoms for 2 
years or more (NHTSA, 2002; 809-446: 67). 
 Actually, there is not enough evidence to verify a relationship between the age 
of the victims and the experience of PTSD or MDE symptoms.  However, gender 
appears to be a significant factor with females found to have a higher risk of suffering 
the above two psychological outcomes (NHTSA, 2002; 809-446: 69).  NHTSA 
estimates that as the MVCs’ survival rates rise the impact of psychological problems 
is likely to become more profound (NHTSA, 2002; 809-446: 69). 
Finally, the Mayou and others study  is consistent with the above findings and 
claims that besides the PTSD and MDE symptoms, there are hospital anxiety and 
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phobic travel anxiety (Mayou and others, 2001: 1231).  Whatever the type of 
psychological effect suffered by MVCs’ victims, it is able to limit or otherwise 
change their life dramatically, with harmful results for the individual, their families 
and friends. 
Other Consequences 
 As this thesis has described above, the surviving MVC victims experience not 
only economic burdens but also psychological impacts.  Moreover, the above 
unfortunate consequences do not only affect the victims but also their families and 
friends.  The victims’ families and friends feel almost the same emotional pain as the 
victim and they often change their daily lives in order to support and help the victims’ 
through their distress and rehabilitation. 
NHTSA states that the economic, psychological and emotional problems that the 
surviving MVC victims experience influence the other members of the family and try 
the family units’ cohesiveness.  When the worst scenario happens, an MVC fatality 
occurrence, the emotional suffering is even deeper, with unpredictable outcomes for 
the family members and friends for years afterward.  This tragedy can sometimes 
cause the breakup of a balanced family tie (NHTSA, 2002; 809-446: 7). 
 The WHO estimates that without increased attempts and new initiatives, the 
total number of MVC fatalities and injuries will increase universally by 65% by 2020 
in comparison with the current dispiriting MVC’s figures (WHO, 2004: 3).  Jones and 
others attempted to develop a procedure as a solution to managing public health 
problems.  Their approach includes the implementation of prevention strategies and 
programs and the continual surveillance and monitoring/evaluating the effectiveness 
of these prevention initiatives (Jones and others, 2000; 18: 72). 
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Therefore, the improvement of the current intervention strategies or 
establishment of more efficient programs would be beneficial in preventing or 
decreasing the frequency and severity of MVC events amongst US Air Force military 
personnel. 
Intervention Programs 
The main purpose of intervention programs is to minimize the road traffic risk 
elements, the risk exposure, the MVC involvement risk, the risk of injury and the 
severity of injury outcome (WHO, 2004: 109-143).  
The WHO believes that the reduction of the risk exposure to the road traffic 
environment can be achieved by good transport and land-use policies.  Likewise, the 
institution of measures against aberrant driver’ behaviors and enforcement of the 
laws, in conjunction with information and education on traffic safety issues, seems to 
be the answer to decreasing the MVC involvement risk and the risk of injury.  The 
MVC’s risk of occurrence and injuries can also be diminished through the 
improvement of the vehicles’ crash-protective system and safety-conscious planning 
and design of the road network.  Finally, the development and maintenance of well 
organized emergency, treatment and rehabilitation systems is able to minimize the 
severity of the injury outcomes (WHO, 2004: 109-143). 
The US Air Force through the AFSC has issued numerous regulations or 
instructions and has put into practice several intervention programs to reduce the 
number of MVCs in which its personnel are involved.  Over the last five years, the 
AFSC has instituted a number of initiatives aimed directly at preventing or reducing 
the frequency and severity of vehicular mishaps involving Air Force personnel – 
including taking the following actions: 
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- Establishment of a traffic safety branch within SEG which has aided in 
energizing the major command (MAJCOM) and subordination of safety offices to 
implement a more aggressive traffic safety oversight and culture improvement 
- Partnerships with sister services and the private sector, such as the 
Motorcycle Safety Foundation, Specialty Vehicle Institute of America, and the 
Governor's Highway Safety Council, to coordinate traffic safety mishap prevention 
efforts 
- Revision of all of the AF traffic safety courses, including the 
development and implementation of Course IIIA, Intermediate Traffic Safety, and 
IIIB, Advanced Traffic Safety with both courses targeting first term Airmen 
- Addition of a Traffic Safety Module to Supervisor's Safety Training 
- Establishment of requirements for a motorcycle mentorship program 
and for unit commanders to be aware of who their units’ motorcyclists are 
- Intensified traffic safety efforts during seasonal campaigns, e.g., 101 
Critical Days 
- Partnership with the Department of Transportation's Traffic Safety 
Institute to develop a Traffic Safety Manager's Program course which numerous 
USAF safety warriors have already attended (AFSC, 2008). 
   One of the most popular US Air Force intervention programs is the “101 
Critical Days of Summer” campaign.  This program, launched in the late 1960’s, runs 
annually to counter the usual increase in Air Force mishaps and deaths that occur 
during the summer period (between Memorial Day and Labor Day) each year.  
Traditionally this period is a season of greater risk to Airmen as they spend more time 
traveling and engage in more outdoor activities than they do in the other seasons 
(AFSC, 2008). 
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Additionally, this campaign focuses on increasing personal readiness against 
possible risks and thereby aims to reduce the number of summer mishaps and 
fatalities.  Other traditional attempts include: messages by senior leadership, briefings 
by commanders, weekly supervisory briefings, pre- trip/travel/departure briefings and 
presentations, etc. (AFSC, 2008). 
  These interventions may have decreased the MVC fatalities and injuries.  The 
rate of fatalities per 100,000 US Air Force military personnel dropped from 21.86 in 
F.Y. 1988 to 12.77 in F.Y. 2007.   
 Figure 21 describes some of the most essential military injury prevention 
partners that play a crucial role in the Department of Defense and military services’ 
efforts to develop and apply more efficient intervention strategies (Jones and others, 
2000: 81-83). 
 
Figure 21. Key Military Injury Prevention Partners  
(Reproduced from Jones and others, 2000: 83 with the permission of the 
publisher) 
 
Finally, according to the Jone and others’ article, an advisory council for the above 
key partners should be formed in order to help coordinate, focus, and prioritize injury 
prevention activities in the military services (Jones and others, 2000; 81). 
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One of the basic purposes of this thesis is to attempt to improve the US Air 
Force data analysis of MVCs to obtain more effective understandings that can assist 
the US Air Force policy makers in making better decisions and apply more efficient 
intervention programs specifically tailored to various groups of Air Force military 
personnel.   
Finally, it is important to point out that accurate data and its maintenance are 
essential, not only for prioritizing health problems or observing trends, but also for 
building and evaluating prevention policies (WHO, 2004: 61).  The WHO, under the 
doctrine that MVC deaths and injuries are preventable, advises that the three basic 
elements of traffic system, road users, road infrastructure and vehicles, should be 
addressed so that multi-sector strategic policies can be developed (WHO, 2004: 109). 
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Summary 
MVCs are a growing global public health concern with economic and 
psychological outcomes for the victims, their family and/or friends, and society.  
During recent years many studies have been carried out in order to address the causes 
that influence road traffic risk elements.  This thesis, consistent with the above 
research, analyzed the three main categories of factors that seem to affect the 
occurrence of MVCs and their grievous results.  These factors are: human factors, 
roadway environment factors, and vehicle factors.  Drivers’ behaviors and 
characteristics appear to be, according to the majority of the literature reviews and 
experts, at the core of the MVC events and are the factors that most influence the four 
road traffic risk elements.  This study will focus on the identification of risk factors 
that are related to MVCs, factors that are associated with alcohol consumption and 
factors that influence the severity of injuries suffered by US Air Force military 
personnel.  In addition this thesis has provided an analysis of the economic costs and 
psychological impacts to the MVC victims, their families, friends and society and has 
defined the purpose and goals of intervention programs, particularly those policies 
implemented by the US Air Force.  This research will examine the factors that affect 
the number of lost workdays that have been caused by MVCs in which military 
personnel are involved and which often detrimentally influence the US Air Force’s 
direct costs.  Finally, this thesis hopes the above analysis will provide valuable input 
to US Air Force policy makers in order to improve the US Air Force prevention 
program’s decision making process.  
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III. Methodology 
 
 
 
Research Approach  
 The AFSC data and their structure drive the methodology of this thesis. 
This study using the AFSC data for MVCs in which US Air Force military personnel 
are involved intends to apply categorical data analysis and factorial analysis to 
address the policy objectives and deal with the research questions which have been 
defined in Chapter I. 
Database 
 This research effort will employ the US AFSC data in order to carry out its 
analysis.  The MVC data collected by the AFSC from F.Y. 1988 through F.Y. 2007 
contain data for MVCs in which US Air Force military personnel were involved when 
they were off duty and off base.  More specifically, the AFSC data include 
demographic figures, such as gender, rank and age of military personnel who were 
involved in an MVC event.  The AFSC data also contain information about the date 
and time of the crash, type of vehicle, mishap class, type of injury, whether the 
victims wore a seatbelt and if there was a toxicological (TOX) test after the incident.  
In cases in which there was a TOX test after the MVC occurrence (this indicated by 
“Yes,” -otherwise by “No” under the column titled “Alcohol Involved”) the data 
include the results of this test in terms of Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) 
percentage.  Finally, the data incorporate figures on lost days from work and 
hospitalized days. 
Categorical Data Analysis 
The various qualitative variables and numerous levels contained in the AFSC 
data are the basic reasons that this research relies on conducting hypothesis tests on 
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multinomial probabilities to identify risk factors that are related to MVCs and which 
influence the type of injuries.   
 More specifically, this research uses the chi-square distribution in order to 
make inferences about category probabilities for data -classified according to either a 
single qualitative variable or two variables.  Finally, this study will conduct various 
hypothesis tests on the proportions and make inferences based on these tests. 
Testing Category Probabilities: One-Way Table. 
This thesis will attempt to apply the Chi-Square Test: One-Way Table in order 
to test several hypotheses about the proportions in each of the categorical variable 
levels in relation to the relevant MVC events.   
This study is going to use the Chi-Square Test: One-way Table at α=0.01 level 
of significance, in order to find answers for the following research questions: 
1. Whether the factors of gender, age and rank of US Air Force military 
personnel affect the risk of MVCs. 
2. Whether the time of day influences the risk of MVCs.  
3. Whether the type of vehicle (motorized four-wheeled, two-wheeled) 
impacts the risk of MVCs. 
4. Whether alcohol (for the cases for which there was a TOX test) is 
associated with the risk of MVCs.  This thesis considers that the alcohol variable has 
three levels based on the TOX results as below: 
(i) Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) equal to 0.00,  
  (ii) BAC between 0.01 and 0.07, and  
  (iii) BAC between 0.08 and 0.29.  
This study points out that, according to the US Alcohol Policy Information 
System (APIS) website (APIS; 2008) and NHTSA (NHTSA, 2008; 810-920: 1), as of 
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January 2007, in all 50 States, as well as the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, it 
is illegal to drive or operate 4-wheeled or 2-wheeled vehicles with a BAC of .08 
grams per deciliter or above.  Also, the upper level of the BAC for this research is 
0.29% BAC because any grams per deciliter above this % can cause possible death 
(Virginia Tech, 2008).    
 Finally, this thesis will construct and interpret a 99% Confidence Interval for 
the true proportion of the high risk categorical variables’ classes.   
Testing Category Probabilities: Two-Way (Contingency) Table. 
 According to McClave, and others, the Chi-Square: the Two-Way 
(Contingency) Table method is suitable in situations in which there is one categorical 
response variable and one categorical predictor variable and the focus of interest is on 
whether the predictor variable has an effect on the response (McClave and others, 
2008: 564 & 569).   
This study is going to use the Chi-Square Test: Two-way (Contingency) Table 
at α = 0.01, level of significance in order to deal with the following research questions 
as to affect of predictor variables on the response variable: 
1. The response variable is the type of injury with four levels as presented 
below:  
  (i) Fatality: “MVC that results in death from an accident or the 
complications arising therefrom, regardless of the length of time intervening between 
the accident and a subsequent death.”  
(DoD, 2008: 34). 
(ii) Permanent Total or Partial Disability (PT or P Dis) where: 
“Permanent Total disability is any nonfatal injury or occupational illness that, in the 
opinion of competent medical authority, permanently and totally incapacitates a 
person to the extent that he or she cannot follow any gainful occupation and results in 
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a medical discharge or civilian equivalent. (The loss, or the loss of use of both hands, 
both feet, both eyes, or a combination of any of those body parts as a result of a single 
accident will be considered as a permanent total disability.)  
Permanent Partial Disability is an injury or an occupational illness that does not 
result in death or permanent total disability, but, in the opinion of competent medical 
authority, results in permanent impairment through loss or loss of use of any part of 
the body, with the following exceptions:  
loss of teeth, loss of fingernails or toenails, loss of tip of fingers or tip of toe without 
bone involvement, inguinal hernia, if it is repaired, disfigurement and sprains or 
strains that do not cause permanent limitation of motion.”  
(DoD, 2008: 34-35). 
(iii) Lost Time Case: “A nonfatal traumatic injury that causes  
any loss of time from work beyond the day or shift it occurred, or a nonfatal non-
traumatic illness and/or disease that causes disability at any time.” (Department of 
Defense (DoD), 2008: 15).  
  (iv) Minor Injuries.  This level includes the following cases: 
1st Aid Case - Lost Time Hrs – Treated & Released. 
The predictor variables are as follows:  
a. Gender of the US Air Force military personnel with two levels: 
  (i) Male 
  (ii) Female 
  b. Age of the US Air Force military personnel with four levels: 
 (i) 17 – 24 
  (ii) 25 – 34 
  (iii) 35 – 44 
  (iv) 45 and older  
c. Rank of the US Air Force military personnel with five levels:  
(i) Airman 
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  (ii) Non Commission Officer (NCO) 
  (iii) Senior NCO 
  (iv) Company Grade 
  (v) Field Grade 
2. Whether the type of injury which is the response variable with four 
levels (as described above) is influenced by the Time of Day which is the predictor 
variable with the below six levels:  
(i) 0200 – 0559  
  (ii) 0600 – 0959  
  (iii) 1000 – 1359 
(iv) 1400 – 1759 
  (v) 1800 – 2159 
  (vi) 2200 – 0159 
3. Whether the type of injury which is the response variable with four 
levels (as described above) is affected by the type of vehicle which is deemed as 
predictor variable with two levels as below:  
(i) Motorized four-wheeled 
(ii) Motorized two-wheeled 
4. Whether the seatbelt is associated with the type of injury when an 
MVC occurred.  In that case, the response variable is the type of injury with 
four levels (as described above) and the predictor variable is the seatbelt with two 
following levels:  
(i) Seatbelt Usage 
  (ii) Non Seatbelt Usage   
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5. Whether the seatbelt (response variable with two levels as above) is 
associated with the following predictor variables, when a MVC event occurred: 
(i) Gender of the US Air Force military personnel with two 
levels (as described above) 
(ii) Age of the US Air Force military personnel with four levels  
(as described above) 
(iii) Rank of the US Air Force military personnel with five 
levels (as described above).   
 Finally, this thesis will construct and interpret a 99% Confidence Interval for 
the true proportion of some of the above categorical variables’ classes.  
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) - Factorial Analysis 
Based on McClave and others, the factorial analysis is appropriate for 
situations where there is one continuous response variable and numerous categorical 
predictor variables, often at two levels and the area of interest is which predictor 
variables, including the interactions among them, affect the response (McClave and 
others, 2008: 521 & 522). 
Therefore, this study applied the above method in order to: 
 1. Address the 1st research question of the 2nd objective which  
is what factors are associated with the alcohol consumption for those MVCs in which 
US Air Force military personnel were involved and for which there was a 
toxicological (TOX) test. 
and   
 2. Deal with the 2nd research question of the 2nd objective which is the 
identification of factors that affect the number of Lost Days resulting from MVCs in 
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which US Air Force military personnel were involved and affect the total MVCs’ 
direct costs. 
Response Variable. 
 According to McClave and others: 
“The response variable is the variable of interest to be measured in the experiment and 
also it is known as dependent variable.”   
(McClave and others, 2008: 476). 
For the above 1st case, this research is going to use the Alcohol Level in terms 
of the BAC measured by the TOX test as the response variable.  Also, for the 2nd case, 
the response variable is the Total Lost Days, which is the sum of Days Hospitalized 
and Days Qtrs (Days at home) resulting from the MVCs and affecting the total 
MVCs’ direct costs.   
This thesis during its effort to deal with the 2nd investigative question of the 
2nd objective of its analysis encountered an issue through the original data concerning 
the calculation of the lost days in cases of the fatal and permanent total or partial 
disabilities injuries.  Lost days have been calculated in only 24 of 1,104 fatal cases 
and 74 of 242 PT or P Dis cases while the remaining cases were listed with zero lost 
days.  Also, the above non zero cases correspond to the hospitalized days and not to 
the lost work days.  
This research believes that the above two types of injury cause lost work days 
which are beyond the detailed hospitalized days for members of the USAF.  
Moreover, since there is no method to estimate these lost days, this study is going to 
define its own method of extrapolating the lost days for the fatal and PT or P Dis 
injuries. 
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This thesis issued two possible scenarios for specifying the lost days in  
these cases and will discuss them separately in Appendix B.  The main purpose for 
presenting each scenario separately is to provide policy makers the opportunity to 
select the scenario which best suits with their requirements. 
Factors (Predictor Variables), Levels – Treatments. 
 McClave and others define that: 
“1. Factors are those variables whose effect on the response is of interest 
to the experimenter.  Quantitative factors are measured on a numerical scale, whereas 
qualitative factors are those that are not (naturally) measured on a numerical scale.  
Factors are also referred to as independent variables.  
2. Factor Levels are the variable of the factor utilized in the experiment. 
3. The treatments of an experiment are the factor-level combinations 
utilized.”  
(McClave and others, 2008: 476-477). 
The literature review of this study identified many factors that influence, not 
only the alcohol consumption, but also the risk of MVC events as well as the number 
of Lost Days.  The majority of these variables are associated with human factors 
which this thesis believes can be controlled by the US Air Force.  The basic reason 
that this study attempts to identify the factors that are most closely related with 
Alcohol consumption and those which have the most serious impact upon the number 
of Total Lost Days is to attain information that can help the US Air Force policy 
makers make better decisions and design more effective intervention programs, 
specifically tailored to various categories of Air Force military personnel. 
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Table 8 presents the factors that will be tested using the AFSC data, in order to 
examine the relationship of these variables to Alcohol consumption by USAF military 
personnel who have been involved in MVCs.   
Table 8. List of Factors (Independent Variables) for the Alcohol Consumption 
ANOVA 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION VARIABLE NAME 
1. Time of Day DAYT 
2. Gender GEN 
3. Rank RANK 
4. Age Groups AGE 
5. Type of Injury INJ 
6. Seatbelt SEATB 
 
 Table 9 lists the factors that will be examined using the AFSC data, in the 
hope of finding the effect of these variables on the number of Lost Days resulting 
from the MVCs in which the USAF military personnel were involved and which 
negatively influence the US Air Force combat power, productivity, budget and 
mission. 
Table 9. List of Factors (Independent Variables) for the Lost Days ANOVA 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION VARIABLE NAME 
1. Time of Day DAYT 
2. Gender GEN 
3. Rank RANK 
4. Age Groups AGE 
5. Activity ACT 
6. Type of Injury INJ 
7. Alcohol Level BAC 
8. Seatbelt SEATB 
 
 The description of the above factors is as follows: 
1. Time of Day: The levels of this factor are the following six  
time periods: 
(i) 0200 – 0559  
  (ii) 0600 – 0959  
  (iii) 1000 – 1359 
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(iv) 1400 – 1759 
  (v) 1800 – 2159 
  (vi) 2200 – 0159 
2. Gender: This factor includes the following two levels: 
  (i) Male 
  (ii) Female 
3. Rank:  This factor has five levels: 
  (i) Airman 
  (ii) Non Commission Officer (NCO) 
  (iii) Senior NCO 
  (iv) Company Grade 
  (v) Field Grade 
4. Age Groups: The levels of this factor are five as the following age 
categories: 
  (i) 17 – 25 
  (ii) 26 – 30 
  (iii) 31 – 35 
  (iv) 36 – 40 
  (v) 41 and older   
5. Activity: This factor has the below two levels: 
  (i) Driver 
  (ii) Passenger 
6. Injury Groups: The levels of this factor are four as follows: 
  (i) Fatality 
  (ii) Permanent Total or Partial Disability (PT or P Dis) 
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  (iii) Lost Time Case  
  (iv) Minor Injury  
7. Alcohol Level (BAC): The levels of this factor are three as 
below: 
  (i) 0.00 – 0.00   
  (ii) 0.01 – 0.07 
  (iii) 0.08 – 0.29 
8. Seatbelt: This factor has the three following levels: 
  (i) Yes or “Y” (for the belted occupants of the 4W vehicle MVCs) 
  (ii) No or “N” (otherwise) 
  (iii) “Z” in case of 2W vehicle MVCs in which the seatbelt as 
an item of safety equipment does not exist.  
Finally, this thesis can claim that the above models satisfy the assumptions 
required for valid F-Tests in Factorial Experiments. 
Summary 
 This chapter described the database and comprehensively discussed the 
methodology applied by this study in order to address the policy objectives and find 
answers for the investigative questions set forth in Chapter I.  Furthermore, the 
response and predictor variables which this research will use to deal with the 1st 
objective were outlined. 
A thorough introduction was also made of the factors with their levels and 
method used to develop the general linear model in order to tackle the 2nd objective.  
Finally, this chapter outlined the development of the models and the mode of analysis 
that will be carried out in the next chapter.           
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IV. Analysis and Results 
 
 
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter mainly discusses the outcomes of the analysis described in 
Chapter III.  It will be recalled that the main purpose of Chapter III was to discuss the 
methodology applied to conduct this study and to answer the research questions 
presented in Chapter I and Chapter III, in greater details.  In this chapter, this thesis 
first presents some general outcomes of its analysis and continues with the description 
of its analysis results in order to deal with the first policy objective which was the 
identification of risk factors that are related to MVCs and that can influence the 
severity of injuries.   
Results of the Categorical Data Analysis 
General Trends. 
 The tables, figures and inferences in the following pages describe statistics 
based on the MVC data collected by the AFSC from F.Y. 1988 through F.Y. 2007 and 
contain data for MVCs in which US Air Force military personnel were involved as 
drivers and passengers when they were off duty and off base. 
 Table 10 summarizes the USAF Private Motor Vehicle (PMV) mishaps by 
type from F.Y. 1988 through F.Y. 2007  
Table 10. USAF PMV Mishaps, F.Y.: 1988-2007 
TYPE OF MISHAP NUMBER 
Fatal 1,048 
Injury 11,034 
Other/Unknown 321 
TOTAL 12,403 
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Figure 22 provides a graphical representation of the USAF PMV Mishap rate 
per 100,000 USAF military personnel from F.Y. 1988 through F.Y. 2007. 
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Figure 22. USAF PMV Mishap Rate per 100,000 Military Personnel 
 
According to the AFSC data and as the above figure displays, the USAF 
MVCs decreased by 9.88% from 2006 through 2007 but the 2007 MVC rate, 183.09 
crashes per 100,000 USAF military personnel, is still close to the 1988 rate, -which 
was 191.03 crashes per 100,000 USAF military personnel. 
Figures 23 and 24 depict the rates of the fatal and injured PMV Mishaps 
respectively per 100,000 USAF military personnel from F.Y. 1988 through F.Y. 2007. 
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Figure 23. USAF Fatal PMV Mishap Rate per 100,000 Military Personnel 
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Figure 24. USAF Injured PMV Mishap Rate per 100,000 Military Personnel 
 
The data analysis showed that the fatal PMV mishaps increased by 5% from 
2006 through 2007 and the injured PMV mishaps decreased by 6.72% from 2006 
through 2007. 
Table 11 depicts a snap-shot of the traffic crash victims by injury type during 
the twenty year period (F.Y.: 1988-2007). 
Table 11. Traffic Crash Victims, F.Y.: 1988-2007 
 
 Figures 25 and 26 illustrate the rates of the fatalities and injuries respectively 
of MVCs per 100,000 USAF military personnel as drivers and passengers from F.Y. 
1988 through F.Y. 2007. 
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Figure 25. USAF Fatality Rate per 100,000 Military Personnel 
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Figure 26. USAF Injury Rate per 100,000 Military Personnel 
 
The data analysis showed that the fatality rate rose to 12.77 fatalities from 
11.91 fatalities per 100,000 USAF population in 2006 and the injury rate declined to 
187.65 injuries from 195.21 injuries per 100,000 USAF population in 2006. 
Furthermore, the results of the analysis provided evidence which supports with 
99% confidence the assertion that the proportion of USAF members who were in 
MVCs as drivers is 62.42% to 64.82% higher than that of those members who were in 
MVCs as passengers.   
In addition, this study examined whether the Type of Injury caused by the 
MVCs and the Activity (Driver or Passenger) are dependant.  The analysis gave 
strong evidence to conclude that the Type of Injury and Activity are not independent 
but are statistically dependent at α = 0.01 level of significance.  Therefore, this thesis 
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can infer with 99% confidence that the proportion of USAF passengers who died in 
MVCs is 0.19% to 3.56% higher than that of USAF drivers.   
Moreover, USAF members had the same proportion of suffering Permanent 
Total or Partial Disability (PT or P Dis) either as drivers or passengers but the 
proportion of experiencing a Lost Time Case is 4.40% to 8.75% greater if these 
members were drivers instead of passengers.  Lastly, the proportion of USAF 
passengers who suffered Minor Injuries in MVCs is 2.99% to 5.69% larger than that 
of USAF drivers. 
 Following on from the above inferences concerning the general trends of the 
USAF MVCs, this thesis will continue to answer the investigative questions presented 
in Chapters I and III related to the categorical data analysis. 
Investigative Questions Answered. 
 This thesis points out that the level of significance for the following statistical 
inferences is α = 0.01 and that these inferences pertain to the MVCs in which the 
USAF military personnel were involved as drivers unless other status is specified.  
Also, conclusions related to the Gender and Rank of the USAF military personnel 
have been reached taking into consideration the total strength of each of the above 
variables through the twenty years of AFSC data unless another factor is specified 
(such as the total number of the MVCs and not the total strength).  The same 
parameters apply to the inferences made about the USAF Age Groups, which are 
based on a 14 – year history instead of a 20 – year history due to the lack of data 
provided for USAF Age Groups before F.Y. 1994. 
1st Policy Objective.  
As this thesis stated in Chapter I, the 1st policy objective of this research 
attempt was to identify the risk factors that cause MVCs and may influence the 
85 
severity of injuries.  For that reason, a set of exploratory questions was set up.  In the 
following paragraphs this study will reply to these research queries one by one.   
1. Whether the factors of the Gender, Age and Rank of US Air Force 
military personnel affect the risk of MVCs. 
Risk of MVCs and Gender. 
The results of the analysis did not provide strong evidence to support that the 
risk of MVCs and gender are statistically dependent.  Figure 27 depicts the male and 
female MVC rates from F.Y. 1988 through F.Y. 2007.  It is obvious that there is no 
significant difference between the two rates. 
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Figure 27. Male vs. Female MVC Rate per 100,000 Military Personnel 
 
So, this thesis supports with 99% confidence that, for a given USAF member 
who is male, the probability that he was a driver in an MVC was almost the same as 
the probability for a given USAF female member. 
Risk of MVCs and Age – Rank.  
Concerning the Age and the Rank of USAF military personnel, the results of 
the analysis provided strong evidence to support the assertion that MVCs and Age 
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and/or MVCs and Rank among USAF military personnel are both statistically 
dependent. 
 This thesis suggests that the USAF age group which most is at greatest risk for 
an MVC is military personnel aged 17-24 years.  Figure 28 presents the Confidence 
Interval (CI) Plots for the probability of MVCs per Age Group, at the 99% confidence 
level. 
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Figure 28. Confidence Interval Plots for the MVC Probability per Age Group 
 
 Finally, figure 29 illustrates the comparison among USAF Age Groups per 
100,000 USAF population from F.Y. 1994 through F.Y. 2007. 
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Figure 29. Age Group MVC Rate per 100,000 Military Personnel 
 
The above graphs support this thesis assertion.     
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Furthermore, the outcomes of this analysis recommend that the USAF rank 
which most is at highest risk for an MVC is the rank of Airman.  Figure 30 maps the 
CI Plots for the probability of MVCs per Rank Group, at the 99% confidence level. 
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Figure 30. Confidence Interval Plots for the MVC Probability per Rank Group 
 
Lastly, figure 31 displays the comparison among the rank groups per 100,000 
USAF population from F.Y. 1988 through F.Y. 2007; this information also supports 
this thesis deduction.  
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Figure 31. Rank Groups MVC Rate per 100,000 Military Personnel 
 
2. Whether the Time of Day influences the risk of MVCs.  
 The outcomes of this analysis revealed strong evidence to suggest the 
existence of a difference in the proportion of the Time of Day in which USAF military 
88 
personnel were involved in MVCs.  The most risky time period of the day seems to be 
between 1400 and 1759 hours. 
Furthermore, figure 32 depicts the CI Plots for the proportion of MVCs per 
Time of Day, at the 99% confidence level. 
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Figure 32. Confidence Interval Plots for the MVC Proportion per Time of Day 
 
Finally, figure 33 provides a graphical comparison among the Time of Day 
MVC percentages (%) from F.Y. 1997 through F.Y. 2007.  
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Figure 33. MVC Percentages by Time of Day 
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3. Whether the type of vehicle (motorized four-wheeled (4W), two-
wheeled (2W)) impacts the risk of MVCs. 
 The results of the analysis provided evidence to demonstrate that the 
proportion of USAF military personnel who were involved in MVCs as drivers-using 
4W vehicles is different to the proportion of USAF military personnel who were 
involved in MVCs as drivers using 2W vehicles.   
This research asserts with 99% confidence that the proportion of USAF 
members who were drivers of 4W vehicles in MVCs is 34.50% to 37.70% higher than 
that of those members who were drivers of 2W vehicles.  Figure 34 provides a 
pictorial presentation of the contrast between 4W and 2W vehicle MVC percentages 
(%) from F.Y. 1988 through F.Y. 2007. 
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Figure 34. MVC Percentages by Type of Vehicle 
 
4. Whether alcohol (for those cases for which there was a TOX test) 
is associated with the risk of MVCs.  
The results of the analysis provided strong evidence to conclude that there is a 
difference in the proportion of the Air Force military personnel’s BAC groups who 
were involved in MVCs.  However, this analysis cannot reach any conclusions about 
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the relation between alcohol consumption and the risk of MVCs because TOX tests 
were not conducted for all of the MVCs in the data.  TOX tests were performed only 
for a small number of MVCs, most likely in cases in which there were strong 
indications that the drivers had consumed alcohol before driving.  
Therefore, this thesis can state with 99% confidence that provided a USAF 
member was in an MVC as a driver and a TOX test was conducted for this member 
after the MVC, the proportions of each BAC level are as follows: 
  (i) BAC equal to 0.00 is 7.71% to 13.42% 
  (ii) BAC between 0.01 and 0.07 is 10.07% to 16.38% and 
  (iii) BAC between 0.08 and 0.29 is 72.58% to 80.47%. 
Finally, figure 35 demonstrates the comparison among the BAC levels from 
F.Y. 1988 through F.Y. 2007, which also supports these thesis findings concerning 
the BAC proportions. 
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Figure 35. BAC Level Percentages by F.Y. 
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5. Whether the Type of Injury are affected by the Gender, Age and 
Rank of the US Air Force military personnel.   
Type of Injury and Gender. 
The results of the analysis provided strong evidence to conclude that the Type 
of Injury and Gender of the USAF military personnel are statistically dependent.  
This thesis asserts with 99% confidence that for a given male member of the 
USAF the probability that he: 
 (i) died in an MVC as a driver was 0.004% to 0.008% higher than 
the probability of a given USAF female member having died in an MVC as a driver.  
Figure 36 illustrates the contrast among USAF Gender fatality rates per 100,000 
USAF population from F.Y.: 1988 through F.Y. 2007. 
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Figure 36. Fatality Rate per 100,000 Military Personnel by USAF Gender 
   
(ii) suffered PT or P Dis in an MVC as a driver was 0.0004%  
to 0.0023% higher than the probability of a given USAF female member having 
suffered PT or P Dis in an MVC as a driver 
  (iii) experienced Lost Time Case in an MVC as a driver was  
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almost identical to the probability of a given USAF female member having 
experienced Lost Time Case in an MVC as a driver 
  (iv) sustained a Minor Injury in an MVC as a driver was almost the 
same as the probability for a given USAF female member having sustained a Minor 
Injury in an MVC as a driver.   
Type of Injury and Age Groups – Rank. 
The results of the analysis did not provide strong evidence to support that  the 
Type of Injury and the Age Group or the Type of Injury and the Rank of the USAF 
military personnel are statistically dependent at α = 0.01. 
However, some additional hypothesis tests were conducted in order to check if 
there is any tendency for either Age or Rank Group to correlate to a specific Type of 
Injury. 
Figure 37 displays the CI Plots for the probabilities of Fatal and PT or P Dis 
MVCs per Age Group, at the 99% confidence level. 
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Figure 37. Confidence Interval Plots for the Fatal and PT or P Dis MVC 
Probabilities per Age Group 
 
Also, figure 38 gives the pictorial comparison among USAF Age Groups 
fatality rates per 100,000 USAF population from F.Y. 1994 through F.Y. 2007. 
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Figure 38. Fatality Rate per 100,000 Military Personnel by USAF Age Groups 
 
In addition, figure 39 demonstrates the CI Plots for the probabilities of Lost 
Time Case and Minor Injury MVCs per Age Group, at the 99% confidence level. 
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Figure 39. Confidence Interval Plots for the Lost Time Case and Minor Inj MVC 
Probabilities per Age Group 
 
Likewise, figure 40 describes the CI Plots for the probabilities of Fatal and PT 
or P Dis MVCs per Rank Group, at the 99% confidence level. 
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Figure 40. Confidence Interval Plots for the Fatal and PT or P Dis MVC 
Probabilities per Rank Group 
 
Also, figure 41 shows the USAF Rank fatality rates per 100,000 USAF 
population from F.Y. 1988 through F.Y. 2007. 
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Figure 41. Fatality Rate per 100,000 Military Personnel by USAF Rank 
 
Moreover, figure 42 depicts the CI Plots for the probabilities of Lost Time 
Case and Minor Injury MVCs per Rank Group, at the 99% confidence level. 
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Figure 42. Confidence Interval Plots for the Lost Time Case and Minor Inj MVC 
Probabilities per Rank Group 
 
6. Whether the Type of Injury is influenced by the Time of Day. 
The outcomes of this analysis revealed strong evidence to suggest that the 
Type of Injury and the Time of Day are statistically dependent. 
Furthermore, table 12 reveals the pair wise comparisons for the proportions’ 
CIs of Fatal MVCs related to the Time of Day, at the 99% confidence level. 
Table 12. Pair Wise Comparisons for the Proportions’ Confidence Intervals of 
Fatal MVCs among the Time of Day Periods 
TIM
E OF 
DAY 
0200-
0559 0600-0959 1000-1359 1400-1759 1800-2159 2200-0159 
0200
-
0559 
  > (1.90% - 12.49%) 
> (3.80% - 
14.06%) 
> (4.54% - 
14.36%) 
> (3.39% - 
13.50%) ≈  
0600
-
0959 
< (1.90% 
- 
12.49%) 
  ≈  ≈  ≈  < (0.055% - 8.62%) 
1000
-
1359 
< (3.80% 
- 
14.06%) 
≈    ≈  ≈  < (2.00% - 10.16%) 
1400
-
1759 
< (4.54% 
- 
14.36%) 
≈  ≈    ≈  < (2.80% - 10.40%) 
1800
-
2159 
< (3.39% 
- 
13.50%) 
≈  ≈  ≈    < (1.61% - 9.57%) 
2200
-
0159 
≈  > (0.055% - 8.62%) 
> (2.00% - 
10.16%) 
> (2.80% - 
10.40%) 
> (1.61% - 
9.57%)   
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Figure 43 maps the contrast among the Time of Day fatality percentages (%) 
from F.Y. 1997 through F.Y. 2007. 
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Figure 43. Fatality Percentages Comparison among the Time of Day Periods 
 
In addition, this thesis is 99% confident that the proportion of USAF members 
who suffered PT or P Dis in MVCs was almost the same, independently of the Time 
of Day of the MVC occurrence. 
Moreover, table 13 presents the pair wise comparisons for the proportions’ CIs 
of Lost Time Case MVCs related to the Time of Day, at the 99% confidence level. 
Table 13. Pair Wise Comparisons for the Proportions’ Confidence Intervals of 
Lost Time Case MVCs among the Time of Day Periods 
TIME 
OF 
DAY 
0200-
0559 
0600-
0959 
1000-
1359 
1400-
1759 
1800-
2159 2200-0159 
0200-
0559   
< (5.09% 
- 17.83%) 
< (7.01% 
- 
19.46%) 
< (7.44% 
- 19.33%) 
< (5.32% 
- 
17.63%) 
≈  
0600-
0959 
> (5.09% - 
17.83%)   ≈  ≈  ≈  
> (2.54% - 
13.10%) 
1000-
1359 
> (7.01% - 
19.46%) ≈    ≈  ≈  
> (4.50% - 
14.69%) 
1400-
1759 
> (7.44% - 
19.33%) ≈  ≈    ≈  
> (4.99% - 
14.50%) 
1800-
2159 
> (5.32% - 
17.63%) ≈  ≈  ≈    
> (2.83% - 
12.85%) 
2200-
0159 ≈  
< (2.54% 
- 13.10%) 
< (4.50% 
- 
14.69%) 
< (4.99% 
- 14.50%) 
< (2.83% 
- 
12.85%) 
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Finally, this study suggests with 99% confidence that the proportion of USAF 
members who sustained Minor Injuries in MVCs was almost the same, independently 
of the Time of Day of the MVC occurrence. 
 7. Whether the Type of Injury is affected by the Type of Vehicle that 
USAF military personnel use either as drivers or passengers.  
Type of Injury and Type of Vehicle (USAF Drivers). 
The results of the analysis provided evidence which suggests that the Type of 
Injury and the Type of Vehicle that the USAF military personnel drivers use are 
statistically dependent. 
 Additionally, this thesis supports with 99% confidence the assertion that, 
given that USAF members were in MVCs as drivers, the proportion of USAF 
members who: 
(i) died was almost the same regardless of whether the  
members were driving 4W or 2W vehicles. 
Figure 44 describes the driver fatality percentages (%) by Type of Vehicle 
from F.Y. 1988 through F.Y. 2007. 
 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
Fiscal Year (F.Y.)
%
 O
F 
FA
TA
LI
TI
ES
% OF MVCs' FATALITIES BY 4W % OF MVCs' FATALITIES BY 2W
 
Figure 44. Driver Fatality Percentages Comparison between the Types of Vehicle 
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(ii) suffered PT or P Dis was 0.09% to 1.57% higher if the  
members were driving 2W rather than 4W vehicles   
(iii) experienced Lost Time Case was almost the same,  
independently of whether the members were driving 4W or 2W vehicles 
(iv) suffered Minor Injury was 1.17% to 2.48% higher if the 
members were driving 4W rather than 2W vehicles.   
Type of Injury and Type of Vehicle (USAF Passengers). 
The results of the analysis provided evidence to suggest that the Type of Injury 
and the Type of Vehicle in which USAF military personnel ride as passengers are 
statistically dependent. 
 Furthermore, this research supports with 99% confidence that, given USAF 
members were in MVCs as passengers, the proportion of USAF members who: 
(i) died was almost the same, independently of whether the 
members were passengers in/on 4W or 2W vehicles. 
Figure 45 provides a picture of the passenger fatality percentages (%) by Type 
of the Vehicle. 
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Figure 45. Passenger Fatality Percentages Comparison between the Types of 
Vehicle 
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(ii) suffered PT or P Dis was  almost the same,  
independently of whether the members were passengers in/on 4W or 2W vehicles 
(iii) experienced Lost Time Case was almost the same,  
independently of whether the members were passengers in 4W or 2W vehicles 
(iv) suffered Minor Injury was 0.001% to 0.46% higher if the 
members were passengers in/on 4W rather than 2W vehicles. 
8. Whether the Seatbelt factor (usage vs non usage by USAF military 
personnel involved in MVCs as either drivers or passengers) is associated with 
the Type of Injury. 
Type of Injury and Seatbelt (USAF Drivers). 
The results of the analysis provided strong evidence to conclude that the Type 
of Injury and Seatbelt factor are statistically dependent as regards USAF drivers.  
This thesis states with 99% confidence that, given USAF members were in 
MVCs as drivers, the proportion of USAF members who: 
  (i) died was 18.15% to 25.98% higher if the members 
were not utilizing their seatbelts as contrasted with those who used seatbelts. 
Figure 46 depicts the Seatbelt fatality percentages (%) from F.Y. 1988 through 
F.Y. 2007 in MVCs in which the USAF military personnel were involved as drivers. 
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Figure 46. Belted vs. Unbelted Drivers in Case of Fatal MVCs 
100 
   
(ii) suffered PT or P Dis was 1.59% to 5.22% greater if the  
members were unbelted rather than belted drivers   
(iii) experienced Lost Time Case was 20.52% to 28.89%  
higher if the members were belted rather than unbelted drivers 
(iv) sustained Minor Injury was almost the same for unbelted  
and belted drivers. 
Type of Injury and Seatbelt (USAF Passengers). 
The results of the analysis provided strong evidence to support that the Type 
of Injury and Seatbelt factor are statistically dependent in cases concerning USAF 
passengers.  
This thesis states with 99% confidence that, given that USAF members were 
in MVCs as passengers, the proportion of USAF members who: 
(i) died was 8.79% to 18.15% higher if the members were  
unbelted rather than belted passengers. 
Figure 47 portrays the Seatbelt fatality percentages (%) from F.Y. 1988 
through F.Y. 2007 in MVCs in which USAF military personnel were involved as 
passengers. 
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Figure 47. Belted vs. Unbelted Passengers in Case of Fatal MVCs 
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(ii) suffered PT or P Dis was almost the same for unbelted  
and belted passengers   
  (iii) experienced Lost Time Case was 7.49% to 18.29% higher if the 
members were belted rather than unbelted passengers 
(iv) sustained Minor Injury was almost the same for unbelted  
and belted passengers. 
9. Whether the seatbelt is associated with gender, age and rank of 
USAF military personnel, when an MVC event occurred. 
The results of the analysis provided strong evidence to deduce that Seatbelt 
and Gender, Seatbelt and Age Groups and Seatbelt and Rank of USAF military 
personnel are statistically dependent.  
This thesis asserts with 99% confidence that the proportion of USAF female 
belted drivers in MVCs, was 6.41% to 10.05% higher than that of USAF male belted 
drivers.   
Figure 48 gives a picture of the contrast between USAF male and female 
seatbelt usage from F.Y. 1988 through F.Y. 2007.  The USAF females display a 
propensity to wear seatbelts more than do USAF males.  
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Figure 48. Seatbelt Usage Percentages by USAF Gender 
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Regarding the Seatbelt and Age Group of USAF military personnel, table 14 
portrays the pair wise comparisons for the proportions’ CIs of belted drivers in MVCs 
related to Age Groups, at the 99% confidence level. 
Table 14. Pair Wise Comparisons for the Proportions’ Confidence Intervals of 
Belted Drivers in MVCs among Age Groups 
AGE 
GROUPS 17-24 25-34 35-44 45 & Over 
17-24   < (1.25% - 6.32%) 
< (0.61% - 
7.28%) 
< (0.21% - 
13.45%) 
25-34 > (1.25% - 6.32%)   ≈  ≈  
35-44 > (0.61% - 7.28%) ≈    ≈  
45 & 
Over 
> (0.21% - 
13.45%) ≈  ≈    
 
Furthermore, figure 49 illustrates the comparison among the USAF Age 
Groups seatbelt usage from F.Y. 1988 through F.Y. 2007. 
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Figure 49. Seatbelt Usage Percentages by USAF Age Groups 
 
Finally, concerning the Seatbelt and Rank of USAF military personnel, table 
15 presents the pair wise comparisons for the proportions’ CIs of belted drivers in 
MVCs related to Rank Groups, at the 99% confidence level. 
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Table 15. Pair Wise Comparisons for the Proportions’ Confidence Intervals of 
Belted Drivers in MVCs among Rank Groups 
RANK 
GROUPS AIRMAN NCO 
SENIOR 
NCO 
COMPAN
Y GRADE 
FIELD 
GRADE 
AIRMAN   < (2.72% - 6.88%) ≈  
< (4.71% - 
11.10%) ≈  
NCO > (2.72% - 6.88%)   ≈  ≈  ≈  
SENIOR 
NCO ≈  ≈    
< (0.79% - 
11.05%) ≈  
COMPA
NY 
GRADE 
> (4.71% - 
11.10%) ≈  
> (0.79% - 
11.05%)   ≈  
FIELD 
GRADE ≈  ≈  ≈  ≈    
 
Lastly, figure 50 provides the pictorial comparison for USAF Rank seatbelt 
usage from F.Y. 1988 through F.Y. 2007. 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
Fiscal Year (F.Y.)
%
 o
f S
ea
tb
el
t 
U
sa
ge
% OF BELTED AIRMAN IN MVC % OF BELTED NCO IN MVC 
% OF BELTED SENIOR NCO IN MVC % OF BELTED COMPANY GRADE IN MVC
% OF BELTED FIELD GRADE IN MVC
 
Figure 50. Seatbelt Usage Percentages by USAF Rank 
 
Results of the ANOVA  
2nd Policy Objective. 
As this thesis stated in Chapters I and III, one of the primary policy objectives 
of this research effort was to identify the factors that are associated with alcohol 
consumption before driving and which affect the number of lost workdays resulting 
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from MVCs and influence the total MVC direct costs and USAF budgets.  As 
described in Chapter III, this thesis applied Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to each of 
the following two research questions.   
1. What factors are related to alcohol consumption for those MVCs 
for which there was a toxicological (TOX) test? 
Alcohol Consumption ANOVA Model Outcomes.  
This thesis has to point out that the following statistical inferences pertain to 
MVCs in which USAF military personnel were involved as drivers.  In order to 
approach the above question, this study applied Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with 
the BAC as the response variable.  The factors of the model and their levels have been 
described in Chapter III.  The ANOVA results using Minitab are presented in Table 
16.  
Table 16. BAC ANOVA Model Results 
Response Variable: Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) 
 
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P-value 
DAYT 5 0.126394 0.127124 0.025425 5.05 0.000 
RANK 4 0.110370 0.119063 0.029766 5.91 0.000 
SEATB 2 0.122177 0.122177 0.061089 12.14 0.000 
Error 648 3.260939 3.260939 0.005032   
Total 659 3.619879     
S = 0.0709388 
R-Sq = 9.92% 
R-Sq (adj) = 8.39% 
 
Finally, the results of the analysis provided evidence to conclude that none of 
the interactions of the above factors is statistically significant not only at α=0.01 but 
also at α=0.10.  Figure 51 demonstrates the salient effects of the factors to the 
response variable. 
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Figure 51. Main Effects Graph (BAC ANOVA Model) 
 
Multiple Comparisons (BAC ANOVA Model). 
 A pair wise comparison analysis revealed evidence to deduce the following 
inferences by factor: 
 A) Time of Day. 
  USAF drivers involved in crashes between:  
(i) 0200 to 0559 had a significantly higher BAC than did  
USAF drivers involved in crashes between 1800 and 2159 at α=0.01 level of 
significance 
  (ii) 0600 to 0959 had a significantly higher BAC than did USAF 
drivers involved in crashes between 1800 and 2159 at α=0.05 level of significance  
  (iii) 2200 to 0159 had a significantly higher BAC than did USAF 
drivers involved in crashes between 1800 and 2159 at α=0.01 level of significance. 
(iv) No other pair was significantly different. 
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 B) Rank. 
  USAF drivers with the rank of:  
(i) NCO had a significantly higher BAC than did USAF  
drivers with the rank of Airman at α=0.01 level of significance 
  (ii) NCO had a significantly higher BAC than did USAF drivers 
with the rank of Company Grade at α=0.05 level of significance 
  (iii) Senior NCO had a significantly higher BAC than did  USAF 
drivers with the rank of Company Grade at α=0.05 level of significance 
(iv) No other pair was significantly different. 
 C) Seatbelt Usage. 
  USAF drivers who did not wear seatbelts had a significantly higher 
BAC, not only than did USAF drivers who did wear a seatbelt, but also higher than 
did 2W USAF drivers at α = 0.01 level of significance.     
2. What factors influence the number of lost workdays resulting from 
MVCs in which USAF military personnel were involved?  
In order to approach the above question, this thesis applied ANOVA.  The 
Lost Days resulting from MVCs in which USAF military members were involved, 
either as drivers or passengers, is considered to be the response variable.  The Time of 
Day, Gender, Rank, Age, Activity, Injury Groups, BAC, and Seatbelt are the factors 
of the model with their levels as described in Chapter III.  In the following paragraphs 
this study will present the outcomes of its analysis by scenario. 
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1st ANOVA Model Outcomes. 
Table 17 presents the most statistically significant factors and their 
interactions that affect the Lost Days for the 1st scenario.   
Table 17. 1st ANOVA Model Results for the Lost Days 
Response Variable: Log(Lost Days)  
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P-value 
DAYT 5 239.88 13.13 2.63 16.03 0.000 
GEN 1 135.99 0.34 0.34 2.07 0.151 
RANK 4 94.00 49.18 12.29 75.05 0.000 
ACT 1 0.00 1.86 1.86 11.37 0.001 
INJ 3 5,390.07 208.18 69.39 423.58 0.000 
BAC         2 6.90 3.71 1.86 11.33 0.000 
SEATB 2 88.86 6.66 3.33 20.33 0.000 
GEN*SEATB 2 3.61 2.46 1.23 7.50 0.001 
RANK*INJ 12 642.52 538.17 44.85 273.75 0.000 
RANK*BAC 8 2.07 4.70 0.59 3.59 0.000 
RANK*SEATB 8 9.22 8.77 1.10 6.69 0.000 
INJ*BAC 6 10.26 8.05 1.34 8.19 0.000 
INJ*SEATB 6 24.12 24.12 4.02 24.54 0.000 
Error 8,249 1,351.38 1,351.38 0.16   
Total 8,309 7,998.88     
S = 0.404751 
R-Sq = 83.11% 
R-Sq (adj) = 82.98% 
 
This study also will describe the results of Multiple Comparisons for the 
significant factors and their interactions at α = 0.01 level of significance unless 
another level of significance is specified.   
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Main Effects (1st ANOVA Model). 
Figure 52 demonstrates the main effects of factors on the response variable. 
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Figure 52. Main Effects Graph (1st ANOVA Model) 
 
According to figure 52 and based on the pair wise comparison analysis, this 
study can make the following inferences: 
 A) Time of Day 
  This research supports the assertion that the MVCs which occurred in 
the two 4 hour groups from 2200 to 0559 resulted in a significantly higher number of 
Lost Days than the crashes that eventuated in the remaining four 4 hour groups from 
0600 to 2159.  No other pair is significantly different. 
 B) Gender 
  This thesis model does not provide any strong evidence that may 
support the significant difference between USAF male and female drivers in terms of 
Lost Days.  This study retains this factor in the model because its interaction with the 
Seatbelt factor is statistically significant. 
 C) Rank 
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The results of the analysis indicate that USAF members  
with the rank of Senior NCO involved in MVCs caused a significantly lower number 
of Lost Days compared to any other rank groups.  No other pair is significantly 
different. 
 D) Activity 
  This research asserts that USAF military members involved in MVCs 
as passengers incurred a significantly higher number of Lost Days than those who 
were involved in MVCs as drivers.  
E) Type of Injury 
  The results of the analysis provided evidence that supports the 
assertion that the largest number of Lost Days was caused by the USAF members who 
sustained: 
(i) PT or P Dis injuries, rather than fatal injuries at α=0.05  
level of significance 
(ii) PT or P Dis and fatal injuries instead of either Lost Time  
Case or Minor Injuries  
(iii) Lost Time Case rather than Minor Injuries. 
 F) BAC  
The model suggests that USAF members who caused  
a significantly larger number of Lost Days had BAC equal to: 
(i) 0.08 - 0.29 rather than 0.00   
(ii) 0.01 - 0.07 rather than 0.00  
  (iii) No other pair is significantly different. 
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G) Seatbelt 
  This analysis shows that USAF members who incurred a significantly 
higher number of Lost Days were: 
(i) occupants of 2W rather than belted or unbelted  
occupants of 4W vehicle and  
(ii) belted rather than unbelted occupants of 4W vehicle. 
Interactions (1st ANOVA Model). 
Figure 53 demonstrates the most significant interaction effects of the factors 
on the response variable. 
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Figure 53. Interaction Graph (1st ANOVA Model) 
 
Based on the figure 53 and the pair wise comparison analysis this study can 
make the following conclusions: 
A) Gender and Seatbelt 
  Based on the Appendix C, this thesis can state that a significantly 
higher number of Lost Days are incurred by USAF: 
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   (i) male or female occupants of 2W vehicles rather than females, 
either belted or unbelted, and male unbelted occupants in 4W vehicles   
(ii) female occupants of 2W vehicles rather than male belted  
occupant in 4W vehicles at α=0.05 level of significance 
  (iii) male or female belted occupants rather than female unbelted 
occupants  
  (iv) male belted occupants rather than female belted or male 
unbelted occupants 
  (v) No other pair is significantly different. 
B) Rank and Type of Injury 
According to the Appendix D, this thesis can state that  
a significantly higher number of Lost Days was incurred by MVCs which involved 
USAF military members with the rank of: 
  (i) Airman, Company Grade and NCO who experienced either 
fatal or PT or P Dis injuries rather than Airman, Company Grade, Field Grade, NCO 
and Senior NCO who incurred either Lost Time Case or Minor Injuries, or Field 
Grade and Senior NCO who experienced fatal injuries and Senior NCO who sustained 
PT or P Dis injuries   
(ii) Field Grade who experienced either fatal or PT  
or P Dis injuries rather than Airman, Company Grade, Field Grade, NCO and Senior 
NCO who incurred either Lost Time Case or Minor Injuries and Senior NCO who 
experienced fatal or PT or P Dis injuries   
  (iii) Field Grade incurring Lost Time Case rather than Airman, 
Company Grade, NCO and Senior NCO who incurred either Lost Time Case or Minor 
Injuries or Field Grade who sustained Minor Injuries and Senior NCO who 
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experienced either fatal or PT or P Dis injuries.  However, the difference in terms of 
Lost Days between Field Grade incurred Lost Time Case and Company Grade, NCO 
and Senior NCO who suffered the same type of injury is significant at α=0.05 level of 
significance 
(iv) Airman, Company Grade, NCO and Senior NCO who  
incurred Lost Time Case rather than Airman, Company Grade, NCO and Senior NCO 
who suffered Minor Injuries or Senior NCO who experienced either fatal or PT or P 
Dis injuries.  However, the difference in terms of Lost Days between Airman, 
Company Grade who sustained Lost Time Case and Senior NCO who suffered PT or 
P Dis injuries is significant at α=0.05 level of significance 
  (v) the rank of Senior NCO who underwent PT or P Dis Injuries 
rather than Airman who suffered Minor Injuries or Senior NCO who experienced fatal 
injuries at α=0.05 level of significance 
  (vi) No other pair is significantly different. 
C) Rank and BAC 
  Based on the Appendix E, this thesis can assert that a significantly 
higher number of Lost Days was incurred by those USAF military members with the 
rank of: 
   (i) Airman, Company Grade, NCO independently of their BAC 
levels and Field Grade with BAC equal to 0.01 - 0.07 and 0.08 - 0.29 rather than Field 
Grade with BAC equals to 0.00 or Senior NCO with any of the three BAC groups.  
However, the difference in terms of Lost Days between Company Grade with BAC 
equal to 0.01 - 0.07 and Field Grade with 0.00 BAC is significant at α=0.05 level of 
significance 
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  (ii) Field Grade with 0.00 BAC rather than Senior NCO with BAC 
equal to 0.00 and 0.08 - 0.29 
  (iii) No other pair is significantly different. 
D) Rank and Seatbelt 
  According to the Appendix F, this thesis can support the statement that 
a significantly higher number of Lost Days was incurred by those USAF military 
members who were: 
  (i) belted or unbelted occupants of 4W and occupants of 2W with 
the rank of Airman, Company Grade, Field Grade and NCO  rather than belted or 
unbelted occupants of 4W and occupants of 2W with the rank of Senior NCO.  
However, the difference in terms of Lost Days between unbelted Field Grade 
occupants of 4W and occupants of 2W with the rank of Senior NCO is significant at 
α=0.05 level of significance 
  (ii) unbelted occupants of 4W with the rank of Airman or NCO, 
belted occupants with the rank of Field Grade and occupants of 2W with the rank of 
Airman, Company Grade, Field Grade and NCO rather than unbelted occupants of 
4W with the rank of Field Grade. However, the difference in terms of Lost Days 
between unbelted Airman and NCO and unbelted Field Grade is significant at α=0.05 
level of significance 
  (iii) occupants of 2W with the rank of Airman rather than belted 
Airman in 4W 
  (iv) occupants of 2W with the rank of NCO rather than belted NCO 
in 4W 
  (v) No other pair is significantly different. 
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E) Injury and BAC 
Based on Appendix G, this thesis suggests that a  
significantly higher number of Lost Days was incurred by those USAF military 
members who experienced: 
   (i) either fatal or PT or P Dis injuries rather than Lost Time Case 
and Minor Injuries, independently of their BAC  
  (ii) PT or P Dis injuries with BAC equal either to 0.00 or 0.08 - 
0.29 rather than fatal injuries with 0.00 BAC.  However, the difference in terms of 
Lost Days between PT or P Dis with 0.00 BAC and fatal injuries with 0.00 BAC is 
significant at α=0.05 level of significance 
   (iii) Lost Time Case rather than Minor Injuries at any BAC level  
(iv) Lost Time Case with BAC equals to 0.01 - 0.07 and 0.08 
- 0.29 rather than Lost Time Case with BAC equal to 0.00   
  (v) No other pair is significantly different. 
 F) Injury and Seatbelt 
According to the Appendix H, this thesis can claim that a 
significantly higher number of Lost Days was caused by those USAF military 
members who sustained: 
   (i) either fatal or PT or P Dis injuries rather than Lost Time Case 
and Minor Injuries, independently of whether they were belted or unbelted occupants 
of 4W vehicles or occupants of 2W vehicles 
  (ii) fatal injuries while they were either belted occupants in the 4W 
or occupants of 2W vehicles rather than fatal injuries while they were unbelted 
occupants in 4W vehicles 
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  (iii) PT or P Dis injuries  while they were either occupants of 2W 
vehicles or belted occupants of 4W vehicles rather than fatal injuries while they were 
unbelted occupants 
  (iv) PT or P Dis injuries  while they were occupants of 2W 
vehicles rather than fatal injuries while they were belted occupants of 4W vehicles at 
α=0.05 level of significance 
  (v) PT or P Dis injuries  while they were occupants of 2W vehicle 
rather than PT or P Dis injuries while they were unbelted occupants at α=0.05 level of 
significance 
  (vi) Lost Time Case rather than Minor Injuries independently of 
whether they were belted or unbelted occupants of 4W or occupants of 2W vehicle 
  (vii) Lost Time Case while they were occupants of 2W rather than 
Lost Time Case while they were belted or unbelted occupants in the 4W vehicle  
  (viii) Minor injuries while they were either belted occupants in the 
4W or occupants of 2W vehicle rather than Minor injuries while they were unbelted 
occupants in the 4W vehicle at α=0.05 level of significance 
  (ix) No other pair is significantly different.   
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2nd ANOVA Model Outcomes. 
Table 18 presents the most statistically significant factors and their 
interactions that affect the Lost Days for the 2nd scenario.  
Table 18. 2nd ANOVA Model Results for the Lost Days 
Response Variable: Log(Lost Days)  
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P-value 
DAYT 5 89.129 12.167 2.433 15.52 0.000 
GEN 1 85.631 0.203 0.203 1.30 0.255 
AGE 4 9.210 7.438 1.859 11.86 0.000 
ACT 1 1.312 1.173 1.173 7.48 0.006 
INJ 3 1,815.484 216.533 72.178 460.23 0.000 
BAC 2 4.834 0.433 0.217 1.38 0.251 
SEATB 2 89.651 4.715 2.357 15.03 0.000 
GEN*SEATB 2 3.378 2.725 1.362 8.69 0.000 
INJ*BAC 6 12.920 10.553 1.759 11.21 0.000 
INJ*SEATB 6 22.828 22.828 3.805 24.26 0.000 
Error 8,041 1,261.055 1,261.055 0.157   
Total 8,073 3,395.432     
S = 0.396015 
R-Sq = 62.86% 
R-Sq (adj) = 62.71% 
 
This study will also describe the results of the Multiple Comparisons for the 
significant factors and their interactions at α = 0.01 level of significance unless 
another level of significance is specified.   
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Main Effects (2nd ANOVA Model). 
Figure 54 displays the primary effects of the factors on the response variable. 
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Figure 54. Main Effects Graph (2nd ANOVA Model) 
 
 According to the above figure, and based on the pair wise comparison 
analysis, this study can make the following inferences: 
 A) Time of the Day 
  This research supports that the MVCs which occurred in the two 4 
hour groups from 2200 to 0559 resulted in a significantly higher number of Lost Days 
than did the crashes that eventuated in the remaining four 4 hour groups from 0600 to 
2159.  No other pair is significantly different. 
 B) Gender 
  This thesis model does not provide any strong evidence that may 
support any significant difference between USAF male and female drivers in terms of 
the Lost Days.  This study retains this factor in the model because its interaction with 
the Seatbelt factor is statistically significant. 
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C) Age Groups 
The results of the analysis indicate that the largest number of  
Lost Days were caused by the USAF members involved in MVC as occupants aged: 
(i) 41 and over, rather than drivers aged 17 – 25, 26 – 30  
and 31 – 35 years old  
(ii) 41 and over, rather than drivers aged 36 – 40 years old at  
α=0.05 level of significance   
(iii) 36 – 40 years old rather than drivers aged 17 – 25 years  
old at α=0.05 level of significance  
(iv) No other pair is significantly different. 
 D) Activity 
  This research asserts that the USAF military members involved in 
MVCs as passengers caused a significantly higher number of Lost Days than those 
who were involved in MVCs as drivers.   
E) Type of Injury 
  The results of the analysis provided evidence that supports the 
assertion that the largest number of Lost Days was caused by the USAF members who 
experienced: 
  (i) either fatal or PT or P Dis injuries rather than Lost Time  
Case or Minor Injuries  
  (ii) Lost Time Case rather than Minor Injuries 
  (iii) No other pair is significantly different. 
 F) BAC 
  This thesis model does not provide any strong evidence that supports 
any significant difference in BAC in terms of Lost Days.  This study keeps this factor 
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in the model because its interaction with the Type of Injury factor is statistically 
significant. 
G) Seatbelt 
This analysis shows that the the USAF members who caused  
a significantly higher number of Lost Days was: 
(i) occupants of 2W rather than belted occupants of 4W  
vehicle and  
(ii) occupants of 2W rather than unbelted occupants of 4W  
vehicle at α=0.05 level of significance. 
  (iii) No other pair is significantly different.  
 Interactions (2nd ANOVA Model). 
Figure 55 demonstrates the most significant interaction effects of the factors 
on the response variable.  
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Figure 55. Interaction Graph (2nd ANOVA Model) 
 
Based on the figure 55 and the pair wise comparison analysis this study can 
make the following conclusions: 
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A) Gender and Seatbelt 
According to the Appendix I, this thesis can claim that a  
significantly higher number of Lost Days was caused by the USAF: 
   (i) male or female, occupants of 2W vehicle and male either belted 
or unbelted occupant of 4W vehicle rather than female belted occupant of 4W vehicle   
(ii) female, occupant of 2W vehicle rather than male belted  
occupant of 4W vehicle  
(iii) female, occupant of 2W vehicle rather than unbelted  
female occupant of 4W vehicle at α=0.05 level of significance 
(iv) male, occupant of 2W vehicle rather than belted male  
occupant of 4W vehicle at α=0.05 level of significance 
  (v) No other pair is significantly different. 
B) Type of Injury and BAC 
Based on the Appendix J, this thesis can claim that a  
significantly higher number of Lost Days was caused by those USAF military 
members who experienced: 
   (i) either fatal or PT or P Dis injuries rather than Lost Time Case 
and Minor Injuries independently of their BAC levels  
  (ii) Lost Time Case rather than Minor Injuries independently of 
their BAC groups 
  (iii) Lost Time Case with BAC equal to 0.01 - 0.07 and 0.08 - 0.29 
rather than Lost Time Case with BAC equal to 0.00   
  (iv) No other pair is significantly different. 
C) Type of Injury and Seatbelt 
Based on the Appendix K, this thesis can claim that a  
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significantly higher number of Lost Days was caused by those USAF military 
members who sustained: 
(i) either fatal or PT or P Dis injuries rather than Lost Time  
Case and Minor Injuries independently of whether they were belted or unbelted 
occupants of 4W or occupants of 2W vehicles  
  (ii) Lost Time Case rather than Minor Injuries independently of 
whether they were belted or unbelted occupants of 4W or occupants of 2W vehicles 
  (iii) Lost Time Case while they were occupants of 2W vehicles 
rather than Lost Time Case while they were belted or unbelted occupants in 4W 
vehicles  
  (iv) Lost Time Case while they were unbelted occupants of 4W 
vehicles rather than Lost Time Case while they were belted occupants in 4W vehicles  
  (v) No other pair is significantly different.  
 
Summary 
 In this chapter, this thesis discussed the results of the categorical data analysis 
and ANOVA.  This study explained its findings and answered the research questions 
set at Chapters I and III.  This research will proceed to review these findings and 
implications in Chapter V, and provide recommendations for future research. 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 
 
Review of Research Objectives 
 The objectives of this research were to identify the risk factors that are related 
to MVCs, influence the severity of injuries, are associated with the alcohol 
consumption, and affect the number of lost workdays resulting from MVCs.  This 
study has tried to answer a number of exploratory questions which were established 
for a better analysis and understanding of the above objectives.  In order for this thesis 
to accomplish its goals and to answer its research questions, Categorical Data 
Analysis and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) have been utilized. 
Overall Conclusions of Research 
General Results 
 The results of this thesis attest to the fact that the Private Motor Vehicle 
Mishap (PMV) is one of the most serious problems that the USAF has to deal with 
and is one which requires more effective and intensive interventions.  It is dispiriting 
but the current PMV Mishap rate per 100,000 USAF population is still high, 
remaining close to the corresponding rate in F.Y. 1988.  There was a reduction of the 
fatality rate from F.Y. 2002 until F.Y. 2006.  However, in 2007, the rate rose to 12.77 
fatalities per 100,000 USAF population from the 2006 rate of 11.91.  Finally, the 
results show that the current injury rate is still comparable to the higher levels of the 
F.Y. 1988 – 2007 period and unfortunately is almost identical to the 1988 injury rate.   
Furthermore, the results of the categorical data analysis indicate that USAF 
members were more likely to be involved in MVCs as drivers rather than as 
passengers (assuming that non-injured passengers with non- military drivers were 
involved in MVCs and they have reported the incident) but the proportion of USAF 
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passengers who died in MVCs is higher than that of USAF drivers while USAF 
members had the same proportion of suffering PT or P Dis either as drivers or 
passengers. 
Categorical Data Analysis and BAC ANOVA Model Results - Limitations 
 This thesis believes that the majority of Categorical Data Analysis outcomes 
seem to be logical and consistent with this thesis literature review.  However, some 
counterintuitive results were found through the above analysis and this thesis will try 
to explain them in this chapter.  Due to the large number of investigative questions 
that this thesis has tried to answer in order to deal with its objectives, this study 
presents the results of the categorical data analysis and BAC ANOVA Model by 
factor. 
Gender.  
 The results of this analysis revealed that there is no significant difference 
between USAF males and females in the aspect of any propensity to become involved 
in MVCs.  However, USAF male drivers had a higher probability of either dying or 
sustaining a PT or P Dis than did USAF female drivers while both had the same 
probability of experiencing either Lost Time Case or Minor Injuries.  Also, USAF 
female drivers seemed to wear seatbelts more than USAF male drivers.  This might 
explain why male drivers suffered more severe injuries than those incurred by female 
drivers.   
Age. 
This research found that USAF military personnel aged 17-24 years were more 
prone to being involved in MVCs than any other age group.  This age group also had 
the highest probability of being involved in a fatal MVC, followed by members of the 
24-34 age group.  The above figures are as anticipated and are consistent with this 
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study’s literature review since members of this age group drive more than any other 
and consequently have a higher level of exposure to road traffic risks.  Finally, 
members aged 17-24 years involved in MVCs wore their seatbelts less than members 
of other age group in crashes.   
Rank. 
The results of the analysis suggested that the USAF members with the rank of 
Airman were more prone to experience an MVC than any other rank group.  The 
above rank group also had the highest probability of involvement in a fatal MVC.  
Once again, the above results might be related with the young age of the Airman 
ranks and the reasons which were presented above under the age factor.   
Furthermore, the rank of Company Grade tended to use their seatbelts more 
than those with the ranks of Airman and Senior NCO when involved in MVCs as 
drivers.  Additionally, members of NCO rank are more likely to drive belted when 
involved in MVCs than are those with the rank of Airman.  All other comparisons 
showed the same proportions of seatbelt usage while driving in MVCs.  
Finally, the ANOVA results showed that rank was one of the most statistically 
significant factors that influence BAC levels.  Based on the BAC ANOVA model, 
NCO followed by Senior NCO military members tended to be under the influence of 
alcohol more than the other rank groups when they were driving in MVCs.   
Time of Day. 
 According to this study, the most risky time period of day for USAF military 
members to be involved in an MVC was between 1400 and 1759 pm.  On the other 
hand, the fatal PMV mishaps peaked between the hours of 2200 pm to 0559 am, 
which encompasses most of the night period and likely related with drivers’ 
propensity towards taking more risks during nighttime than daytime travel.   
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The factor of the Time of Day was also statistically significant in the BAC 
ANOVA model.  The USAF military members who were involved in MVCs during 
the time from 2200 pm until 0559 am had a significantly higher BAC than those who 
were involved in MVCs between 1800 pm and 2159 pm.  This last finding reinforces 
the above stated propensity of drivers towards taking more risks when driving at 
nighttime.      
Type of Vehicle. 
 The Type of Vehicle involved in the majority of MVCs was the 4W vehicle 
rather than 2W vehicle.  However, based on the AFSC data, both USAF drivers and 
passengers had the same proportions of experiencing fatal MVCs independently of 
whether they drove or used either a 4W or a 2W vehicle.  This thesis believes that 
more data are needed to be collected concerning the Vehicle Traveled Miles (VTM) 
of each Type of Vehicle which the USAF members drive or use.  This additional 
information might give a better measurement of the exposure level to road traffic risks 
by Type of Vehicle and more reliable findings may be drawn.  
Alcohol Consumption in terms of BAC. 
This research has to be very cautious with the interpretation of its BAC 
analysis outcomes in order to avoid making a selection bias error.  The results of the 
analysis rely on only part of the AFSC data because TOX tests were not conducted for 
all of the MVCs in the data.  It is well known that TOX tests were performed only in 
some incidents, most likely in those in which there were strong indications that the 
drivers had consumed alcohol before driving.  The only conclusion that this thesis can 
claim concerning the BAC is that, given that TOX tests were conducted after MVC 
events, the proportion of BAC between 0.08 and 0.29 was higher than that for the 
other two BAC levels.   
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The circumstances described above might explain why factors such as Gender, 
Age Group and Type of Injury, which are commonly associated with drivers’ alcohol 
consumption, did not seem to be statistically significant factors in the BAC ANOVA 
model.  
Seatbelt. 
 Seatbelts, but more specifically the use or non use of this occupant protection 
system, had a significant effect on the Type of Injury.  This thesis should highlight the 
value of wearing seatbelts for the prevention of severe injuries during crashes.  Based 
on the AFSC data, both unbelted USAF drivers and similarly unrestrained passengers 
had significantly higher proportions experiencing fatal MVCs than those who were 
belted at the time of the MVC.  Moreover, unbelted USAF drivers had a higher 
proportion of sustaining PT or P Dis MVCs than those who were belted at the time of 
the MVC.  On the other hand, both belted USAF drivers and belted passengers had 
significantly higher proportions suffering Lost Time Case MVCs than those who were 
unbelted at the time of the MVC.  The seatbelt factor was also statistically significant 
in the BAC ANOVA model.  The USAF drivers of 4W vehicles who did not wear a 
seatbelt had a significantly higher BAC than did, not only those who did wear 
seatbelts in 4W vehicles but also 2W USAF drivers.    
Lost Days ANOVA Results - Limitations 
 Regarding the ANOVA analysis for the Lost Days, this thesis applied two 
separate models for the reasons carefully detailed in Chapter III. 
Both models have common significant main factors, which are the Time of Day, 
Activity, Type of Injury and Seatbelt.  Moreover, the 1st ANOVA model has two 
additional main factors, Rank and BAC whereas the 2nd ANOVA model has Age 
Group.   
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In both models the night hours and more specifically the time period from 
2200 pm to 0559 am have the greatest impact upon Lost Days of any Time of Day 
period.  One possible explanation of this is that occupants tend to take more risks 
(they may drink more, increase speed, or not use safety equipment such as seatbelts or 
helmets, underestimate the increased risks of nighttime driving due to the reduced 
visibility, etc) during the nighttime in comparison with daytime travel. 
This thesis can state that increased alcohol consumption and non-use of 
seatbelts do not correlate significantly to night hours, since the interaction factors of 
the Time of Day and BAC and Time of Day and Seatbelt were not statistically 
significant in either model.  However, this thesis cannot reach a conclusion for the 
remaining risks due to the lack of this information within the data.   
Rank was a statistically significant factor only for the 1st ANOVA  
model.  More specifically, Senior NCOs seemed to be more resistant to MVCs and to 
incur fewer Lost Days than did any other rank group.   
However, this thesis should be very cautious with this result.  None of the 
ranks, which constitute the Senior NCO group, were included in the extrapolation 
table of the estimation of the Lost Days in fatal or PT or P Dis cases for the 1st 
scenario.  This occurred because, based on the Time in Service Table, the above ranks 
had already exceeded the upper bound of 20 years of service (which is one of the 
assumptions of this extrapolation scenario which are presented in the Appendix B) ; 
hence, the Lost Days estimation for the above cases was zero for these ranks.   
In the 2nd ANOVA model, Age seems to be a statistically more significant 
factor than is Rank.  The military members aged 41 and over had a greater affect upon 
Lost Days rates than did any other age group.  Also, there was a significant difference 
in terms of Lost Days between those members aged 36-40 years and those aged 17-25 
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years, with the older members causing greater Lost Days than the younger members.  
This may be related with longer recovery times being required for older people than 
younger age groups. 
 Additionally, in both ANOVA models, the Activity had a statistically 
significant effect on the Lost Days.  This thesis analysis revealed that USAF military 
passengers had a more significant affect on Lost Days than did USAF military drivers.       
 The Type of Injury was a statistically significant factor in both models.  This 
thesis has to point out that this factor has a strong effect on the number of Lost Days.  
Based on the analysis, it seems that the more severe the Type of Injury that is 
incurred, the greater the number of Lost Days that is recorded.  More specifically, in 
both models the fatal and PT or P Dis injuries resulted in a significantly greater 
number of Lost Days than did the Lost Time Case or Minor Injuries.  Finally, based 
on the 1st scenario results, the PT or P Dis injuries caused a significantly higher 
number of Lost Workdays than did those that were caused by fatal injuries. 
 Moreover, the BAC factor was statistically significant to the 1st model but not 
to the 2nd one.  The ANOVA outcomes for the 1st model revealed that cases showing 
the presence of alcohol (either BAC = 0.01-0.07 or BAC = 0.08-0.29) caused a 
significantly greater number of Lost Days when compared to those with no presence 
of alcohol (BAC = 0.00) indicated.   
Additionally, concerning the Seatbelt factor, both scenarios’ results revealed 
that the USAF military occupants of 2W vehicles incurred a significantly higher 
number of Lost Days than did USAF military belted or unbelted occupants of 4W 
vehicles.  The above result is reasonable given that 2W occupants do not have enough 
protection compared to the 4W occupants, relying mostly on their clothing and their 
personal readiness.  
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Surprisingly, the 1st ANOVA model results regarding the Seatbelt factor 
showed that the belted occupants incurred a significantly higher number of Lost Days 
than did the unbelted occupants in contrast with the 2nd scenario in which there is no 
significant difference in terms of Lost Days between belted and unbelted occupants.  
It might be possible that when people feel safe, they may be more inclined to behave 
less carefully than when feeling vulnerable or cautious.   
It seems reasonable for this thesis to assume that seatbelt use can prevent 
many of severe or fatal injuries, but at the same time, the seatbelt use in combination 
with other factors such as excessive speed, can cause many other injuries on the 
human body if an MVC occurs.  The above explanation is supported by this thesis’ 
Categorical Data Analysis concerning the Seatbelt’s results.  Both unbelted USAF 
drivers and passengers had significantly higher proportions of fatal MVCs than did 
those who were belted at the time of the MVC.  Moreover, unbelted USAF drivers 
had higher proportions of sustaining PT or P Dis MVCs than did those who were 
belted at the time of the MVC.  In contrast, both belted USAF drivers and passengers 
had significantly higher proportions of suffering Lost Time Case MVCs (which 
represent almost 85% of cases in the AFSC data) than did those who were unbelted at 
the time of the MVC.   
Finally, relating to the interaction factors, the 1st ANOVA model has three 
additional factors and three common factors compared to the 2nd one, which has only 
these three common interaction factors with the 1st ANOVA model.  The interactions 
of Gender with Seatbelt, Injury with BAC and Injury with Seatbelt are the common 
interaction factors while the Rank with Injury, Rank with BAC and Rank with 
Seatbelt are the supplementary interaction factors in the 1st ANOVA model.  This 
study analysis showed that the interpretation of the results differs interestingly and 
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significantly even among the common interaction factors of the two ANOVA models.  
In Appendices C-K, this study presents a detailed description of the above interaction 
factors’ interpretation.  The basic common characteristics of these interpretations are 
the dominant roles of the Type of Injury and the 2W vehicle MVCs.  Once again, the 
more severe the Type of Injury is, the greater the number of Lost Days becomes; the 
2W vehicles MVCs have the most significant effect on the number of Lost Days.      
This research considers the 1st model to be a more useful and more reliable 
model for use in making safety decisions for the following primary reason.  The 
primary reason is that the 1st ANOVA model employed the 1st scenario for 
extrapolating the Lost Days in fatal and PT or P Dis MVC cases as this thesis 
comprehensively described in Chapter III and presented in Appendix B as well.  
Although, the 2nd scenario is more simple and easier to utilize, this research believes 
that the 1st scenario estimates more accurately the missing Lost Days in the above two 
injury cases since it takes into account realistic information e.g. the Retention Rate 
data per rank (AF/A1, 2008), the Time in Service and the Time in Grade (Office of 
Secretary of Defense, Information Delivery System, 2008).  On the other hand, the 
more simplistic 2nd scenario relies only on the basic assumption of a fixed number of 
Lost Days associated with the average time that the AFPC needs to find and send 
someone new to take over the position from the previous member who had suffered a 
serious MVC. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 This thesis establishes the ground-work for future research.  This study has 
been limited because the data used in this research are not complete.  Factors such as 
speed and safety equipment other than seatbelts, for example helmets or airbags, were 
not addressed in the current analysis due to the lack of these factors in the present 
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AFSC data base.  These could be added in the future.  Inclusion of the speed factor in 
particular, will provide a better insight into these PMV mishaps, given that this factor 
is considered one of the critical factors in many MVC occurrences. 
 Another potential area for follow-up research would be to use the database and 
analysis of this study and apply it to: 
  (i) test statistically whether USAF safety intervention programs 
are making a difference in MVCs 
 (ii) find a better approach for dealing with the issue of the Lost 
Days extrapolation in MVCs in which USAF military members were involved and 
due to which they experienced either fatal or PT or P Dis injuries. 
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Appendix A. Definitions of Economic Costs 
 
 
 
Medical Costs:  
The cost of all medical treatment associated with motor vehicle injuries 
including that given during ambulance transport. Medical costs include emergency 
room and inpatient costs, follow-up visits, physical therapy, rehabilitation, 
prescriptions, prosthetic devices, and home modifications. 
Emergency Services:  
Police and fire department response costs.  
Vocational Rehabilitation: 
The cost of job or career retraining required as a result of disability caused by 
motor vehicle injuries 
Market Productivity: 
The present discounted value of the lost wages and benefits over the victim’s 
remaining life span. 
Household Productivity: 
The present value of lost productive household activity, valued at the market 
price for hiring a person to accomplish the same tasks. 
Insurance Administration: 
The administrative costs associated with processing insurance claims resulting 
from motor vehicle crashes and defense attorney costs. 
Workplace Costs: 
The costs of workplace disruption that is due to the loss or absence of an 
employee. This includes the cost of retraining new employees, overtime required to 
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accomplish work of the injured employee, and the administrative costs of processing 
personnel changes. 
Legal Costs: 
The legal fees and court costs associated with civil litigation resulting from 
traffic crashes. 
Travel Delay: 
The value of travel time delay for persons who are not involved in traffic 
crashes, but who are delayed in the resulting traffic congestion from these crashes. 
Property Damage: 
The value of vehicles, cargo, roadways and other items are damaged in traffic 
crashes. 
(NHTSA, 2002; 809-446: 73-74). 
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Appendix B: Two Scenarios of Extrapolating the Lost Days for the Fatal 
and PT or P Dis Injuries 
 
 
 
1st Scenario  
Lost Work Days equal to the 20-year retirement point minus the Time in 
Service (TiS) of the military member, taking into account the Retention Rate by 
Grade 
This thesis assumes that: 
  (i) The Upper Limit for Active Service for the USAF member is 
20 Years (minimum retirement point). 
  (ii) The TiS per rank for each death and PT or P Dis personnel is 
the average TiS based on the 5 last years (FY 2003 - FY 2007) TiS data (Office of 
Secretary of Defense, Information Delivery System, 2008). 
  (iii) The Time in Grade (TiG) for each death and PT or P Dis 
personnel is the average TiG based on the 5 last years (FY 2003 - FY 2007) TiG data 
(Office of Secretary of Defense, Information Delivery System, 2008). 
  (iv) The exact number of years that the death and PT or P Dis 
personnel held their rank at the time of the MVC is the midpoint of the average TiG.  
The purpose of this midpoint calculation is to estimate the remaining years that the 
members should stay at the same rank before their anticipated promotion date. 
  (v) The Retention Rate per rank for each death and PT or P Dis 
personnel is the average Retention Rate based on the 5 last years (FY 2004 - FY 
2008) Retention Rate data (AF/A1, 2008).    
(vi) The number of work days per year is 220 days. 
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The formula which this study applied in order to make the lost work days 
estimation for this scenario is: 
 
where pi,r is the probability that the death or PT or P Dis military member would be in 
service after i years, taking into consideration the average Retention Rate by Rank, r. 
For example (the numbers are randomly selected): 
A male Major with 14 years as TiS experienced a fatal injury due to an MVC.  
He could have been in service 6 years more before he would have reached the 
minimum retirement point at 20 years of service. Also, this thesis assumes that:  
(i) he could have been Major for the next 3 years (based on the midpoint 
estimation) from the point of the MVC until his promotion to Lt Col  
(ii) he could have been Lt Col for 3 years (based on the TiG table) from 
the point of his promotion to Lt Col until his retirement. 
 Table 19 depicts the process that this thesis employed in order to calculate the 
Lost Days for the above example using the retention rates by grade.   
Table 19. Lost Days Calculation Process 
 
 
A detailed description of this process follows. 
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Using the above formula and the steps from the above table, this study can 
estimate the expected number of lost workdays for this example by calculating: 
p1 = pmaj = 0.91, 
where pmaj is the probability (retention rate) of his staying in service after the  
1st year of the MVC if he had survived the MVC and in the same way for the  
2nd year: 
p2 = (pmaj)2 = (0.91)2 = 0.83 
where (pmaj)2 is the probability (retention rate) of his staying in service after the  
2nd year of the MVC as a Major if he had survived the MVC and in the same  
way for the 3rd year: 
p3 = (pmaj)3 = (0.91)3 = 0.75 
where (pmaj)3 is the probability (retention rate) of his staying in service after the  
3rd year of the MVC as a Major if he had survived the MVC and in the same  
way for the 4th year: 
p4 = (pmaj)3 * pLt Col = (0.75)*(0.87) = 0.65 
where p4 is the probability of his staying in service after the 4th year of the  
MVC if he had survived the MVC, and  
PLt Col is the probability (retention rate) of his staying in service after the 1st  
year as a Lt Col if he had survived the MVC 
…………. 
P6 = (pmaj)3 * (pLt Col)3 = (0.75)*(0.66) = 0.49 
where p6 is the probability of his staying in service after the 6th year of the  
MVC if he had survived the MVC, and  
(pLt Col)3 is the probability (retention rate) of his staying in service after the 3rd  
year as a Lt Col if he had survived the MVC.  
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After the summation, the expected number of lost workdays for this death 
Major is: 220*4.2 = 924 days. 
2nd Scenario  
Lost Work Days equal to the average time that AFPC needs to “replace” a 
military member because of an emergency like an MVC which causes either fatal or 
PT or P Dis injuries   
This study tried to estimate the average time the AFPC needs to find and send 
someone new to take over the position from the previous service member who had a 
serious MVC.  This thesis, after a discussion with appropriate military personnel, 
estimates that an average of the above needed time is 6 months, independently of the 
rank.  Therefore, the Lost Work Days of this scenario is a fixed number per rank and 
this number is equal to 6 months or 110 days. 
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Appendix C. Multiple Comparisons Output for the GEN*SEATB Interaction 
 
 
 
Gen: FEMALE Gen: MALE 
Seatb: NO (4W) Seatb: YES (4W) Seatb: Z (2W) Seatb: NO (4W) 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF 
LOST DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF 
LOST DAYS' MEAN 
FEMA
LE & 
NO < 
FEMA
LE & 
YES 
FEMALE 
& YES < FEMALE & 2W FEMALE & 2W > MALE & NO MALE & NO < MALE & YES 
FEMA
LE & 
NO < 
FEMA
LE & 
2W 
FEMALE 
& YES < MALE & YES FEMALE & 2W > MALE & YES MALE & NO < MALE & 2W 
FEMA
LE & 
NO < MALE & YES FEMALE & YES < MALE & 2W             
FEMA
LE & 
NO < MALE & 2W                   
*The above colored cell indicates that the difference in the mean is statistically significant at α = 0.05 significance level 
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Appendix D. Multiple Comparisons Output for the RANK*INJ Interaction 
 
 
 
Rank: AIRMAN 
Inj: FATALITY Inj: LOST TM CASE Inj: MINOR INJ Inj: PT or P DIS 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF 
LOST DAYS' MEAN 
AIRMA
N & 
FATALI
TY 
> 
AIRMA
N & 
LOST 
TIME 
CASE 
AIRM
AN & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> 
AIRMA
N & 
MINOR 
INJ 
AIRM
AN & 
MINO
R INJ 
< AIRMAN & PT or P DIS 
AIRM
AN & 
PT or P 
DIS 
> 
COMP 
GRAD
E & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
AIRMA
N & 
FATALI
TY 
> 
AIRMA
N & 
MINOR 
INJ 
AIRM
AN & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
< AIRMAN & PT or P DIS 
AIRM
AN & 
MINO
R INJ 
< 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
AIRM
AN & 
PT or P 
DIS 
> 
COMP 
GRAD
E & 
MINO
R INJ 
AIRMA
N & 
FATALI
TY 
> 
COMP 
GRADE 
& LOST 
TM 
CASE 
AIRM
AN & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
< 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
AIRM
AN & 
MINO
R INJ 
< 
COMP 
GRADE 
& LOST 
TM 
CASE 
AIRM
AN & 
PT or P 
DIS 
> 
F & F 
GRAD
E & 
FATA
LITY 
AIRMA
N & 
FATALI
TY 
> 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 
MINOR 
INJ 
AIRM
AN & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 
MINOR 
INJ 
AIRM
AN & 
MINO
R INJ 
< 
COMP 
GRADE 
& PT or 
P DIS 
AIRM
AN & 
PT or P 
DIS 
> 
F & F 
GRAD
E & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
AIRMA
N & 
FATALI
TY 
> 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
AIRM
AN & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
< 
COMP 
GRADE 
& PT or 
P DIS 
AIRM
AN & 
MINO
R INJ 
< 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
AIRM
AN & 
PT or P 
DIS 
> 
F & F 
GRAD
E & 
MINO
R INJ 
AIRMA
N & 
FATALI
TY 
> 
F & F 
GRADE 
& LOST 
TM 
CASE 
AIRM
AN & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
< 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
AIRM
AN & 
MINO
R INJ 
< 
F & F 
GRADE 
& LOST 
TM 
CASE 
AIRM
AN & 
PT or P 
DIS 
> 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
AIRMA
N & 
FATALI
TY 
> 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 
MINOR 
INJ 
AIRM
AN & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
< 
F & F 
GRADE 
& LOST 
TM 
CASE 
AIRM
AN & 
MINO
R INJ 
< 
F & F 
GRADE 
& PT or 
P DIS 
AIRM
AN & 
PT or P 
DIS 
> NCO & MINOR INJ 
AIRMA
N & 
FATALI
TY 
> 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
AIRM
AN & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
< 
F & F 
GRADE 
& PT or 
P DIS 
AIRM
AN & 
MINO
R INJ 
< NCO & FATALITY 
AIRM
AN & 
PT or P 
DIS 
> 
SENIO
R NCO 
& 
FATA
LITY 
AIRMA
N & 
FATALI
TY 
> NCO & MINOR INJ 
AIRM
AN & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
< NCO & FATALITY 
AIRM
AN & 
MINO
R INJ 
< 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
AIRM
AN & 
PT or P 
DIS 
> 
SENIO
R NCO 
& 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
AIRMA
N & 
FATALI
TY 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
FATALI
TY 
AIRM
AN & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> NCO & MINOR INJ 
AIRM
AN & 
MINO
R INJ 
< NCO & PT or P DIS 
AIRM
AN & 
PT or P 
DIS 
> 
SENIO
R NCO 
& 
MINO
R INJ 
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AIRMA
N & 
FATALI
TY 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
AIRM
AN & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
< NCO & PT or P DIS 
AIRM
AN & 
MINO
R INJ 
< 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
AIRM
AN & 
PT or P 
DIS 
> 
SENIO
R NCO 
& PT 
or P 
DIS 
AIRMA
N & 
FATALI
TY 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
MINOR 
INJ 
AIRM
AN & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
FATLIT
Y 
AIRM
AN & 
MINO
R INJ 
< 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
PT or P 
DIS 
      
AIRMA
N & 
FATALI
TY 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
PT or P 
DIS 
AIRM
AN & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
MINOR 
INJ 
            
    
  
AIRM
AN & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
PT or P 
DIS 
            
Rank: COMPANY GRADE 
Inj: FATALITY Inj: LOST TM CASE Inj: MINOR INJ Inj: PT or P DIS 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF 
LOST DAYS' MEAN 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
> 
COMP 
GRADE 
& LOST 
TM 
CASE 
COMP 
GRAD
E & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 
MINOR 
INJ 
COMP 
GRAD
E & 
MINO
R INJ 
< 
COMP 
GRADE 
& PT or 
P DIS 
COMP 
GRAD
E & PT 
or P 
DIS 
> 
F & F 
GRAD
E & 
FATA
LITY 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
> 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 
MINOR 
INJ 
COMP 
GRAD
E & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
< 
COMP 
GRADE 
& PT or 
P DIS 
COMP 
GRAD
E & 
MINO
R INJ 
< 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
COMP 
GRAD
E & PT 
or P 
DIS 
> 
F & F 
GRAD
E & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
> 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
COMP 
GRAD
E & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
< 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
COMP 
GRAD
E & 
MINO
R INJ 
< 
F & F 
GRADE 
& LOST 
TM 
CASE 
COMP 
GRAD
E & PT 
or P 
DIS 
> 
F & F 
GRAD
E & 
MINO
R INJ 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
> 
F & F 
GRADE 
& LOST 
TM 
CASE 
COMP 
GRAD
E & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
< 
F & F 
GRADE 
& LOST 
TM 
CASE 
COMP 
GRAD
E & 
MINO
R INJ 
< 
F & F 
GRADE 
& PT or 
P DIS 
COMP 
GRAD
E & PT 
or P 
DIS 
> 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
> 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 
MINOR 
INJ 
COMP 
GRAD
E & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
< 
F & F 
GRADE 
& PT or 
P DIS 
COMP 
GRAD
E & 
MINO
R INJ 
< NCO & FATALITY 
COMP 
GRAD
E & PT 
or P 
DIS 
> NCO & MINOR INJ 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
> 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
COMP 
GRAD
E & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
< NCO & FATALITY 
COMP 
GRAD
E & 
MINO
R INJ 
< 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
COMP 
GRAD
E & PT 
or P 
DIS 
> 
SENIO
R NCO 
& 
FATA
LITY 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
> NCO & MINOR INJ 
COMP 
GRAD
E & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> NCO & MINOR INJ 
COMP 
GRAD
E & 
MINO
R INJ 
< NCO & PT or P DIS 
COMP 
GRAD
E & PT 
or P 
DIS 
> 
SENIO
R NCO 
& 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
141 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
FATALI
TY 
COMP 
GRAD
E & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
< NCO & PT or P DIS 
COMP 
GRAD
E & 
MINO
R INJ 
< 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
COMP 
GRAD
E & PT 
or P 
DIS 
> 
SENIO
R NCO 
& 
MINO
R INJ 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
COMP 
GRAD
E & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
FATALI
TY 
      
COMP 
GRAD
E & PT 
or P 
DIS 
> 
SENIO
R NCO 
& PT 
or P 
DIS 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
MINOR 
INJ 
COMP 
GRAD
E & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
MINOR 
INJ 
            
COMP 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
PT or P 
DIS 
COMP 
GRAD
E & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
PT or P 
DIS 
            
Rank: FIELD & FLAG GRADE 
Inj: FATALITY Inj: LOST TM CASE Inj: MINOR INJ Inj: PT or P DIS 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF 
LOST DAYS' MEAN 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
> 
F & F 
GRADE 
& LOST 
TM 
CASE 
F & F 
GRADE 
& LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 
MINOR 
INJ 
F & F 
GRAD
E & 
MINO
R INJ 
< 
F & F 
GRADE 
& PT or 
P DIS 
F & F 
GRAD
E & PT 
or P 
DIS 
> 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
> 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 
MINOR 
INJ 
F & F 
GRADE 
& LOST 
TM 
CASE 
< 
F & F 
GRADE 
& PT or 
P DIS 
F & F 
GRAD
E & 
MINO
R INJ 
< NCO & FATALITY 
F & F 
GRAD
E & PT 
or P 
DIS 
> NCO & MINOR INJ 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
< NCO & FATALITY 
F & F 
GRADE 
& LOST 
TM 
CASE 
< NCO & FATALITY 
F & F 
GRAD
E & 
MINO
R INJ 
< NCO & PT or P DIS 
F & F 
GRAD
E & PT 
or P 
DIS 
> 
SENIO
R NCO 
& 
FATA
LITY 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
> 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
F & F 
GRADE 
& LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
      
F & F 
GRAD
E & PT 
or P 
DIS 
> 
SENIO
R NCO 
& 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
> NCO & MINOR INJ 
F & F 
GRADE 
& LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> NCO & MINOR INJ       
F & F 
GRAD
E & PT 
or P 
DIS 
> 
SENIO
R NCO 
& 
MINO
R INJ 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
< NCO & PT or P DIS 
F & F 
GRADE 
& LOST 
TM 
CASE 
< NCO & PT or P DIS       
F & F 
GRAD
E & PT 
or P 
DIS 
> 
SENIO
R NCO 
& PT 
or P 
DIS 
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F & F 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
FATALI
TY 
F & F 
GRADE 
& LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
FATALI
TY 
            
F & F 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
F & F 
GRADE 
& LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
            
F & F 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
MINOR 
INJ 
F & F 
GRADE 
& LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
MINOR 
INJ 
            
F & F 
GRADE 
& 
FATALI
TY 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
PT or P 
DIS 
F & F 
GRADE 
& LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
PT or P 
DIS 
            
Rank: NCO 
Inj: FATALITY Inj: LOST TM CASE Inj: MINOR INJ Inj: PT or P DIS 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF 
LOST DAYS' MEAN 
NCO & 
FATALI
TY > 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> NCO & MINOR INJ 
NCO & 
MINO
R INJ < 
NCO & 
PT or P 
DIS 
NCO & 
PT or P 
DIS > 
SENIO
R NCO 
& 
FATA
LITY 
NCO & 
FATALI
TY > 
NCO & 
MINOR 
INJ 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
< NCO & PT or P DIS 
NCO & 
MINO
R INJ < 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
NCO & 
PT or P 
DIS > 
SENIO
R NCO 
& 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
NCO & 
FATALI
TY > 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
FATALI
TY 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
FATALI
TY 
      
NCO & 
PT or P 
DIS > 
SENIO
R NCO 
& 
MINO
R INJ 
NCO & 
FATALI
TY > 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
MINOR 
INJ 
      
NCO & 
PT or P 
DIS > 
SENIO
R NCO 
& PT 
or P 
DIS 
NCO & 
FATALI
TY > 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
MINOR 
INJ 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
PT or P 
DIS 
            
NCO & 
FATALI
TY > 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
PT or P 
DIS 
                  
Rank: Senior NCO             
Inj: FATALITY Inj: LOST TM CASE 
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DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN             
SENIOR 
NCO & 
FATALI
TY 
< 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
SENIO
R NCO 
& 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
MINOR 
INJ 
            
SENIOR 
NCO & 
FATALI
TY 
< 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
PT or P 
DIS 
SENIO
R NCO 
& 
LOST 
TM 
CASE 
> 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
PT or P 
DIS 
            
*The above colored cells indicate that the difference in the mean is statistically significant at α = 0.05 significance level 
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Appendix E. Multiple Comparisons Output for the RANK*BAC Interaction 
 
 
 
Rank: AIRMAN 
BAC: 0.00 BAC: 0.01 - 0.07 BAC: 0.08 - 0.29 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
AIRMAN 
& 0.00 > F & F GRADE & 0.00 AIRMAN & 0.01 - 0.07 > F & F GRADE & 0.00 
AIRMAN 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 > F & F GRADE & 0.00 
AIRMAN 
& 0.00 > SENIOR NCO & 0.00 AIRMAN & 0.01 - 0.07 > SENIOR NCO & 0.00 AIRMAN & 0.08 - 0.29 > SENIOR NCO & 0.00 
AIRMAN 
& 0.00 > SENIOR NCO & 0.01 - 0.07 AIRMAN & 0.01 - 0.07 > SENIOR NCO & 0.01 - 0.07 
AIRMAN 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 > SENIOR NCO & 0.01 - 0.07 
AIRMAN 
& 0.00 > SENIOR NCO & 0.08 - 0.29 AIRMAN & 0.01 - 0.07 > SENIOR NCO & 0.08 - 0.29 
AIRMAN 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 > SENIOR NCO & 0.08 - 0.29 
Rank: COMPANY GRADE 
BAC: 0.00 BAC: 0.01 - 0.07 BAC: 0.08 - 0.29 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 0.00 > F & F GRADE & 0.00 
COMP 
GRADE & 
0.01 -0.07 > 
F & F 
GRADE & 
0.00 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 
> F & F GRADE & 0.00 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 0.00 > SENIOR NCO & 0.00 
COMP 
GRADE & 
0.01 -0.07 > SENIOR NCO & 0.00 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 
> SENIOR NCO & 0.00 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 0.00 > SENIOR NCO & 0.01 - 0.07 
COMP 
GRADE & 
0.01 -0.07 > 
SENIOR 
NCO & 0.01 - 
0.07 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 
> SENIOR NCO & 0.01 - 0.07 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 0.00 > SENIOR NCO & 0.08 - 0.29 
COMP 
GRADE & 
0.01 -0.07 > 
SENIOR 
NCO & 0.08 - 
0.29 
COMP 
GRADE 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 
> SENIOR NCO & 0.08 - 0.29 
Rank: FIELD & FLAG GRADE 
BAC: 0.00 BAC: 0.01 - 0.07 BAC: 0.08 - 0.29 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 0.00 < F & F GRADE & 0.01 - 0.07 
F & F 
GRADE & 
0.01 - 0.07 > SENIOR NCO & 0.00 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 
> SENIOR NCO & 0.00 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 0.00 < F & F GRADE & 0.08 - 0.29 
F & F 
GRADE & 
0.01 - 0.07 > 
SENIOR 
NCO & 0.01 - 
0.07 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 
> SENIOR NCO & 0.01 - 0.07 
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F & F 
GRADE 
& 0.00 < NCO & 0.00 
F & F 
GRADE & 
0.01 - 0.07 > 
SENIOR 
NCO & 0.08 - 
0.29 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 
> SENIOR NCO & 0.08 - 0.29 
F & F 
GRADE 
& 0.00 < NCO & 0.01 - 0.07             
F & F 
GRADE 
& 0.00 < NCO & 0.08 - 0.29             
F & F 
GRADE 
& 0.00 > SENIOR NCO & 0.00             
F & F 
GRADE 
& 0.00 > SENIOR NCO & 0.08 - 0.29             
Rank: NCO 
BAC: 0.00 BAC: 0.01 - 0.07 BAC: 0.08 - 0.29 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
NCO & 
0.00 > SENIOR NCO & 0.00 NCO & 0.01 - 0.07 > SENIOR NCO & 0.00 NCO & 0.08 - 0.29 > SENIOR NCO & 0.00 
NCO & 
0.00 > SENIOR NCO & 0.01 - 0.07 NCO & 0.01 - 0.07 > SENIOR NCO & 0.01 - 0.07 
NCO & 
0.08 - 
0.29 > SENIOR NCO & 0.01 - 0.07 
NCO & 
0.00 > SENIOR NCO & 0.08 - 0.29 NCO & 0.01 - 0.07 > SENIOR NCO & 0.08 - 0.29 
NCO & 
0.08 - 
0.29 > SENIOR NCO & 0.08 - 0.29 
*The above colored cells indicate that the difference in the mean is statistically significant at α = 0.05 significance level 
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Appendix F. Multiple Comparisons Output for the RANK*SEATB Interaction 
 
 
 
Rank: AIRMAN 
Seatb: NO (4W) Seatb: YES (4W) Seatb: Z (2W) 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' MEAN 
AIRMAN & 
NO > F & F GRADE & NO AIRMAN & YES < AIRMAN & 2W AIRMAN & 2W > F & F GRADE & NO 
AIRMAN & 
NO > SENIOR NCO & NO AIRMAN & YES > SENIOR NCO & NO AIRMAN & 2W > SENIOR NCO & NO 
AIRMAN & 
NO > SENIOR NCO & YES AIRMAN & YES > SENIOR NCO & YES AIRMAN & 2W > SENIOR NCO & YES 
AIRMAN & 
NO > SENIOR NCO & 2W AIRMAN & YES > SENIOR NCO & 2W AIRMAN & 2W > SENIOR NCO & 2W 
Rank: COMPANY GRADE 
Seatb: NO (4W) Seatb: YES (4W) Seatb: Z (2W) 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' MEAN 
COMP 
GRADE & 
NO > SENIOR NCO & NO 
COMP 
GRADE & 
YES > SENIOR NCO & NO 
COMP 
GRADE & 
2W > F & F GRADE & NO 
COMP 
GRADE & 
NO > 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
YES 
COMP 
GRADE & 
YES > 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
YES 
COMP 
GRADE & 
2W > SENIOR NCO & NO 
COMP 
GRADE & 
NO > SENIOR NCO & 2W 
COMP 
GRADE & 
YES > SENIOR NCO & 2W 
COMP 
GRADE & 
2W > SENIOR NCO & YES 
            COMP GRADE & 2W > SENIOR NCO & 2W 
Rank: FIELD & FLAG GRADE 
Seatb: NO (4W) Seatb: YES (4W) Seatb: Z (2W) 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' MEAN 
F & F 
GRADE & 
NO < 
F & F 
GRADE & 
YES 
F & F 
GRADE & 
YES > SENIOR NCO & NO 
F & F 
GRADE & 
2W > SENIOR NCO & NO 
F & F 
GRADE & 
NO < 
F & F 
GRADE & 
2W 
F & F 
GRADE & 
YES > 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
YES 
F & F 
GRADE & 
2W > SENIOR NCO & YES 
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F & F 
GRADE & 
NO < NCO & NO 
F & F 
GRADE & 
YES > SENIOR NCO & 2W 
F & F 
GRADE & 
2W > SENIOR NCO & 2W 
F & F 
GRADE & 
NO < NCO & 2W             
F & F 
GRADE & 
NO > SENIOR NCO & NO             
F & F 
GRADE & 
NO > 
SENIOR 
NCO & 
YES 
            
F & F 
GRADE & 
NO > SENIOR NCO & 2W             
Rank: NCO 
Seatb: NO (4W) Seatb: YES (4W) Seatb: Z (2W) 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
NCO & NO > SENIOR NCO & NO NCO & YES < NCO & 2W NCO & 2W > SENIOR NCO & NO 
NCO & NO > SENIOR NCO & YES NCO & YES > SENIOR NCO & NO NCO & 2W > SENIOR NCO & YES 
NCO & NO > SENIOR NCO & 2W NCO & YES > SENIOR NCO & YES NCO & 2W > SENIOR NCO & 2W 
      NCO & YES > SENIOR NCO & 2W       
*The above colored cells indicate that the difference in the mean is statistically significant at α = 0.05 significance level 
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Appendix G. Multiple Comparisons Output for the INJ*BAC Interaction 
 
 
 
Inj: FATALITY 
BAC: 0.00 BAC: 0.01 - 0.07 BAC: 0.08 - 0.29 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
FATALITY 
& 0.00 > LOST TM CASE & 0.00 FATALITY & 0.01 - 0.07 > 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.00 
FATALITY 
& 0.08 - 0.29 > LOST TM CASE & 0.00 
FATALITY 
& 0.00 > LOST TM CASE & 0.01 - 0.07 FATALITY & 0.01 - 0.07 > 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.01 - 0.07 
FATALITY 
& 0.08 - 0.29 > LOST TM CASE & 0.01 - 0.07 
FATALITY 
& 0.00 > LOST TM CASE & 0.08 - 0.29 FATALITY & 0.01 - 0.07 > 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.08 - 0.29 
FATALITY 
& 0.08 - 0.29 > LOST TM CASE & 0.08 - 0.29 
FATALITY 
& 0.00 > MINOR INJ & 0.00 FATALITY & 0.01 - 0.07 > MINOR INJ & 0.00 FATALITY & 0.08 - 0.29 > MINOR INJ & 0.00 
FATALITY 
& 0.00 > MINOR INJ & 0.01 - 0.07 FATALITY & 0.01 - 0.07 > MINOR INJ & 0.01 - 0.07 FATALITY & 0.08 - 0.29 > MINOR INJ & 0.01 - 0.07 
FATALITY 
& 0.00 > MINOR INJ & 0.08 - 0.29 FATALITY & 0.01 - 0.07 > MINOR INJ & 0.08 - 0.29 FATALITY & 0.08 - 0.29 > MINOR INJ & 0.08 - 0.29 
FATALITY 
& 0.00 < PT or P DIS & 0.00             
FATALITY 
& 0.00 < PT or P DIS & 0.08 - 0.29             
Inj: LOST TM CASE 
BAC: 0.00 BAC: 0.01 - 0.07 BAC: 0.08 - 0.29 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.00 < 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.01 - 0.07 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.01 – 0.07 > MINOR INJ & 0.00 
LOST TM 
CASE & 0.08 
- 0.29 > MINOR INJ & 0.00 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.00 < 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.08 - 0.29 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.01 – 0.07 > MINOR INJ & 0.01 - 0.07 
LOST TM 
CASE & 0.08 
- 0.29 > MINOR INJ & 0.01 - 0.07 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.00 > MINOR INJ & 0.00 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.01 – 0.07 > MINOR INJ & 0.08 - 0.29 
LOST TM 
CASE & 0.08 
- 0.29 > MINOR INJ & 0.08 - 0.29 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.00 > 
MINOR 
INJ & 0.01 
- 0.07 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.01 – 0.07 < PT or P DIS & 0.00 
LOST TM 
CASE & 0.08 
- 0.29 < PT or P DIS & 0.00 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.00 > 
MINOR 
INJ & 0.08 
- 0.29 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.01 – 0.07 < PT or P DIS & 0.01 - 0.07 
LOST TM 
CASE & 0.08 
- 0.29 < PT or P DIS & 0.01 - 0.07 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.00 < PT or P DIS & 0.00 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.01 – 0.07 < PT or P DIS & 0.08 - 0.29 
LOST TM 
CASE & 0.08 
- 0.29 < PT or P DIS & 0.08 - 0.29 
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LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.00 < 
PT or P 
DIS & 0.01 
- 0.07 
            
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.00 < 
PT or P 
DIS & 0.08 
- 0.29 
            
Inj: MINOR INJ 
BAC: 0.00 BAC: 0.01 - 0.07 BAC: 0.08 - 0.29 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
MINOR 
INJ & 0.00 < PT or P DIS & 0.00 MINOR INJ & 0.01 - 0.07 < PT or P DIS & 0.00 MINOR INJ & 0.08 - 0.29 < PT or P DIS & 0.00 
MINOR 
INJ & 0.00 < PT or P DIS & 0.01 - 0.07 MINOR INJ & 0.01 - 0.07 < PT or P DIS & 0.01 - 0.07 MINOR INJ & 0.08 - 0.29 < PT or P DIS & 0.01 - 0.07 
MINOR 
INJ & 0.00 < PT or P DIS & 0.08 - 0.29 MINOR INJ & 0.01 - 0.07 < PT or P DIS & 0.08 - 0.29 MINOR INJ & 0.08 - 0.29 < PT or P DIS & 0.08 - 0.29 
*The above colored cells indicate that the difference in the mean is statistically significant at α = 0.05 significance level 
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Appendix H. Multiple Comparisons Output for the INJ*SEATB Interaction 
 
 
 
Inj: FATALITY 
Seatb: NO Seatb: YES Seatb: Z (2W) 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
FATALITY 
& NO < FATALITY & YES FATALITY & YES > LOST TM CASE & NO FATALITY & 2W > 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
NO 
FATALITY 
& NO < FATALITY & 2W FATALITY & YES > LOST TM CASE & YES FATALITY & 2W > 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
YES 
FATALITY 
& NO > LOST TM CASE & NO FATALITY & YES > LOST TM CASE & 2W FATALITY & 2W > 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
2W 
FATALITY 
& NO > LOST TM CASE & YES FATALITY & YES > MINOR INJ & NO FATALITY & 2W > MINOR INJ & NO 
FATALITY 
& NO > LOST TM CASE & 2W FATALITY & YES > MINOR INJ & YES FATALITY & 2W > MINOR INJ & YES 
FATALITY 
& NO > MINOR INJ & NO FATALITY & YES > MINOR INJ & 2W FATALITY & 2W > MINOR INJ & 2W 
FATALITY 
& NO > MINOR INJ & YES FATALITY & YES < PT or P DIS & 2W       
FATALITY 
& NO > MINOR INJ & 2W             
FATALITY 
& NO < PT or P DIS & YES             
FATALITY 
& NO < PT or P DIS & 2W             
Inj: LOST TM CASE 
Seatb: NO Seatb: YES Seatb: Z (2W) 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
NO < LOST TM CASE & 2W 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
YES < 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
2W 
LOST TM 
CASE & 2W > MINOR INJ & NO 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
NO > MINOR INJ & NO 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
YES > MINOR INJ & NO LOST TM CASE & 2W > MINOR INJ & YES 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
NO > MINOR INJ & YES 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
YES > MINOR INJ & YES LOST TM CASE & 2W > MINOR INJ & 2W 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
NO > MINOR INJ & 2W 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
YES > MINOR INJ & 2W LOST TM CASE & 2W < PT or P DIS & NO 
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LOST TM 
CASE & 
NO < PT or P DIS & NO 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
YES < PT or P DIS & NO LOST TM CASE & 2W < PT or P DIS & YES 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
NO < PT or P DIS & YES 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
YES < PT or P DIS & YES LOST TM CASE & 2W < PT or P DIS & 2W 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
NO < PT or P DIS & 2W 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
YES < PT or P DIS & 2W       
Inj: MINOR INJ 
Seatb: NO Seatb: YES Seatb: Z (2W) 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
MINOR 
INJ & NO < MINOR INJ & YES MINOR INJ & YES < PT or P DIS & NO MINOR INJ & 2W < PT or P DIS & NO 
MINOR 
INJ & NO < MINOR INJ & 2W MINOR INJ & YES < PT or P DIS & YES MINOR INJ & 2W < PT or P DIS & YES 
MINOR 
INJ & NO < PT or P DIS & NO MINOR INJ & YES < PT or P DIS & 2W MINOR INJ & 2W < PT or P DIS & 2W 
MINOR 
INJ & NO < PT or P DIS & YES             
MINOR 
INJ & NO < PT or P DIS & 2W             
Inj: PT or P DIS             
Seatb: NO             
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN             
PT or P 
DIS & NO < PT or P DIS & 2W             
                  
*The above colored cell indicates that the difference in the mean is statistically significant at α = 0.05 significance level 
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Appendix I. Multiple Comparisons Output for the GEN*SEATB Interaction 
 
 
 
Gen: FEMALE Gen: MALE 
Seatb: NO (4W) Seatb: YES (4W) Seatb: Z (2W) Seatb: YES (4W) 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
FEMALE 
& NO < FEMALE & 2W FEMALE & YES < FEMALE & 2W FEMALE & 2W > MALE & YES MALE & YES < MALE & 2W 
      
FEMALE 
& YES < MALE & NO             
      
FEMALE 
& YES < MALE & YES             
      
FEMALE 
& YES < MALE & 2W             
*The above colored cell indicates that the difference in the mean is statistically significant at α = 0.05 significance level 
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Appendix J. Multiple Comparisons Output for the INJ*BAC Interaction 
 
 
 
Inj: FATALITY 
BAC: 0.00 BAC: 0.01 - 0.07 BAC: 0.08 - 0.29 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
FATALITY 
& 0.00 > LOST TM CASE & 0.00 FATALITY & 0.01 - 0.07 > LOST TM CASE & 0.00 
FATALITY 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 > 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.00 
FATALITY 
& 0.00 > LOST TM CASE & 0.01 - 0.07 
FATALITY 
& 0.01 - 
0.07 > 
LOST TM 
CASE & 0.01 
- 0.07 
FATALITY 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 > 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.01 - 0.07 
FATALITY 
& 0.00 > LOST TM CASE & 0.08 - 0.29 
FATALITY 
& 0.01 - 
0.07 > 
LOST TM 
CASE & 0.08 
- 0.29 
FATALITY 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 > 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.08 - 0.29 
FATALITY 
& 0.00 > MINOR INJ & 0.00 FATALITY & 0.01 - 0.07 > MINOR INJ & 0.00 
FATALITY 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 > MINOR INJ & 0.00 
FATALITY 
& 0.00 > MINOR INJ & 0.01 - 0.07 FATALITY & 0.01 - 0.07 > MINOR INJ & 0.01 - 0.07 
FATALITY 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 > 
MINOR INJ 
& 0.01 - 
0.07 
FATALITY 
& 0.00 > MINOR INJ & 0.08 - 0.29 FATALITY & 0.01 - 0.07 > MINOR INJ & 0.08 - 0.29 
FATALITY 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 > 
MINOR INJ 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 
Inj: LOST TM CASE 
BAC: 0.00 BAC: 0.01 - 0.07 BAC: 0.08 - 0.29 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
LOST TM 
CASE & 0.00 < LOST TM CASE & 0.01 - 0.07 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.01 - 0.07 > MINOR INJ & 0.00 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.08 - 0.29 > MINOR INJ & 0.00 
LOST TM 
CASE & 0.00 < LOST TM CASE & 0.08 - 0.29 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.01 - 0.07 > MINOR INJ & 0.01 - 0.07 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.08 - 0.29 > 
MINOR INJ 
& 0.01 - 
0.07 
LOST TM 
CASE & 0.00 > MINOR INJ & 0.00 LOST TM CASE & 0.01 - 0.07 > MINOR INJ & 0.08 - 0.29 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.08 - 0.29 > 
MINOR INJ 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 
LOST TM 
CASE & 0.00 > MINOR INJ & 0.01 - 0.07 LOST TM CASE & 0.01 - 0.07 < PT or P DIS & 0.00 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.08 - 0.29 < PT or P DIS & 0.00 
LOST TM 
CASE & 0.00 > MINOR INJ & 0.08 - 0.29 LOST TM CASE & 0.01 - 0.07 < PT or P DIS & 0.01 - 0.07 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.08 - 0.29 < 
PT or P DIS 
& 0.01 - 
0.07 
LOST TM 
CASE & 0.00 < PT or P DIS & 0.00 LOST TM CASE & 0.01 - 0.07 < PT or P DIS & 0.08 - 0.29 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
0.08 - 0.29 < 
PT or P DIS 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 
LOST TM 
CASE & 0.00 < PT or P DIS & 0.01 - 0.07             
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LOST TM 
CASE & 0.00 < PT or P DIS & 0.08 - 0.29             
Inj: MINOR INJ 
BAC: 0.00 BAC: 0.01 - 0.07 BAC: 0.08 - 0.29 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
MINOR INJ 
& 0.00 < PT or P DIS & 0.00 MINOR INJ & 0.01 - 0.07 < PT or P DIS & 0.00 
MINOR INJ 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 < PT or P DIS & 0.00 
MINOR INJ 
& 0.00 < PT or P DIS & 0.01 - 0.07 MINOR INJ & 0.01 - 0.07 < PT or P DIS & 0.01 - 0.07 
MINOR INJ 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 < 
PT or P DIS 
& 0.01 - 
0.07 
MINOR INJ 
& 0.00 < PT or P DIS & 0.08 - 0.29 MINOR INJ & 0.01 - 0.07 < PT or P DIS & 0.08 - 0.29 
MINOR INJ 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 < 
PT or P DIS 
& 0.08 - 
0.29 
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Appendix K. Multiple Comparisons Output for the INJ*SEATB Interaction 
 
 
 
Inj: FATALITY 
Seatb: NO Seatb: YES Seatb: Z (2W) 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
FATALITY 
& NO > LOST TM CASE & NO FATALITY & YES > LOST TM CASE & NO FATALITY & 2W > LOST TM CASE & NO 
FATALITY 
& NO > LOST TM CASE & YES FATALITY & YES > 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
YES 
FATALITY 
& 2W > LOST TM CASE & YES 
FATALITY 
& NO > LOST TM CASE & 2W FATALITY & YES > LOST TM CASE & 2W FATALITY & 2W > LOST TM CASE & 2W 
FATALITY 
& NO > MINOR INJ & NO FATALITY & YES > MINOR INJ & NO FATALITY & 2W > MINOR INJ & NO 
FATALITY 
& NO > MINOR INJ & YES FATALITY & YES > MINOR INJ & YES FATALITY & 2W > MINOR INJ & YES 
FATALITY 
& NO > MINOR INJ & 2W FATALITY & YES > MINOR INJ & 2W FATALITY & 2W > MINOR INJ & 2W 
Inj: LOST TM CASE 
Seatb: NO Seatb: YES Seatb: Z (2W) 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
NO > 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
YES 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
YES < LOST TM CASE & 2W 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
2W > MINOR INJ & NO 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
NO < 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
2W 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
YES > MINOR INJ & NO 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
2W > MINOR INJ & YES 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
NO > MINOR INJ & NO 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
YES > MINOR INJ & YES 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
2W > MINOR INJ & 2W 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
NO > MINOR INJ & YES 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
YES > MINOR INJ & 2W 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
2W < PT or P DIS & NO 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
NO > MINOR INJ & 2W 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
YES < PT or P DIS & NO 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
2W < PT or P DIS & YES 
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LOST TM 
CASE & 
NO < PT or P DIS & NO 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
YES < PT or P DIS & YES 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
2W < PT or P DIS & 2W 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
NO < PT or P DIS & YES 
LOST TM 
CASE & 
YES < PT or P DIS & 2W       
LOST TM 
CASE & 
NO < PT or P DIS & 2W             
Inj: MINOR INJ 
Seatb: NO Seatb: YES Seatb: Z (2W) 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST 
DAYS' MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE OF LOST DAYS' 
MEAN 
MINOR 
INJ & NO < PT or P DIS & NO MINOR INJ & YES < PT or P DIS & NO MINOR INJ & 2W < PT or P DIS & NO 
MINOR 
INJ & NO < PT or P DIS & YES MINOR INJ & YES < PT or P DIS & YES MINOR INJ & 2W < PT or P DIS & YES 
MINOR 
INJ & NO < PT or P DIS & 2W MINOR INJ & YES < PT or P DIS & 2W MINOR INJ & 2W < PT or P DIS & 2W 
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